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                                                   Abstract
This study analyses the formulation of Turkish foreign policy in the period 1944 to 1952 and
considers the making of Turkey’s Western Alliance in this context. The thesis aims at indicating that
Turkey’s resolute quest for a Western alliance in the aftermath of WW II was a natural end-result of
the experiences inherited from wartime diplomacy. While Turkey’s sensitivity against the bloc
strategy of world powers was continuing, it was evaluated by the makers of Turkish foreign policy
that aggression could emerge from the totalitarian regimes which combined their forces or by one of
them. Previously, the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939 had demonstrated that the danger could emerge as a
collective movement. Shortly afterwards, it was understood that the split in this bloc had not
removed the threat either. In this framework of analysis, the thesis discusses that forced by the
conditions of an unpredictable international environment, Turkey constantly sought the ways to
enhance its security; an effort which eventually paved the way to the formation of an alliance with
the West.
In order to deepen the discussion in this context, the thesis makes a comparative study of
Turkish foreign policy of the period in concern as well. Thus, attitudes of consecutive governments
as mainly divided between those run under the Presidency of İsmet İnönü and the Democrat Party
era after May 14, 1950 elections towards the course of international events are explored. On this
premise, a contention is advanced that the making of Turkey’s Western Alliance and its adherence to
NATO was the end-product of a variety of incidents and policies which operated towards this effect.
Turkey’s participation in the plannings for a Middle Eastern Defence Organization (MEDO) and its
decision to assign a combat force of a brigade size in the UN Command in Korea are evaluated as
the main events of this process.
In 1946, facing the Soviet assertiveness in global affairs, it was increasingly felt by the makers of
Turkish foreign policy that maintaining an alliance with Britain and the USA was of utmost priority.
At this juncture, Britain was pursuing a regular withdrawal policy from its global status which
hampered London to develop a strategic partnership with Ankara. In its turn, Washington was not in
favour of extending its commitments and had the opinion that as far as the coordination of security
plannings were concerned Turkey was in Britain’s area of responsibility. It was the Truman Doctrine
that marked a complete change in the US perception of Turkey and Greece. The thesis aims to shed
light on a set of matters, the futile efforts around the MEDO and the concurrent hot conflict over
Korea being the most significant ones. The period subsequent to the elections of May 1950 after
which the Democrat Party administration  decided to push Turkey to its limits  - through hasty
attempts at times - where the reflexes of benovelent neutrality towards the Allied side inherited from
WW II left its place to an active search for security and partnership with the West is examined as the
last phase in this process. In this framework, the thesis also aims to elaborate that the continuation of
politics by war, and the continuation of war by politics continued throughout 1950 and 1952 which
finally paved the way to the first enlargement of Western Alliance within the framework of NATO
by the inclusion of Turkey and Greece.
Key words: Turkey, West, Alliance, 1944, 1952.
v         Özet
Bu çalışma 1944 ve 1952 yılları arasında Türk dış politikasının oluşturulmasını ve bu kapsamda
Türkiye’nin Batı İttifakının kurulmasını analiz eder. Tez, 2. Dünya Savaşının ardından Türkiye’nin bir
Batı ittifakını kararlılıkla arayışının, savaş dönemi diplomasisinden devralınan deneyimlerinin bir
sonucu olduğunu ortaya koymayı amaçlar. Türkiye’nin Dünya güçlerinin izlediği bloklaşma
stratejisine karşı hassasiyeti devam ederken, Türk dış politikasının hazırlayıcılarınca, saldırganlığın
güçlerini birleştiren totaliter rejimlerin tarafından veya bunlardan birinden doğacağı tahmin
ediliyordu. Daha önce, 1939 yılında Nazi-Sovyet Paktı tehlikenin birleşik bir hareket olarak ortaya
çıkabileceğini göstermişti. Kısa zamanda, bu bloktaki ayrışmanın da tehlikeyi ortadan kaldırmadığı
anlaşılmıştı. Bu analiz çerçevesinde tez, öngörülerde bulunmanın güç olduğu bir uluslararası ortamda
Türkiye’nin süreklilik arzeder şekilde, sonuçta Batı ile bir ittifak oluşturmasına giden güvenliğini
pekiştirme yollarını aramasını tartışmaktadır.
Bu kapsamda tartışmanın derinleştirilmesi amacıyla, tezde, Türk dış politikasının araştırmaya
konu dönem içinde karşılaştırmalı bir incelemesi de yapılmaktadır. Bu itibarla, esas olarak İsmet
İnönü’nün Cumhurbaşkanlığı ve 14 Mayıs 1950 seçimlerinden sonraki Demokrat Parti dönemindeki
hükümetlerin uluslararası gelişmelere yönelik tutumları araştırılmaktadır. Bu zeminde, Türkiye’nin
Batı İttifakının kurulmasının ve NATO’ya  girişinin, bu yönde gelişen bir dizi olayın ve politikanın
sonuç-ürünü olduğu düşüncesi ortaya konmaktadır. Türkiye’nin bir Orta Doğu Savunma
Organizasyonu’na ilişkin planlamalara katılması ve Kore BM Komutanlığı’nda tugay ölçeğinde bir
muharebe gücü görevlendirmesi sözkonusu sürecin ana olayları olarak ele alınmaktadır.
1946 yılına gelindiğinde, Sovyetlerin uluslararası ilişkilerde etkinliğini artırma çabaları karşısında,
Türk dış politikasının hazırlayıcıları, İngiltere ve ABD ile bir ittifak sürdürmenin ilk önceliği taşıdığını
artan bir biçimde hissediyorlardı. Bu aşamada, Londra, Ankara ile stratejik bir bir ortaklık
geliştirmesini engelleyen, küresel konumundan düzenli geri çekilme politikası izlemekteydi. Vaşington
ise, taahhütlerini genişletme yanlısı olmayıp, güvenlik planlamalarının eşgüdümü sözkonusu olduğu
sürece, Türkiye’nin İngiltere’nin sorumluluğunda olduğu görüşündeydi. ABD’nin Türkiye ve
Yunanistan’a yönelik algılamalarında bütüncül bir değişiklik Truman Doktrini ile oldu. Bu hususlar ile
birlikte, tez, en önemlileri Orta Doğu Savunma Organizasyonu etrafındaki sonuçsuz çabalar ve
bununla eş zamanlı olarak Kore’deki sıcak savaş konusundakiler olmak üzere bir dizi  konuya ışık
tutmayı amaçlamaktadır. Demokrat Parti idaresinin Türkiye’yi - kimi zaman da aceleci girişimlerle - 2.
Dünya Savaşı’ndan devralınan, müttefikler yanında faydacı tarafsızlık politikasını, aktif bir güvenlik ve
Batı ile ortaklık arayışı ile değiştirdiği limitlere itme kararını aldığı Mayıs 1950 seçimlerinden sonraki
dönem bu sürecin son aşaması olarak incelenmektedir. Bu çerçevede, tez, 1950 ve 1952 yılları
boyunca siyasetin savaşı ve savaşın da siyaseti izlemesinin, sonunda, Türkiye ve Yunanistan’ın dahil
olmasıyla Batı İttifakının NATO çerçevesinde ilk genişlemesine giden yolun açıldığını ortaya koymayı
da amaçlamaktadır.
Anahtar kelimeler: Türkiye, Batı, İttifak, 1944, 1952.
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I INTRODUCTION
I . 1 Argument of the Study
In conventional world political systems, stability was always expected to result from
strategic and political engineering by the concerted actions of great powers within the
workings of a balance of power system. The divergent attitudes among the victors regarding
the post-war order at the end of World War II, however, paved the way to a state of extreme
tension between the United States and the Soviet Union - two major allies of the war - which
admittedly dominated global politics for the next 44 years, until the fall of the Berlin Wall.
The outbreak of the Cold War and spinning events within, compelled the West in general,
and the United States in particular to implement a fresh policy to consolidate the western
camp against threats generated by Soviet aspirations for power. These measures were to
involve different parts of the world, since the Kremlin might envelope additional areas in
Europe and elsewhere. Indeed, before the end of the war, the West had decided that the
Soviets were playing a double game. The prospect of Soviet aggrandizement in Asia Minor
and the Middle East posed a major threat in this regard.
As for Turkey, a country that followed a policy of benovelent neutrality towards the
Allied side while remaining non-belligerent in the global conflict, the need for a reassessment
of its security concerns with regard to changes in the balance of power on the European
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theatre was emerging, soon to become an utmost priority. Though Turkey had remained
outside the alliance schemes in the course of the war, and the struggle had not spread to its
land, changing times and conditions would make it almost impossible for the Turkish
policymakers to remain outside emerging trends in international relations.
With the rapid growth of mutual suspicion and acrimony, exemplified first by the Soviet’s
imposition of full blockade on Berlin in June 1948, the Cold War was given a start. The Cold
War, can be defined as the state of extreme tension between the superpowers "stopping short
of all-out war but characterised by mutual hostility and involvement in covert warfare and
war by proxy as a means of upholding the interests of one against the other." 1 Apparently,
the resulting tensions ensured that both sides maintained a continuous state of readiness for
war. As Robin Brown stated, the superpowers appeared to be locked in a relationship of
tension and danger from which there seemed no escape. 2
As Kenneth W. Thomson stated, Stalin's military strategy from the early 1940s was
geared to his post-war ambitions. Despite the dramatic incidents in the summer of 1941,
when the SU was attacked by Germany, Stalin never lost sight of political objectives. Indeed,
the Soviet plans to grasp control of Eastern Europe was as evident in the negotiations
between Molotov and Ribbentrop held in Berlin in 1939, as in Stalin's talks with Roosevelt
and Churchill in 1945 in Teheran and  Yalta. 3
                    
1Michael L. Dockrill, The Cold War 1945-1963, (NJ: Humanities Press, 1988),   p 1.
2 Robin Brown, “Towards A New Synthesis of International Relations”, in From Cold War To Collapse
Theory and World Politics in the 1980s, Ed. by, Mike Bowker and Robin Brown, (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 1.
3 Kenneth W. Thomson, Cold War Theories Vol. I: World Polarization 1943-1953, (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1981) , p. 28.
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At this stage, Turkey found itself compelled to immediately figure out the ways in which
it could incorporate its efforts with those of the West to assure an inviolable security. The
division of blocs were rising and the fate of “Soviet liberated” nations of Europe were
alarmingly falling into the hands of their liberators. No doubt, this amazing dynamism of the
Soviets in the post-war months were gaining strength to openly pronounce further desires on
Turkish possessions: the Straits issue; and the demand of return of some Turkish eastern
provisions to the SU being the most cited ones. In their turn, with their war shattered
economies and crippled resources, the Western democracies were unwilling to pay immediate
attention to Turkey’s efforts to draw attention to growing Soviet ambitions.
Given these premises, it is the contention of this study that:
1. Turkey’s resolute quest for a Western alliance in the aftermath of WW II was a natural
end-result of the experiences inherited from wartime diplomacy. While Turkey’s sensitivity
against the bloc strategy of world powers was continuing, it was evaluated by the makers of
Turkish foreign policy that aggression could emerge from the totalitarian regimes which
combined their forces or by one of them. Previously, the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939 had
demonstrated that the danger could emerge as a collective movement. Shortly afterwards, it
was understood that the split in this bloc had not removed the threat either. In this context, it
is aimed to indicate that, forced by the conditions of an unpredictable international
environment, Turkey constantly sought the ways to enhance its security.
2. Another objective of the thesis is to indicate that in a world moving onwards a bipolar
cold or hot conflict, two epic events in totally different parts of the globe played significant
roles in the making of Turkey’s Western alliance: the decision to create MEDO, and the
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Korean War. On this premise, a contention is advanced that making of Turkey’s Western
alliance was the end-product of a variety of incidents and policies which operated towards
this effect. Turkey’s participation in the plannings for a Middle Eastern Defence
Organization (MEDO) and its decision to assign a combat force of a brigade size in the UN
Command in Korea are evaluated as the main events of this process.
In an attempt to deepen the discussion in this context, the thesis makes a comparative
study of Turkish foreign policy of the period in concern. Thus, attitudes of consecutive
governments as mainly divided between those run under the Presidency of İsmet İnönü and
the Democrat Party era after May 14, 1950 elections towards the course of international
events are explored. 4
I . 2 A Précis of the Chapters
The second part of this work analyzes the Allied and Axis relations with Turkey and the
making of Turkish foreign policy in this period. In this context, it is explained that while
                    
4 The “Comparative Study of Foreign Policy” (CFP) methodology includes two central features: a
commitment to foreign policy phenomena as the object of inquiry and a commitment to the comparative
method. The study of foreign policy as the central core culminates in a perception that foreign policy
had to be considered not only as a concept but as a set of variables that could assume different
discernible values in covariation with other variables. The most pervasive orientation envisioned foreign
policy as a dependent variable, the patterns of which are to be comprehended by investigating various
explanatory sources.
   It has been widely accepted that the comparative method placed in CFP may embrace different forms
of interpretation. Some have stated that it envisages a commitment to multi-national comparisons, while
the others have stressed that the CFP also includes comparisons of a system through time as well as
comparisons across units. Charles F. Hermann and Gregory Peacock, “The Evolution and Future of
Theoretical Research in the Comparative Study of Foreign Policy”, in Charles F. Hermann(ed.), New
Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy, (London: Allen&Unwin, 1987), pp. 13-32.
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Turkey’s sensitivity against the bloc strategy of world powers was increasing, the Nazi-
Soviet pact of 1939 demonstrated that the danger could emerge as a collective movement.
Subsequently, it is asserted that the split in this bloc had not removed the threat and in an
unpredictable international environment, Turkey constantly sought the ways to enhance its
security; an effort which eventually paved the way to building a sui-generis crisis
management/prevention system of its own. As stated in this chapter, this was a complex
system which could not be explained in terms of neutrality or an evasive foreign policy.
Here, it will also be argued that, from the early 1940s on, the Soviet military strategy was
geared towards post-war goals. Despite the dramatic incidents in the summer of 1941, when
the SU was attacked by Germany, Stalin never lost sight of political objectives. The
consistent Russian purpose was revealed when Stalin offered the British a straight sphere of
influence deal at the end of 1941. He suggested that Britain should recognize the Soviet
absorption of the Baltic states, part of Finland, eastern Poland and Besserabia in return for
Russia’s support for any special British need for bases or security arrangements in Western
Europe.
In this framework of analysis, the very beginning of the period of “polarization” was
considered as having its roots in the diverging attitudes of the former Allies. Indeed, the
Soviet plans to grasp control of Eastern Europe was as evident in the negotiations between
Molotov and Ribbentrop held in Berlin in 1939, as in Stalin’s talks with Roosevelt and
Churchill in 1945 in Teheran and Yalta. From then on, Anglo-Americans faced a situation
that the war should be fought for the dual purpose of defeating Germany and forestalling the
emergence of the SU as a mighty power in the center of Europe.
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On the part of Turkish-Allied States negotiations, the events of 1943, the talks between
the Turkish President İnönü and Churchill in Adana on January, 30-31, 1943; the Cairo
Talks between the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Numan Menemencioğlu, and the
British Foreign Minister, Anthony Eden, on November, 4-6, 1943; and the Cairo Conference
of December, 5-8, 1943 between İnönü, Churchill and Roosevelt, are also discussed in the
context of providing the background in which Turkey chose to continue talks with the Allied
powers while adopting a benovelent neutrality in the course of events. This chapter finally
examines the Turkish-Soviet talks between 1944 and 1946 which culminated in Ankara’s
decision that the situation could not be improved with Moscow.
The third part tries to elaborate that surfacing problems with peace were coupled with
consolidating rival blocs both on the part of the Soviets and the West between the years 1946
to 1948. Here, it is analyzed that by the turn of 1946, facing the growing ambitions of the
Kremlin in different parts of the continent, Ankara was more apprehensive then ever about
the consequences of Soviet moves. In this period, Turkey accelarated its efforts to bring its
foreign policy nearer to that of the USA and tried to enhance its relations with the democratic
camp in Europe. In this context, this chapter  discusses the visit of USS Missouri at the
Turkish Straits and the ambivalance of Washington about its policy towards Ankara. Here,
the Turkish-Soviet exchange of Notes in 1946 is examined as well.
The fourth part concentrates on the USA’s inclusion of Turkey in its foreign assistance
programs, the Truman Doctrine being the most cited one. Within the context of discussing
the developing crisis in international affairs, the circumstances under which the Truman
Doctrine was launched and Ankara’s efforts to side with the European democracies are
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analyzed. It is extensively discussed that Ankara’s inclusion in the US aid program was
subjected to considerable difficulties and truly, the US aid was not automatically offered at
all, in contrast it was first requested by Ankara. In this chapter, weaknesses in Ankara’s
position of negotiation which opened up a period of bilateral agreements - some of which
were of a secret nature - with the USA were brought under scope as well.
The fifth part discusses the Turkish role in regional defence and the creation of the
MEDO between 1948 to 1950. This chapter begins with discussing the increasing tensions of
the Cold War in Europe which resulted in the signing of the Brussels Pact on March, 17,
1948 by Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg to face the emerging
threat. It is then explained that however, the coup in Czechoslavakia and Stalin’s rigidity in
Eastern Europe showed this would not be enough. The full scale blockade of Berlin by the
Soviets in the summer of 1948 fostered this line of thinking. There was also a counter-
blockade in the Russian zone by the west that made Stalin agree for a mutual lift in January
1949. Clearly, the success of airlift in breaking the blockade increased western unity and
confidence. However, the division over Germany through the establishment of the German
Democratic Republic re-alarmed the West. Facing the undelightful course of events in
Europe, Truman immediately recommended support for the Brussels Pact, and on June, 11,
the Senate adopted the Vandenberg Resolution, pledging the USA to associate itself with
regional and other collective arrangements of this kind. The direction of negotiations for a
new and expanded pact was undertaken by Secretary George C. Marshall, and then
completed by the new Secretary of State Dean Acheson.
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Negotiations between the USA and Canada then followed on the creation of a single
North Atlantic Alliance based on security guarantees and mutual commitments between
Europe and North America. Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway and Portugal were invited to
take part in this process. These negotiations culminated in the signature of the Treaty of
Washington in April 1949. It was confirmed by the US Senate on July, 21, 1949 by a vote of
82 to 13. Although the degree to which the members were bound to take action was unclear,
the US adherence to the treaty marked the end of its non-entanglement policy.
Turkey’s plea of combining its defence with the rest of Europe received poor support.
Ankara’s exclusion from the alliance as a founding member in NATO is discussed in this
framework. Considerable evidence supports that Turkish non-involvement in  WW II was
among the most crucial reasons behind this interlude in relations with the West. As will also
be discussed, the Turkish policymakers were facing the dilemma of enhancing the security of
their vast land on the cross-roads between east and west, and getting involved in the active
defense schemes being launched by both London and Washington, which might either ensure
deterrence or provoke further aggresion.
 For Washington, it was essential to determine whether the inclusion of Turkey in NATO
would provoke or deter the Soviets. As will be further explained, no doubt, question marks
were more than one: would the advantages that would accrue be offset by the administrative
burdens that would be imposed on NATO’s half-completed organizational structure ? Would
Turkey be reassured by the additional guarantees or frustrated by the statements that NATO
lacked the capabilities to offer much concrete assistance should a hot war erupt in the near
future ?
xx
Consecutively, it is explained that to the disappointment of the Turkish Government, the
US Joint Chiefs of Staff expressed similar reservations on the untimely admission of Turkey
(and Greece) into NATO since this would hamper their commitments in western Europe. The
decision was to offer Turkey an Greece an associate status and when western capabilities
grew, it would be desirable to include Turkey and Greece in NATO. There were no explicit
promises, however. In this period of uncertainty, Washington hoped to placate Turkey and
sustain the strategic advantages of cooperation.
As subsequently discussed, in May 1950, Foreign Office Under Secretary, Michael
Wright, raised the possibility of establishing a Middle East defense pact, perhaps linked to
NATO. The US policy makers reacted unenthusiastically and skeptically, refusing to extend
American obligations under NATO to the Middle East. However, shortly after, domestic
political factors forced Washington to commit itself to the maintenance of stability in the
region. Arms supply to the Middle East had been a political and diplomatic issue since the
UN embargo ended. To entice Egypt to participate in a joint defense pact that would settle
the base dispute, Britain resumed shipments of arms to Egypt and other Arab countries in late
1949. Israel simultaneously asked permission to purchase American military equipment, but
Pentagon rejected it, because Israel refused to explain how the equipment would be used. The
arms deliveries began to destabilize the entire Middle East by encouraging the Egyptian
nationalists and increasing Israeli uneasiness. At this juncture, a joint American-British-
French declaration was designed to prevent a Middle East arms race and intraregional
aggression. In due course, American and British officials worked out the wording of a
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tripartite declaration, and the USA, Britain and France announced the declaration
concurrently on May, 25 1950.
Meanwhile, Washington’s concerns were heightened by reports that increasing mobility
was taking place on the part of North Korea. The outbreak of war in Korea on June, 25,
1950 prompted the belief in Washington that North Korean troops marched to the Kremlin’s
cadence and encouraged fears that the Soviets would initiate aggression in other regions.
Officials in the State Department began to apply the lessons of Korea to the Middle East.
Evidently, Korea was another area of conflict to which Turkey would pay particular
attention to consolidate its position within the western camp. In this framework, the sixth
part discusses another concurrent struggle on the part of Korea.
Following the surrender of the Japanese forces in Seoul, the Korean lands were divided in
two. In fact, almost two years ago, at Cairo in December 1943, the USA, Britain, and China
had joined in declaring that in due course Korea should become free and independent. This
multilateral pledge was reaffirmed in the Potsdam Declaration of July 1945, and subscribed
to by the SU when it entered the war against Japan - following the dropping of A-Bombs - by
the USA. In Moscow in December of 1945, the Foreign Ministers of the USA, Britain and
the SU concluded an agreement designed to bring about the independence of Korea. This
agreement was later adhered to by China. It provided for the establishment of a joint US-
Soviet Commission to meet in Korea and, through consultations with Korean democratic
parties and social organizations, to decide on methods for establishing a provisional Korean
government. The Joint Commission was then to consult with that provisional government on
methods of giving assistance to Korea, any agreement reached would be submitted for
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approval to the four powers adhering to the Moscow Agreement. Two years later, the
independence of Korea was no further advanced. In the end Korea remained divided.
The demarcation line of the 38th parallel had no basis in Korean history, geography or
anything else. It had been settled on hastily in the last week of WW II, as a temporary
measure to facilitate the surrender of Japanese troops, and those north of the line had
surrendered to the Soviets, those in the south, to US forces.  Consecutively, the USA
continued to support that the best interests of the Korean people would be served by the
withdrawal of all occupying forces from Korea at the earliest practicable date. This same
view was also embodied in the UN General Assembly resolution of November 14, 1947, in
which provision was made for such withdrawal as soon as practicable after the establishment
of the Korean Government which it was the intention of that resolution to bring into being.
The SU, in turn, remained reluctant to cooperate in carrying out the provisions of the
resolution of November 14.
Throughout 1949, the North Korean leadership continued its efforts to receive aid to
incorporate the south. Receiving the North Korean leader, Kim Il Sung in the Kremlin on
March 5, 1949, Stalin showed obvious concern about the plea of his interlocutor. In the
beginning Stalin considered that it would be wise to wait for the maturation of the alleged
attacks from the south. In answering Kim, he stated that only if the adversary attacked
P’yongyang could they try military reunification by launching a counter-attack.
In the subsequent months, P’yongyang continued to try to persuade the Kremlin that the
Northern armed forces were superior to the southern army after the withdrawal of American
troops. When, finally, Stalin ordered a new appraisal of the situation in Korea, sending on
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September 11, 1949, instructions to the Soviet embassy in P’yongyang to study the military,
political, and international aspects of a possible attack on the South, the scene was set for war
in Korea.
From the recognition of the Korean Government to the involvement in war over Korea,
Turkey’s attitude around the developments over this far eastern country gradually moved
onwards combining its policy with that of the USA. The UN Security Council’s call of June
27, 1950, upon the members of UN for taking a stand against aggression in Korea received a
positive response from the Turkish Government as well.  The Turkish Government informed
the UN Secretary General that a brigade of 4.500 soldiers would be assigned to UN
command. No doubt, this policy demarche later became subject of debate in Turkey,
paradoxically creating a favourable climate for a renewed application for membership in
NATO as well.
Ankara’s renewal of its application for membership in NATO in August 1951, following
the Menderes Government’s decision of contributing troops to the UN Command in Korea
was declined by the Council of North Atlantic Treaty (NAT) on the grounds of its smaller
members’ unwillingness to make commitments for the defense of Turkey.
It is explained that in view of the stalemate in Korea and the course of events in the
Middle East, the US policymakers maintained their suspicion that Turkey could reappraise its
attitude in the Cold War. Turkey was contributing troops to the struggle in Korea and
participating in the defense of freedom and containment of communist totalitarianism in the
Middle East. When Ambassador George McGhee visited Turkey in February 1951, President
Celal Bayar stated his personal displeasure with the existing partnership. Why should they
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assent to the desires of the US Navy to mine the Straits in peacetime and why should they
make commitments to allow US forces to use their airbases in war time if they lacked a
guarantee of defense cooperation in return ? Why should they accept to be left in a vulnerable
position ?
A practicable solution was apparently reached soon after the new British Foreign
Secretary Herbert Morrison’s public announcement of UK’s support for the admittance of
Turkey and Greece to NATO. Subsequently, the idea of creating a common Middle Eastern
Defense Board including the USA, UK, France and Turkey was welcomed. Consequently,
the Middle Eastern Defence Organization (MEDO) and the Middle Eastern Command (MEC)
were established. On October 13, 1951, the Four-Power proposals to incorporate Egypt into
the MEC was forwarded. But the turning point came about when the Egyptian Prime
Minister, Nahas Pasha, rejected the suggestions for Egypt’s agreement with Four-Power
statements. To some extent, Egypt’s policy towards the west and Israel would become the
model to be emulated by all other Arab states.
From then on, the conditions of the Cold War soon dictated its own requirements in
Turkish-NATO relations. Here, it is explained that through its participation in the Korean
War and in the military/diplomatic efforts aiming at establishing a defensive grouping in the
Middle East, Ankara had demonstrated that it had all the assets to assume its responsibilities
within NATO. It is finally expressed that, backed by the US evaluation that Turkey’s
geostrategic position was of tremendous value for the alliance, the difficulties caused by the
resistance of the European members of NATO were removed.
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II THE MAKING OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY: (1941-1945)
Admittedly, many of the underlying motives of the post-war Turkish foreign policy were
inherited from the years of the world war. Throughout the war, Ankara remained outside of
the conflict, but the Turkish foreign policy makers always perceived a threat of being
dragged into it. In the war years, Ankara’s threat perceptions were almost equally associated
with Berlin and the Kremlin. Besides, the period between the Nazi-Soviet pact of August
1939 and Berlin’s declaration of war on Russia on June 22, 1941 dramatically increased
Ankara’s suspicions of these totalitarian regimes. Hitler’s onslaught on Russia could merely
introduce a limited change in these assessments. In the eyes of the Turkish statesmen, either
allied with Germany or on its own, Moscow was not reliable at all, and was considered as
another potential enemy at times.
Indeed, Ankara was at odds between the Nazi-Soviet aggression and the British insistence
on Turkish belligerency in accordance with its undertakings as set forth in the October 19,
1939 Anglo-Franco-Turkish Mutual Assistance Treaty as well. In an international arena
which was dominated by the relentless attacks of the aggressors which took over Turkey’s
neighbours and allies within the Balkan Entente one by one, eventually, Ankara chose to
continue its policy of benovelent neutrality towards the Allied side. This being the case,
Turkish foreign policy makers’ decision to build a strategy to deal with the aggressive
totalitarian regimes while maintaining an alliance with the democratic regimes of the West
had its roots in these years.  Undoubtedly, experiences of the war helped them to quickly
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adapt in the post war era which was dominated by Soviet expansionism. Thus, the German
and Nazi-Soviet position vis a vis Turkey and their economic and political pressure, and
finally, Ankara’s emergence as an important political center in which Allied and Axis
diplomacy tried to counterbalance each other will be an appropriate starting point.
II . 1 The Question of Turkish Belligerency Reviewed
By the time war broke out in Europe, Turkey was unprepared to resist any large scale
aggression. The economy of the early republic was in a state of serious underdevelopment. A
considerable foreign debt hindered capital development so essential for an ailing economy.
The country was predominantly agrarian and underpopulated. 5 As for foreign relations, the
Kemalist tradition had laid the foundations of a policy in which affiliation with alliances of
unclear objectives or similar grouping of states were regarded as a threat to the regime’s
security. In accordance with this policy, all revisionist attempts and conspiratory endeavours
with unrevealed goals were considered as having a negative impact on the international states
system.
Immediately after coming to power on January 25, 1939, the government of Dr. Refik
Saydam announced the peaceful orientation of  Turkish foreign policy as formulated in the
                    
5 As late as 1932, the largest portion of the budeget (146,210,355 Turkish Liras) was allocated to the
repayment of the public debt while only 86,007,582 Liras were expanded on defence, finance and
other public services. As for the population, it was under 14 million according to the 1927 census,
with only 16.4 percent living in urbanized areas. Feroz Ahmad, The Making of Modern Turkey,
(London: Routledge, 1993), pp. 94-95.
  A census taken on October 21, 1940 gave the population of the Republic as 17,869,901, an increase
on the last (1935) census of 1,771,883 or 18 per 1,000 per annum. Keesing’s Contemporary
Archives, Vol. No. IV, 1940-1943, p. 4369.
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Government’s program. He stated that the spinning developments with changes in every
moment in world affairs  required Turkey’s foreign policy to remain more alert than usual.
The contemporary world crisis, bringing the nations against each other, culminating in the
removal of states within a few days, was naturally of close interest to the Republican
Government. But, he said, all these changes, being next to quick and fundamental
developments, did not indicate an alteration in Turkey’s foreign policy.6
Meanwhile, disturbance of the Turkish officials about the change and unpredictabilities of
the SU were obvious. On October, 19, 1939, when Turkey concluded the Treaty of Mutual
Assistance with Britain and France and entered into an alliance with Western democracies,
the Soviets had expressed satisfaction with this development. However, this was merely an
uncelebrated gesture. The Nazi-Soviet Pact - which was soon to be unrevealed - was secretly
concluded on August 24 and the visit of Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Şükrü
Saracoğlu, in the following month, had served as a catalyst for Turkey to immediately enter
into a formal alliance with Britain and France. In Moscow, Vyacheslav M. Molotov, the
Soviet Foreign Commissar, had repeatedly put forward the Straits issue and also demanded
that Turkey should commit itself not to make war on Germany on behalf of the Western
powers.
In November 1940, Molotov’s talks in Berlin once more spurred Turkish anxieties of
further Germano-Russian agreement. In Berlin, the German Foreign Minister, Joachim von
                    
6 From Prime Minister Refik Saydam’s speech in TGNA on his government’s programme, April, 3,
1939. The MFA Archives. Interestingly, Saydam’s speech included a strong commitment to the
effective and timely function of the TGNA, in case necessity arose, in a period of quick changes in
the international arena: “With a view towards the general interest of peace and Turkish high interest,
we will subject new conditions to a constant examination and alert status and exercise the necessary
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Ribbentrop, proposed to Molotov a plan for extending the three-power pact to include the
SU, accompanying it with two secret protocols inspired by those of 1939, and including a
revision of spheres of influence on certain bases which envisaged Moscow’s control of the
region south from Russia towards the Indian Ocean; splitting of Turkey from the western
system and modification of the Montreux Convention with a view to assuring only the Black
Sea states of unrestricted passage through the Straits and a permanent base for the SU in the
Straits. 7
On November 26, Molotov told the German Ambassador, Schulenburg, that his
government accepted Ribbentrop’s proposals under the following conditions; the immediate
withdrawal of German troops from Finland; the conclusion of Soviet-Bulgarian treaty of
mutual assistance; granting of land and naval bases on the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles to
the SU; recognition of the zone south of Baku and Batum toward the Persian Gulf, as a center
of Soviet aspirations; and Japan’s renunciation of its rights to coal and oil concessions in
northern Sakalin. As Andre Fontaine put it, “four years later Stalin presented virtually the
same demands to the Western Allies. What interested him was the stakes themselves; it
                                                               
care with attention to the Great National Assembly to exert its control and right decision timely and
fully.”
7  Hitler disclosed these designs after his invasion of the SU. On this see, Documents from the
Archives of the German Foreign Office, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941, (Washington: US
Department of State, 1948), pp. 217-259.
    Ribbentrop’s proposal on the revision of spheres of influence were on the following bases as well:
   Germany: European territorial changes to be postponed until after the conclusion of a peace treaty;
Central Africa.
    Italy: Same reservation, North and Northeast Africa.
    Japan: The Far East south of the Japanese archipelago.
  See, Andre Fontaine, History of the Cold War, (NY: Vintage Books, 1970), pp. 146-147.
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mattered little to him from what source the promise came so long as the source could
deliver.” 8
A month later, at 3.00 a.m. in the morning of October 28, the Italian Minister in Athens
Grazzi, handed to General Metaxas, the Greek Prime Minister, an ultimatum in which
Greece was accused of tolerating the use of its territorial waters and ports by the British
Navy for the prosecution of the war against Italy. Metaxas rejected the ultimatum and told
Grazzi that he regarded it as an Italian declaration of war against Greece. At 5.50 a.m., half
an hour before the ultimatum was due to expire, Italian troops operating from Albania
attacked Greek territory. The British War Cabinet met early the same morning and replied
vigorously. The plans alreday made for extending Greece all help in Britain’s power under
the guarantee given on April 13, 1939 were reviewed and W. Churchill sent a message to
Metaxas. The day after, First Lord of the Admiralty A.V. Alexander declared that British
naval help for Greece had already begun. 9
On the Turkish side, Prime Minister Saydam, broadcasting to the nation, said that the
situation was becoming graver. He stressed that Turkey was sure of its power and the nation
would not hesitate to defend itself. Meanwhile, the British Ambassador, H. Knatchbull-
Hugessen, and the Greek Ambassador saw the Minister of Foreign Affairs Saracoğlu, on
October 28. The Italian attack on Greece they said, had called into operation Article 2 (1) of
the Anglo-Franco-Turkish Mutual Assistance Treaty of October 19, 1939, which provided
for Turkey’s collaboration effectively and lending the UK and France all aid and assistance in
                    
8  Ibid., p. 147.
9 Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, Vol. No. IV, p. 4312.
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its power “in the event of an act of aggression by a European Power leading to war in the
Mediterranean area in which France and the United Kingdom are involved.” 10
However, Saracoğlu responded with the “Protocol Number Two” which was annexed to
the Anglo-Franco-Turkish Treaty. He stated that Turkey’s belligerency might cause it to
become involved in war with the Soviets. Based on this reason, he explained, Turkey would
retain its neutrality. In fact, facing an unpredictable neighbour like the Soviet Union, Turkey
had demanded the inclusion of the “Protocol Number Two” according to which “the
obligations undertaken by Turkey...can not compel the country to take action having, as its
consequence, entry into armed conflict with the U.S.S.R.” 11 with a view to obtaining a
general reservation clause to save itself from being dragged into the global conflict.
To justify Ankara’s concerns, on January 17, 1941, having regarded the occupation of
these countries by German troops, who were constantly being concentrated in Rumania, as a
threat to Russian security, the Soviet Foreign Commissar told the German ambassador that
his government considered the Bulgarian territory and the Straits as the security zone of the
SU. Berlin paid no attention to this stament. At the end of February, King Boris of Bulgaria
                    
10 Ibid.; For the text of this treaty, see, appendix in, Selim Deringil, Turkish Foreign Policy During
the Second World War, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
11 Ibid. In the meantime, Turkey’s commercial relations with Britain were increasingly continuing.
On December 5, 1940, a new financial and trade agreement was announced between the two
countries, whereby in exchange for British munitions, rolling stock, textile goods and other
Government requirements, Turkey would send agricultural and primary products. Besides, The UK
Commercial Corporation, the British Government’s agent, had already arranged under the agreement
a contract for 22 locomotives and 650 waggons. Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, Vol. No. IV, p.
4380.
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joined the three-power pact and agreed to the German occupation of his country. 12 Under
these circumstances, during 1940-41, the issue of the Straits was more than once the subject
of negotiations between the Nazi and Soviet leaders.
In fact, Bulgaria’s ambiguous position between Germany and the SU had already turned
the Turco-Bulgarian Treaty of Friendship dated February 17, 1941, for which Ankara had
felt limited trust, to an ineffective document. The Soviet Foreign Commissar was insisting
that the German troops should not enter Bulgaria and this country should be left in the
Kremlin’s sphere of influence. However, under the pressure of Berlin, Sofia agreed that the
German forces would use the Bulgarian territory for transit passage. Facing the
unpredictability of Berlin, this time the Kremlin turned to Ankara and suggested the signing
of a communiqué along the lines of 1925 non-aggression treaty between the two countries. In
their turn, President İnönü and the makers of Turkish foreign policy saw no reason to decline
the Russian proposal and the Communiqué was announced in Ankara and in Moscow
simultaneously on March 24.  13
In the meantime, Saracoğlu met with the British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden. Eden
and the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Sir John Dill, had arrived at Ankara on February
26, after their visit to the Near Eastern fronts for conferences with their counterparts. Prior
to the departure of Eden and Dill from Ankara for Athens on March 1, an official
                    
12 Upon this incident, Molotov handed the German ambassador a memorandum “deploring” the
German move and warning Berlin that it could not count on the Kremlin’s support on this issue.
Andre Fontaine, History of the Cold War, pp. 147-148.
13 Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, İkinci Adam, Vol. II, 1938-1950, (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 7th ed.,
1999), pp. 179-180; Kamuran Gürün, Türk Sovyet İlişkileri (1920-1953), (Ankara: TTK Basımevi,
1991), p. 239.
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communiqué was issued by the Turkish Government which stated that Eden and Dill were
received by President İnönü and had conversations with Prime Minister Saydam, the Minister
of Foreign Affairs Saracoğlu, and Marshal Fevzi Çakmak. It stated that the two governments
recorded their firm adherence to the Turco-British alliance, that the present international
situation was examined in detail and special attention was given to the situation in the
Balkans, which closely concerned the mutual interests of Turkey and Britain. There was
complete agreement between the two governments on their policy with regard to all these
problems. 14
In this chaotic international environment, and in the absence of substantial assistance from
the Allies, Ankara had shifted to consider the ways in which it could obtain a treaty of non-
aggression with Germany in order to balance its international position. Obviously, the ground
was not convenient for Turkey to openly pronounce its intention to this effect. Following a
period of exchange of letters between İnönü and Hitler, both Turkish and German Foreign
Ministries were authorized to draft a treaty which would serve towards this objective. In fact,
upon his receipt of İnönü’s reply on March 17, 1941, Hitler had gone to the extent of
expressing that Germany had ended its friendship with the SU in order to side with Turkey
on the issue of the Straits. He said, the Germans had friendly feelings towards Turkey which
was Germany’s former comrade in arms, and Turkey’s presence in the Straits and in İstanbul
were in Germany’s political interest. Besides, he narrated his talks with the Soviet Foreign
Commissar in a distorted manner, and said that Molotov had demanded a base in the Black
Sea Straits in order to adhere to the Tripartite pact which he had strongly rejected.
                    
14 Communiqué dated March 1, 1941. The MFA Archives.
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As for Bulgaria, the Nazi dictator said, Molotov had demanded to send the Russian forces
to this country and in return for this, he had suggested to force the Yugoslavians to cede
Macedonia to Bulgaria, a proposal which himself and the King of Bulgaria had declined.
According to him, the presence of German troops in this country was serving to save this
country from the emergence of Bolshevism. To assure the Turkish Ambassador to Berlin,
Hüsrev Gerede, of his friendly policy towards Turkey and ultimately to increase Ankara’s
suspicions of the Kremlin he said, through saving Bulgaria he had assured Turkey’s position
as a strong and independent country safeguarding the Straits. The Nazi tyrant had basically in
mind securing Germany’s Balkan wing before launching the offensive against the SU. 15
On March 15, Turkish Ambassador to Washington, Münir Ertegün, called on Cordell
Hull, the Secretary of State, to inform him of certain assurances that the Turkish President
İnönü had received from Hitler relative to the German occupation of Bulgaria. In his turn,
Hull told his interlocutor a commonly admitted fact that the German dictator had taken this
communication out of his stock on hand of similar communications. He had been sending
these to each of the dozen countries he had occupied or conquered and he seemed to
contemplate sending them to countries whose seizure he had in mind in the future.
Meanwhile in Yugoslavia, following the Regent’s acceptance to adhere to the Axis pact, a
coup d’etat occurred in March 27, 1941 and King Peter assumed control of the country and
                    
15 As for the Italian attack on Greece, Hitler said, Germany, like Turkey had no responsibility
concerning this war. The Nazi dictator put forward one single negative issue which was about the
press attacks in Turkey that were directed at both himself and the Nazi regime. Gerede, particularly
emphasized this point in his report. See, the report of Turkish Ambassador to Berlin Hüsrev Gerede
dated March 17, 1941 to the MFA, in Hüsrev Gerede, Harb İçinde Almanya, (İstanbul: ABC Ajansı
Yayınları, 1994), pp. 184-185. See also, Johannes Glasneck, Türkei im Deutsch-
Angloamerikanischen Spannungsfeld, Berlin 1968, trans. Arif Gelen, Türkiye’de Faşist Alman
Propagandası, (Ankara: Onur Yayınları, undated), pp. 144-145.
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General Simovic became premier. However, Yugoslavia could regain its independence only
for the moment. Ten days after the coup, the Germans launched their attack on Yugoslavia
and Greece. Expectedly, the Yugoslav coup d’etat which resulted in the overthrow of the
Tsvetkovitch Government and its replacement by an-all party government under General
Simovitch led to an immediate worsening of relations between Yugoslavia and Germany. On
April 1, von Heeren, German Minister in Belgrade, left for Berlin to report after a lenghty
conversation with Nintchitch, the Yugoslav Foreign Minister, during which he had demanded
an apology for the anti-German demonstrations, which marked General Simovitch’s coup,
immediate ratification of the Tripartite Pact, and demobilization of the Yugoslav army. 16  By
the first week of April, reports from all Balkan capitals spoke of the concentration of German
troops and mechanized forces on the Hungarian, Rumanian and Bulgarian frontiers of
Yugoslavia.
Indeed, Nazi-Soviet relationship was crystalizing around the Balkan situation. Pravda, in
an article on April 1, contradicting rumours that the Soviet Government had cabled
congratulations to General Simovitch’s Government, wrote: “There would have been nothing
extraordinary if congratulations had actually been sent. If they were not sent it was perhaps
an omission on the part of the Soviet Government, or because the idea did not occur to
anyone.” On the same day, M. Gavrilovitch, Yugoslav Minister without portfolio and
Minister in Moscow, had a conference in Ankara after discussions in Moscow. A few days
later, on April 3, Lieutenant General Sir James Marshall-Cornwall and Air Vice-Marshal
                                                               
16 Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, Vol. No. IV, p. 4535.
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Elmhirst, representing the British Middle East Command, arrived in Ankara for defence talks
with Turkish military chiefs. 17
On April 6, within a few hours of the German invasion of Greece and Yugoslavia, a
meeting of the Turkish Cabinet was held and the British, Greek and Yugoslav Ambassadors
were received by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Saracoğlu. Shortly afterwards, on April 9,
the Allied diplomatic representatives were informed of the decisions taken by the government
on Turkey’s attitude in face of the extension of the war in the Balkans. As explained by the
Ankara Radio on April 11, the government, following the military situation, might be obliged
to make new decisions and the present attitude of non-belligerence was in keeping with
Ankara’s treaty obligations. It was also stated that this was an initial decision, since there was
no way of foretelling future developments of the war, which was being waged at a close
distance. Given this, Ankara paid particular attention to the attitude of Bulgaria and it was
reported that the Bulgarian Minister had denied statements by the Yugoslav Minister that
Bulgarian troops were operating with the Germans.
Against this background, on June 18, 1941, the Treaty of Friendship between Turkey and
Germany was signed by the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Saracoğlu and German
Ambassador Franz Von Papen in Ankara. Article 1 of the treaty stated that “The Republic of
Turkey and the German Reich mutually undertake to respect the inviolability and territorial
integrity of each other and to refrain from every action directed at directly or indirectly
against each other.” 18 The subsequent article included that Turkey and Germany binded
                    
17  Ibid.
18 For the text of the treaty which was signed in Turkish and German languages, see, “Türkiye
Cumhuriyeti ile Alman Reich’i Arasında Andlaşma”, in İsmail Soysal, Türkiye’nin Dış
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themselves in the future on all questions concerning their common interests to meet in
friendly contact to reach an understanding on the treatment of such questions. Thus, at least
on paper, the Turkish position in war was moved a step forward towards the center between
the Allies and the Axis. Interestingly, the TGNA ratified this treaty on June 25, 1941 with
Law No. 4072, three days after Germany’s attack on Russia. The protocol pertaining to the
ratification of the treaty was signed by the Turkish Ambassador Gerede and the Secretary
General of the MFA, Cevat Açıkalın and his German counterpart Ernst Weisaecker in July 5,
1941, in Berlin.
On the other hand, having concluded such an agreement Turkey was not less suspicious of
either German or Soviet acts since the memory of the short-lived Nazi-Soviet pact was still in
minds. After Germany’s invasion on June 22, 1941, the Soviet attitude towards Turkey
changed overnight. Formerly, Ankara had been blamed for not maintaining complete
neutrality, now it was gradually accused of objectively serving the interests of Germany by
staying neutral.
As for the German attack on Russia, by the autumn of 1941, the German war-machine
had understood that the Russian defense would not allow its advance as envisaged by the
Operation Barbarossa. From then on, the German concept of lightning war turned to a dead-
lock and the center of gravity of the German onslaught was gradually shifted to the south and
north wings of the front. This brought the case of Turkey under discussion again by
Germany. However, it was eventually decided to refrain from coercive methods in relations
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TTK Basımevi, 1965), pp.  293-294; Hüsrev Gerede, Harb İçinde Almanya, p. 212.
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with Ankara while the option of developing an attack through Anatolia was shelved for the
time being. 19 Then Ribbentrop instructed Papen firstly, to enhance Turkey’s confidence to
the effect that Germany had no territorial claims over Turkey, and recognized it as the
guardian of the Straits; to revitalize the deep seated imperialistic tendencies of Turkey against
Russia; and finally, to decline all the suggestions of Ankara for a conciliatory peace with
Britain. 20
On August 19, 1941, Ribbentrop told Gerede that the Red Army would be destroyed
within a few weeks. In his turn, Gerede told his interlocutor that based on the informations
he had from American sources, he had found this information to be exaggerated. When
Ribbentrop inquired as to what he had thought in regard to the people of Turkish origin in the
Caucasia and in the east of Caspian Sea, Gerede told him that in line with the official policy
of Turkey, Ankara had no claims beyond its frontiers. Shortly afterwards, in Ankara,
Saracoğlu communicated the content of the Ribbentrop-Gerede talk to the British Ambassador
Knatchbull-Hugessen. 21
In fact, considerable evidence suggest that as his personal choice - which no doubt had an
effect on his interpretation of issues - Saracoğlu maintained a strong anti-Communist policy.
Correspondingly, on September 30, he told Papen that he attributed utmost importance to the
overthrow of Bolshevism. But, he said, “the chauvinist circles were suggesting to their
leadership to wait for the development of the military operation in silence.” 22
                    
19 Johannes Glasneck, Türkiye’de..., pp. 156-157.
20 Ibid., p. 158.
21 For an interesting account of Saracoğlu-Knatchbull-Hugessen talks, see, Barry Rubin, İstanbul
Intrıgues, (NY: McGraw-Hill Publishing Co., 1989), pp. 45-47.
22 Ibid., p. 159. Meanwhile, on August 10, 1941, Britain and the SU communicated to the Turkish
Government that they never had claims on the Straits while the Kremlin further expressed that in
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On July, 9, 1942, Şükrü Saracoğlu - now Prime Minister, after Dr. Saydam’s death on
July 8 - explaining his government’s foreign policy stated that Turkey, who had not and
would nor run after any adventure outside of its frontiers, had searched for the ways in which
it could stay out of the war and had found those ways in its march on a conscious and
positive neutrality. He said, “Turkey would not and will not be able to preserve its neutrality
through a negative impartiality before a tragedy which has been devastating and ruining the
world for three years. Turkey’s impartiality is the processed form of an international system.
And our policy has a sincerity and transparency which will not drag anyone into anxiety.” 23
Saracoğlu emphasized that Turkey’s alliance agreement with England would continue to serve
both parties as a beneficial instrument, and that the Turco-British alliance was the expression
of reality brought into existence as an essential pillar of the international political system. He
maintained that another clear and sincere manifestation of this policy was the Turco-German
agreement which confirmed the mutual understanding and friendship between Turkey and
Germany. Turkish position towards these two major opposing parties and Turkey’s relations
with each of these states were therefore “clear examples of this positive policy.” 24
                                                               
view of the German propaganda, it saw a necessity to repeat its assurance which it had lastly
expressed in the Communiqué dated March 24, 1941 that the SU had no claims on the Turkish
territory and the Straits. Ernst Jache, P. Kuturman (trans.), Yükselen Hilal, (İstanbul: Cumhuriyet
Matbaası, 1946), pp. 273-274; Yüksel İnan, Türk Boğazlarının Siyasal ve Hukuksal Rejimi, (Ankara:
Turhan Kitabevi, 1995), p. 104.
23 From Prime Minister Şükrü Saracoğlu’s speech in TGNA on his government’s programme on July
9, 1942. The MFA Archives.
24 Ibid.
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II . 2 In Time of War Prepare For Peace: Strains and Stresses of Wartime
Diplomacy
Upon entering WW II, the USA considered the ways to bring allies closer and  took the
lead in drawing up and signing the Declaration of the United Nations on January 1, 1942.
Other signatories were Britain, the SU and China, five nations of the British Commonwealth,
the governments in exile of eight European countries overrun by the Axis powers, and nine
states of Latin America that had followed the USA into the war. The original signatories
numbered twenty-six and as will be discussed later, particulary with an emphasis on the
Turkish Government’s declaration of war on Germany and Japan and adherence to the UN,
before the war’s end the number had increased to forty-seven. 25
   The principles of the Atlantic Charter were endorsed by the SU with an interpretative
approach and were accepted by the governments signing the Declaration of the United
Nations of January 1, 1942. The Kremlin, meanwhile, was working towards ends that
directly contradicted the principle of self-determination,  emphasized in the Atlantic Charter.
Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Minister, visiting Moscow in December 1941, was
confronted with a demand that Britain recognize Russia’s annexation of the Baltic States and
a part of Finland. In his turn, Eden felt obliged to pass on Moscow’s proposal to London and
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Honduras, India, Luxemburg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Poland,
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Colombia, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Mexico, Paraguay,
Peru, Phillipines, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, Uruguay and Venezuela. All of these governments
declared war against one or more of the Axis powers.
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Washington. Washington promptly rejected the demand since it was in conflict with the
Atlantic Charter. Churchill concurred at the time, however in March 1942, he admitted,
“under the pressure of events, I did not feel that this moral position could be physically
maintained. In a deadly struggle it is not right to assume more burdens than those who are
fighting for a great cause can bear.” Accordingly, he wrote Roosevelt:
...The increasing gravity of the war has led me to feel that the
principles of the Atlantic Charter ought not to be construed so as
to deny to Russia the frontiers she occupied when Germany
attacked her.  This was the basis on  which  Russia  acceded to the
Charter...
I hope therefore that you will be able to give us a free hand to
sign the treaty which Stalin desires as soon as possible... 26
Foreign Commissar Molotov, visiting London in May 1942, added eastern Poland and a
slice of Romania to the claims which Moscow demanded recognition. In their turn, the
British and US officials declined these claims, while Molotov settled for a twenty-year treaty
of alliance with Britain in which both governments agreed to act in accordance with the two
principles of not seeking territorial aggrandizement for themselves and non-interference in
the internal affairs of other states. For the time being, this phraseology accorded well with
the Atlantic Charter.
In January 1943, Roosevelt and Churchill met at Casablanca. Stalin was invited to attend
the meeting, but he informed the US President and the British Prime Minister that he was
unable to leave Russia at the time of the great offensive which he himself, as Commander-in-
Chief, was directing. On January 26, 1943, in his remarks to the press correspondents at the
close of conference, Roosevelt informed the reporters that the Democracies’ war plans were
xli
to extricate the “unconditional surrender” of the Axis. The use of this phrase, which had
been endorsed in advance by Churchill and the British War Cabinet was evidently intended to
convince the Kremlin that the USA and Britain were determined to fight the war to a finish.
However, in the opinion of most analysts, it had the unintended and unfortunate effect of
stiffening enemy resistance and postponing the day of surrender. Conducing to the complete
destruction of German and Japanese military potential, it helped to ensure the collapse of the
balance of power and the military ascendancy of the Soviet Union in Europe and Asia. 27
Indeed, among the essential factors which created a power vacuum in Europe was the
doctrine of 'Unconditional Surrender' put forward by Churchill and Roosevelt and their Joint
Chiefs of Staff at the Casablanca Conference in January of 1943. Obviously, in certain
respects the strategy of 'Unconditional Surrender' worked to Stalin's advantage. It increased
the "proletarianisation" of the people of Germany and Central Europe, and made them more
susceptible to Communist influence. Secondly, the propounded doctrine meant that the Red
Army, having advanced to Elbe, would have a legitimate reason for staying there and "for
maintaining what would amount to occupation forces in the countries through which its
supply lines ran". 28 Having understood the undelightful course of developments, for the rest
of the remaining eighteen months of war, Churchill would try to persuade the Americans that
                                                               
26 Winston S. Churchill, The Hinge of Fate (The Second World War), Vol. IV, (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Company, 1950), p 327.
27 For an interesting account of this declared policy and its repercussions see, H.W. Baldwin, Great
Mistakes of the War, (NY: Harper&Row Publishers, 1950), pp 683-691; Anne Armstrong,
Unconditional Surrender: The Impact of the Casablanca Policy on World War II, (New Brunswick:
Rutgers University Press, 1961).
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the war should be fought for the dual purpose of defeating Germany, and forestalling the
emergence of the SU as a mighty power in the center of Europe.
At the close of a twelve days’ conference between October 19-30, 1943 in Moscow, the
Foreign Ministers of the Big Three issued a communiqué and a number of declarations
concerning Italy, Greece, Yugoslavia, France and Austria. Within this framework, it was
agreed to set up in London a European Advisory Commission to study and make
recommendations upon questions that might arise as the war developed. China was invited to
join in a Declaration of Four Nations on General Security in which the four governments
pledged that the united action of wartime would be continued for the organization and
maintenance of peace and security, and recognized the necessity of establishing at the earliest
practicable date a general international conference towards this end.
Consecutively, it was agreed that the next meeting would be at Teheran. This was as far
as Stalin could be induced to travel from Russia at the time. In his turn, the Chinese
President Chiang Kai-shek did not hesitate to fly to Cairo where he conferred with Roosevelt
and Churchill as they stopped there en route to Tehran. In Cairo, the three leaders issued a
declaration of significance for the post-war Far East:
...It is their purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands
in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the
beginning of the first World War in 1914, and that all the territory
Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa
and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China.
Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has
taken by violence and greed. The aforesaid three great powers,
mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined
that in due course Korea shall become free and independent.  29
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Roosevelt was to meet Stalin for the first time in November 1943. A month before that,
Secretary of State Hull had gone to Moscow to confer with his Russian and British
counterparts. In the meantime, Italy had surrendered to the Allied forces and German corps
were being steadily pushed back. The Russian armies had taken the offensive as well. The
tide of war had evidently turned and the time was nearer to consider post-war settlements.
The talks between the Turkish President İnönü and Churchill in Adana on January 30-31,
1943;  the Cairo Talks between the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Numan
Menemencioğlu, and the British Foreign Minister, Anthony Eden, on November, 4-6, 1943,
where the Allied decison of inviting Turkey to take its part on the Allied side (made at the
Moscow Conference of October, 19) was expressed to the Turkish Officials; and finally the
Cairo Conference of December, 5-8, 1943 between Roosevelt, Churchill and İnönü
constituted a background in which Turkey chose to continue the talks with the Allied powers
while adopting a benovelent neutrality in the course of  events.
During the war, three other conferences were held between the heads of governments of
the 'Big Three'. To many analysts, Turkey’s entry into the war was considered as it would
have a direct effect in the form of diverting nine Bulgarian divisions and leave the Germans
alone to battle in Yugoslavia and Greece. In this context, at Teheran, Churchill assured Stalin
that Britain “had no ambitious interests in the Balkans but merely wanted to pin down the
German Divisions there”. 30  In his turn, Stalin replied to his question on whether or not the
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xliv
Turkish negotiators should be incited to war by stating, “I am all in favour of trying again.
We ought to take them by the scruff of the neck if necessary”. 31  It was however, put forward
that the Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes of the first plenary meeting registered the opposite
and cited Stalin as having commented that Turkey could not be brought in by force. At
Teheran, in November 1943, Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin negotiated the Anglo-American
plan for the Second Front. On November 28, at the first session of Teheran, Churchill raised
the issue of Turkey’s entry into the war. According to him, opening the Straits would allow a
free flow of supply and war equipment to the Soviets and the Allies would use the Turkish
airports. He asked his counterparts as to which  could be the most efficient way for Turkish
belligerency in strategic terms. The questions he posed were as follows: Should Turkey first
attack Bulgaria and then declare war on Germany ? Should it confine its military drive to
Thrace or shift to a larger offensive - If this approach was adopted, what would Bulgarians
think about Russia which was their prime liberator - ? And lastly, what kind of affects could
be expected on the part of Roumania - a country which was at odds between surrounding
Axis or Allied forces and striving for moving out of war - or on Hungary ? According to
Valentin Berezhkov, a diplomat of the Soviet delegation, Churchill addressed these questions
to Stalin and added that these were matters of specific problems on which Russians had
particular views. As will be stated below, Stalin gradually shifted to adopt an attitude less
hopeful of Turkey’s entry into war. He expressed his belief that no pressure was likely to
lead to this effect.
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However, Churchill emphasized that Turkey should be deceived or pressed hard to accept
belligerency before Christmas, and he was willing to undertake the mission of informing the
Turkish President İnönü of the decisions reached at Teheran. Churchill also stated that he
was ready to tell İnönü that in case Turkey rejected the Allies’ proposal to join the war, he
would state that this could have serious implications for Turkey and could effect its rights
over the Straits. Moreover, he added that Britain would not be frustrated if Turkish
belligerency could not be realized. The invasion of some Turkish islands could also be
considered since this could secure the way through the Dardanelles. He said, this would not
bother Germany either which could continue its activities in the region.  On November 29,
the military experts stated similar views regarding Turkish belligerency as it would have
rather positive results for the Allies.
At the last day of the conference, Harry Hopkins, special aide of Roosevelt, said that the
problem of Turkish belligerency depended on how much aid could be transfered to Turkey
from the USA and Britain. Apart from this, it was required to harmonize Turkey’s entry into
war with the Allies’ general strategy. When Stalin recalled that Churchill had mentioned
earlier to allocate 2 to 3 divisions and some further war equipment to Turkey, Churchill
denied this statement and replied that these 2 or 3 divisions were planned to be used if the
invasion of Turkish islands was decided. The military arsenal which could be allocated to
Turkey could comprise 17 air squadrons deployed in Egypt under the Anglo-American joint
command and, three anti-aircraft regiments to cooperate in Turkey’s air defense. In his turn,
Roosevelt explained that he was keen on keeping the promises given to Ankara, whereas he
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had strong anxieties given the incomplete war preparations of the JCS for OVERLORD. He
said, he would prefer if this issue did not alter the agreement reached the day before.
While these deliberations were going on, Stalin chose to forward no further argument
with a view to endanger plans of OVERLORD. When Churchill demanded that the USA add
military equipment to British offers for Turkey, Roosevelt responded that he would need to
consult his military advisors first. At a later stage, when Eden suggested that Turkey might
be convinced to open its airports to the Allies, Stalin said that if Turkey opened its airports to
the Allies, it was fairly possible that Bulgarians would not attack Turkey. The Germans
would not attack  Turkey either and expect Turks to attack first. In the meantime, “The Allies
would use Turkish airports and harbours and this was a very good thing.” 32
To sum up, although he was ready to exploit the occasion, Stalin postponed a full
discussion of the overall Soviet territorial demands, whereas he realized a preliminary
agreement on the boundaries with Poland. As for Turkey, at Teheran, the USA was
convinced that it would inevitably get involved in the Aegean and the Straits if Turkey
entered the war. Stalin also reversed the position his Foreign Minister had taken at the
Moscow Conference, and instead of supporting the British on the question of Turkey, sided
with Roosevelt. He expressed that it would be better to concentrate all efforts upon
OVERLORD and to consider the other campaigns as diversionary. Stalin said that he had lost
hope of Turkey’s entering the war, and was now certain that it would not, in spite of all the
pressure that might be exerted. 33  However, considerable evidence suggests that the SU,
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together with Britain, was still interested in Turkey’s entry into the war. Churchill himself,
was also ready to exploit Russian ambitions since he suggested that such a large land mass as
Russia deserved access to a warm-water port and this could be settled agreeably between
friends. Then Stalin inquired about the regime of the Dardanelles. He said “Since England no
longer objected, it would be well to relax that regime.” 34
Consecutively, on United States’ invitation, the US, British, Russian and Chinese
representatives met  between August 21-October 9, 1944 at Dumbarton Oaks, a mansion in
the Georgetown area of Washington. The outcome was a charter drafted along the lines of the
4th paragraph of the Declaration of Four Nations on General Security mentioned above,
similar to the Covenant of the League of Nations but, it was hoped without its faults. As will
be briefly discussed later, it was accepted at the Yalta Meeting with modifications, subject to
final action by a conference of all nations at war with the Axis powers.
With a view to the agenda of the Conference of Foreign Ministers of the Big Three,
Cordell Hull, Anthony Eden and Vyacheslav Molotov held a meeting at Moscow on October,
19, 1943, where the Soviets demanded that the three powers coerce Turkey immediately into
war, and open the Second Front in the spring of 1944 as scheduled. Considerable evidence
suggests that it was agreed then between Britain and the Soviets to push Turkey into the war
on their side in one way or another. As will be briefly discussed, eventually, for the British,
the most appropriate way to do that appeared as extending military aid to Turkey, around
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which they made a few attempts that remained in vain given the problems of furnishing the
poorly equipped Turkish army while the global conflict was being carried on.
When Hitler's weakened Eastern Front allowed the Soviets to advance from the Vistula to
the Oder, right before the Yalta Conference, "This strategic situation reacted directly on the
diplomatic discussions of that historic conference, for Stalin, having overwhelmed his
enemies in the field, was able to outmaneuver his allies at the conference table." 35
The Yalta Meeting was held in February 1945. It has been said that at Yalta, the SU was
empowered to establish its control over the liberated countries of Eastern Europe. In effect,
the Soviets were already in military occupation of all Eastern Europe, except Greece, which
was liberated by the British forces in 1944. In the previous meeting of Teheran, the scheme
put forward by Churchill to invade Eastern Europe, which would have forestalled the SU,
might have altered the situation, but it lacked the support of the USA.
At Yalta, Roosevelt was anxious to ensure the SU's involvement in the war against Japan.
However, Stalin appeared in the remaining months of the war, highly interested in assuring
Russian domination in the heart of Europe, moving up the Danube through Bucharest and
Belgrade to Budapest and Poland. Stalin persuaded General Eisenhower to hold back the
Western advance to Prague and resumed the attack on Berlin only when the Americans were
near the German capital. Thomson stated that, "It was military strategy in WW II and not the
diplomacy of Yalta which created power vacuums on either side of Russia into which it
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irresistibly     expanded." 36 Given this, the crucial question for the Western leaders was how
much farther would the SU expand ? In this political atmosphere, at Yalta, the Big Three
arranged for a conference to be held at San Francisco to draft the Charter of a United Nations
Organisation. The date set for the conference was April 25, the place, San   Francisco.
Regarding Roosevelt’s concerns, agreement was reached on a matter of great importance
to the USA. This was the SU’s undertaking to enter the war against Japan. However, Soviet
policy in collaborating with the USA was not genuine. Within three months after the the
collapse of Germany, Stalin demanded the return of Russia's 1905 losses and the recognition
of Soviet interests in Manchuria.
Another  diverging difference arose over Poland. The Soviets had established at Lublin, a
communist dominated provisional government which rivalled the exiled Polish government in
London. At Yalta, Britain and the USA agreed to withdraw recognition from the Polish
government in London in return for holding free elections in Poland. 37 Although the SU was
allowed to retain those provinces it had acquired with Nazi collaboration in 1939, little
agreement could be reached over the frontiers of Poland. It was finally agreed that Poland
should be compensated in the north and west at Germany's expense.
At Yalta, in the fifth plenary meeting, Stalin used Turkey as a symbol in raising the issue
of which states should be admitted and which should be excluded. In fact, at Yalta, each of
the Big Three advocated the invitation of countries who sided with them in the course of war
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lto the United Nations. Then Roosevelt stated a principle that only those nations that had
declared war on Germany should be accepted to the status of  Associated Nation and
suggested March 1945 as the deadline for the as yet uncommitted to declare war on
Germany. Referring to Turkey, Stalin declared that certain nations had “wavered and
speculated on being on the winning side.” 38 In his turn, Churchill responded that if a large
group of hitherto uncommitted nations were to declare war at this time it would have an
effect on Germany’s morale. Churchill also added that Turkey’s candidacy ”would not be
greeted with universal approbation”. But, he concluded that Turkey had allied with them at a
very difficult time and had proved both friendly and helpful. 39
Stalin also speculated about the Montreux Convetion as it was outmoded and needed
revision. In the end, it was agreed that the negotiation of the issue would be included in the
agenda of the first meeting of Foreign Ministers to be held in London. The Soviets turned
their attention towards Turkey. Shortly after the conclusion of Yalta, in order to bring
pressure upon Turkey, on March 19, 1945, Moscow informed Ankara that it would terminate
the Turco-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Nonaggression of December, 17, 1925, renewed
in accordance with a protocol dated November 7, 1935. According to this protocol, the treaty
itself was renewed for 10 years, to be prolonged by tacit consent for further 2-year periods
unless denounced 6 months before expiry. If therefore the treaty were not to remain operative
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until at least November 7, 1947, it would have to be denounced by one party or the other by
May 7, 1945, at the latest.
It was also understood that the SU had not informed the Allies of its decision a priori.
The memorandum Molotov handed the Turkish Ambassador, Selim Sarper, on the same day
included that though the Soviet Government, with a view to continuation of the friendship
relations of the two parties appreciated the value of this agreement, because of the deep
changes emerged during WW II, had found the agreement inappopriate for the new
conditions and, with its conviction that it required an amelioration in a serious manner
wished to terminate the agreement in concern. 40   On March 21, the US Ambassador in
Moscow, Averell Harriman, reported to Washington that it had been anticipated in Turkish
circles in Moscow that the Russians would denounce the treaty, and the Turkish Ambassador
had avised his government to this effect one or two months ago. Then the denunciation itself
was not a surprise, but the circumstances in which it took place were unexpected. According
to Harriman, Sarper had arranged to return to Ankara for a period of consultation which was
expected to last several weeks. He was scheduled to depart on March 25 and on March 19 he
informed the Foreign Commissariat that before his departure to Ankara he would be glad to
call on Molotov for a courtesy visit since he had nothing to discuss with him. To Sarper’s
surprise, Assistant Foreign Commissar Kavtaradze told him that he was invited to call the
same day on 15.00 hrs. Harriman explained that Molotov informed the Turkish Ambassador
of the denunciation of the treaty and told him that the Soviet Government had intended to
take this step at a somewhat later date, but in view of his impending departure had decided to
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act at once, in order that he might be able to discuss Turkish-Russian relations with his
government against this background. Although Molotov had used this ostensible reason as a
pretext to communicate the decision of the Kremlin, at this stage Harriman chose not to alert
Washington, and stated in his assessment that Soviet Foreign Commissar’s attitude was
consistently friendly and correct, and there was no intimation on his part that the action
reflected ill feeling or any tendency to bring pressure on Turkey.
According to Harriman, Sarper then inquired about Molotov’s views as to the ways in
which the present treaty might be “improved”. However, Molotov was unwilling to commit
himself on this point, and said that after the Ambassador had talked with his government he
would be glad to learn how the Turkish Government felt on this point. He evaluated that in
denouncing the treaty, the Russians had in mind the anticipated discussion of the Montreux
Convention at the first meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the three Allies.
The US Ambassador, however, said the denunciation of the treaty made it possible for
them to insist on the early redefinition, in a new agreement, of their relations with Turkey
and thus opened up a channel of pressure on the Turkish Government, which might prove
useful as the question of the Straits again came under discussion. Interestingly, he needed to
emphasize that the Soviet-Bulgarian policy seemed pointed in the same direction. He stated
that it was evidently Russian tactics to maneuver the Turks into coming forward first with
their ideas on the redefiniton of Turkish-Russian relations. What would come after that was
of course impossible to predict, but the Russians would then be free to accept or to criticize
the Turkish suggestion as they liked, and issues might be raised in the course of these
discussions which would provide opportunities for the exertion of strong political pressure.
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Not surprisingly, this in turn, would open several possibilities. In this context, Turkey might
be asked to accept in advance broader discussions, a given set of Soviet views with respect to
the regime of the Straits, on the assumption that it would be difficult for any outside power to
challange or ignore a program advanced by the two countries most directly concerned. 41
II . 3 Implications of New Soviet Tactics and the Turkish “Long Telegram”
During the war, Turkey’s suspicions were first confirmed when Nazi-Soviet Pact was
concluded. Following that, Moscow had refused to withdraw its forces from Iran, and
conspired in an assasination attempt against the German Ambassador to Ankara, which
further deteriorated Russo-Turkish relations. 42 Thus, it came as no surprise when on March,
13, 1945, Moscow announced its intent to renounce the December, 17, 1925 Treaty of
Friendship and Neutrality with Turkey. 43
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Soviet charges against Turkey of weakening the Allies through maintaining political and
commercial relations with Germany had become more aggressive particularly after the battle
of Stalingrad. In his turn, President İnönü chose to repel Soviet charges through suppressing
both the extreme leftist and rightist activities in Turkey. In his speech on May 19, 1944,
İnönü stated that when the Indepence War of Turkey ended, Turkey was friendly with only
the Soviets and in the present international arena, those who claimed that Turkey had become
racist and Pan-Turanist were serving the interests of foreigners. He said, “it is for sure that
those who wish to perpetuate these ideas which will only bring trouble and disaster to the
Turkish nation will be of no service to the Turkish nation.” 44 Then, the arrests to which the
governmet gave wide publicity followed.
To the disturbance of Turkish officials, the SU had persistently sought ways in which
Turkey could be channelled to follow a special kind of relationship with itself. This had
become repeatedly evident particularly towards the end of the war. The Turkish Minister of
Foreign Affairs, Numan Menemencioğlu, interviewed Sergei Vinogradov, the Soviet
Ambassador to Ankara on May 22, 1944,  just two weeks before his resignation due to
increasing British pressures on Turkey’s chromite trade with Germany in exchange for
weaponry. In their talks, Menemencioğlu felt obliged to tell Vinogradov that Turkey
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considered Turco-Soviet relations as having an independent nature, and implied that relations
with the SU were not under the influence of Britain and the USA. He further stated that
issues raised in the Soviet Foreign Commissar, Molotov’s statement to the press on April 2,
1944, regarding the situation in the Balkans in general, and Roumania in particular, might be
turned to an agreement between Turkey and the SU since these countries shared the view that
cooperation in the Balkans would be the first step for cooperation in European affairs.
Saracoğlu’s fairly negative experience when he visited Moscow in September 1939 to
conclude a mutual cooperation pact limited to the Black Sea and the Straits still remembered,
Menemencioğlu suggested that such an understanding could include the expression that the
two countries would undertake political consultations in case circumstances threatening their
security and interests arise. Though Vinogradov was pleased to hear Menemencioğlu,
Moscow’s response which came on June 5 was not in the affirmative. The Kremlin stated that
before Turkey terminated its relationship with Germany through making a fundamental
transformation in this respect and declare war on this country,no political agreement would
likely to produce any effect.
On June 15, this time, General Secretary Cevat Açıkalın, who resumed the talks
following Menemencioğlu’s leave of office, interviewed Vinogradov. He told Vinogradov
that the SU handled the issues of improving Turco-Soviet relations and political consultations
and cooperation in the Balkans separately and regarding the latter, laid down the condition of
Turkey’s declaration of war on Germany. Açıkalın asked if the SU had a condition
concerning the improvement of Turco-Russian relations as well. Instructed by the Kremlin,
Vinogradov started a tour d’horizon, expressing a series of Russian views and expectations
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on the trial of the Russian citizen who attempted to assassinate von Papen, Panturanistic
movements in Turkey directed at people of Turkish origin in the Caucasus and Central Asia,
press attacks against Russia, and the negative effects of the friendship treaty which Turkey
concluded with Germany three days before the German assault towards Russia. In his turn
Açıkalın stated:
“You were not just affiliated with Germany through a military
aggression pact, but as a political partner in actual practice. On our
return from Moscow a couple of months ago [Açıkalın referred to
the visit of Şükrü Saracoğlu to Moscow in September 1939 -
following the Nazi-Soviet Pact of August 24 which lasted nearly a
month, however, without any outcome], as an answer to our
proposal for cooperation, we had a German reservation in our
pocket handed over to us by yourself...Do you mean it was no sin
when you had laid down the condition of a German reservation for
our proposal for cooperation, but it is bad of us as we concluded a
non-aggression treaty with Germans through succeeding to make
Germans accept our alliance when and despite German armies had
reached our frontiers and there was no possibility to expect any
assistance from our Allies ?” 45
What brought Turkish apprehensions concerning the ambitions of the Kremlin “to a near
fever pitch in September 1944, notwithstanding the moderate Soviet position toward Iran,
Czechoslovakia, Finland and Romania, was the Russian invasion of Bulgaria.” 46 On
September 8, in an attempt to appease the Kremlin, the Bulgarian Government, headed by
Constantine Muraviev, broke diplomatic relations with Berlin and called for an armistice with
the SU. However, Soviet troops under Marshal Tolbukhin had already begun to invade
Bulgaria. The next day, Kimon Georgiev, the pro-Soviet leader of the Fatherland Front
assumed the Premiership and King Simeon II was forced to consent to the new regime. From
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then on, the possibility of a synthesis between Bulgarian irredentism and Soviet supported
Communist menace alarmed Ankara. Thus, Ankara suddenly found itself bordering a country
“which had long been irredentist toward Thrace and Macedonia, had long openly coveted a
port on the Aegean, and which had now become the instrument not only of Bulgarian
nationalism but of Soviet expansionist aspirations as well.” 47 Anxieties in Ankara grew when
Tito, along with Georgiev broached the subject of Pan-Slavism in January 1945.
Turkey finally declared war on Germany and Japan and adhered to the Charter of the UN
on February 23, 1945 through the unanimous vote of existing 401 members of parliament in
the TGNA. 48 In his speech before the Assembly, Prime Minister Saracoğlu expressed that
Turkey had sided with the democratic nations since the breakout of the war threat. He stated
that Turkey had proceeded in the same direction with its Assembly and the Government and
this time “...would like to fulfill the place that we have actually been occupying in official
terms as well” and towards this objective, Turkey declared war against Germany and Japan,
in accordance with the good of the world and humanity and the national interests. 49 From
then on, admittedly, Turkey approached the end of the war with closer ties to its ally,
Britain, somewhat strained. George Harris maintained that if Turkey focused its attention
primarily on dealing with the British in the supply of war material rather than addressing
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itself to Washington with the same urgency, this was because Britain was a formal ally and in
fact served as the main channel for equipment during the war. 50
Turning back to Turco-Soviet talks, on June 7, 1945, Molotov received the Turkish
Ambassador S. Sarper, as will be discussed below, to introduce a pragmatic solution to the
deterioration in bilateral relations. In this context, before he left Ankara for Moscow, Sarper
was instructed to deliver Turkey’s offer of an alliance with the SU.
At the outset of talks, to the surprise of Sarper, Molotov first criticized the Moscow
Agreement of March 16, 1921, and demanded that the injustice done by this agreement
should be corrected. The point raised by Molotov was quite distasteful for Turkey since the
agreement in concern had laid down the basis of bilateral relations. Now, the Soviets had
declared that they no longer appreciated it, and on the contrary expressed their view that they
were interested in changing it. The Soviet Foreign Commissar’s statement included that the
SU had suffered immense losses during the war, and it was compelled to spend a part of its
energy for its security in the Black Sea. The situation in this region had not turned to a
source of threat but the Soviets had felt that “the fate of 200 million people depended on
Turkey’s will.” 51 Molotov added that they were sure of Turkey’s goodwill, but they could
not rely on its capability to defend the Straits. When it was understood that no agreement was
likely, Sarper  suggested to leave this issue aside and continue the talks on other matters.
Molotov stated that they might not negotiate this issue, but this would not mean that they had
settled down all questions of dispute between the two countries.
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Sarper’s difficulty to state Turkey’s proposal for an alliance with the SU continued since
Molotov insisted on inquiring as to which guarantees Ankara could give to Moscow in case
two countries entered into an alliance. Sarper told his interlocutor that the joint defense of the
Straits could be subject to discussions of military experts in case the necessity arose, and it
was evident that Turkey would do whatever necessary to be victorious if it was left with no
option but to engage in war. Then, Molotov turned to the issue of revising the Montreux
Convention and to the astonishment of Sarper, put forward that both countries might hold
parallel negotiations for an alliance and determining a joint approach towards the regime of
the Straits concurrently. Regarding the Soviet Foreign Commissar’s last statement, Sarper
expressed that if talks were held for the revision of Montreux in the future, this could only be
a mere exchange of views since any revision in the convention was a matter of multilateral
talks in the form of  a conference to be held specifically for this purpose. However, there
would be a difference between pursuing these talks under existing conditions and with an
alliance with the SU. Following another futile round of talks, Sarper suggested to state the
issues to be negotiated in the form of articles. However, Molotov declined this proposal and
said that any agreement could only be made after the issues were settled. In the end, all the
matters negotiated were left unsolved.
Right after the talks, Sarper informed Ankara by phone that the situation could not be
improved with the Soviets. Decoding of Sarper’s telegram was completed on June 12, and on
the same day it was decided in Ankara to instruct him to communicate to Molotov that no
territorial change or allocation of bases with a view to the conclusion of a treaty could be
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accepted, and no significant outcome could be expected from the bilateral talks on the
revision of Montreux as explained before.
To the disturbance of Turkey, following the first round of talks, it was announced
through Pravda and Izvestia that the decisions regarding the territorial demands of Armenia
from Turkey, and a call for the return of Armenians in diaspora adopted at the Armenian
Catholicos Election Congress were endorsed by Moscow. Besides, illustrations of solidarity
were held between the Soviet and Armenian committee representatives in San Francisco.52
Meanwhile, Ankara had informed Washington and London of the Moscow talks. On June
9, before he read Sarper’s complete telegram which was arriving at Ankara in parts, İnönü
told the Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nurullah Esat Sümer, to speak to the British and
US Ambassadors in Ankara about urging their governments to react against the Russian
designs at once. 53  
The second Molotov-Sarper meeting took place on June 18. In the opening of talks, to the
astonishment of Sarper, the Soviet Foreign Commissar continued along his previous line of
maximalist debate. In his turn, Sarper held the opinion that the Soviet proposals would
violate Turkey’s sovereignty and might adversely affect its strategic and political position.
Sarper’s telegram also underlined that the talks were abruptly ended:
...When Molotov said that the Soviet Republics were a great and
mighty country, but this would not be a reason for sacrificing the
rights of the smaller republics of Armenia and Georgia, I said I
had come to Moscow with great expectations. I had very much
appreciated to have the opportunity to work in order to put an
order and reform the relations between our countries. But if this
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can not be realized..it is the outcome of your leaving us before
this impasse..’ Molotov standing, said ‘it will be very good if you
think once more about this matter.’ I replied ‘let’s consider
together, you consider it some as well’ and we left. 54
 Sarper’s second telegram was received on June 20. On the day Sarper’s telegram was
read in Ankara, the Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sümer, spoke to the Soviet
Ambassador Vinogradov. Sümer told Vinogradov that “under these conditions, instead of
friendship and understanding we have been pursuing, a freeze and distance will resurge.” 55
Sümer observed that the Soviet Ambassador appeared complaisant and uninsisting in his
answers to Turkish rejections. However, the real Soviet position was contrary as Vinogradov
explained to the US Ambassador in Ankara, Edwin Wilson, towards the end of June. Wilson
stated that Vinogradov was keen on expressing Molotov’s demand for certain measures
necessary for the security of the Black Sea without directly referring to the allocation of bases
on the Straits. He also stated that territorial demands of the SU were voiced on behalf of
Armenia which needed additional lands. When Wilson asked if any Armenians were living in
the eastern provinces of Turkey, he replied that there were only a few since the Turks
massacred most of them. The US Ambassador noted that Vinogradov was very critical of
Turkey in this matter and on other issues. 56 However, it was understood that neither the
USA, nor Britain were in favor of imposing a  constraint for themselves and handicapping
the talks through declaring a policy in regard to the Turkish case two weeks before the
opening of deliberations with the SU at Potsdam.
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Meanwhile, Washington tried unsuccessfully to ease the tension between Ankara and the
Kremlin. Britain was not less anxious than the USA to develop a policy in this regard. On
June 18, John Balfour, the British Chargé to Washington, called on Acting Secretary of
State, Joseph C. Grew, to discuss the situation. It was indeed surprising that Soviet Foreign
Commissar should have made a demarhché at a time when Britain and the USA were still
awaiting the Soviet views in regard to the Straits promised at Yalta. Then, Balfour
communicated the proposal of London in view of the Anglo-Turkish Treaty, to support the
Turkish position  particularly as the position taken by Molotov appeared to be in direct
conflict with statements made by Stalin at Yalta. Subsequently, the British Chargé d’Affaires
inquired if Grew would endorse a joint Anglo-American approach and that this approach be
made to the Soviet Government prior to the meeting of the Big Three at which it might well
be necessary to discuss this whole question.
In his turn, the US Secretary of State promised the necessary attention to the suggestion,
explaining that it would be preferable to withhold action until the end of the San Francisco
conference and that if action was to be taken, there would presumably be plenty of time
between the close of the conference and the meeting of the Big Three. Balfour said he agreed
with Grew, but he was further instructed to state that even if Washington should not feel in a
position to make a joint approach with the British Government, “his Government hoped that
we would at least support the British action with some step of our own.” 57 Two days later,
on June 20, Ambassador Wilson in Ankara suggested that Washington express an interest in
this matter in Moscow for the reason that “the Russian proposals to Turkey are wholly
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incompatible with the spirit and principles on which we are seeking with the participation of
the Soviet Union to set up a new world organization.” 58
On July 7, the Turkish Ambassador in Washington, H. Ragıp Baydur, called on Grew
and after some preliminary talk concerning the success of the San Francisco Conference, he
turned to the conversation which had taken place in Moscow three weeks ago between Sarper
and Molotov in which the former had stated the Soviet demand for a rectification of the
Turco-Soviet frontier; a demand for bases on the Dardanelles and a bilateral modification of
the Montreux Convention. Subsequently, Molotov had added that there might be also certain
requirements from the Balkan states, “which the Ambassador interpreted as some sort of a
territorial demand from Bulgaria.” 59 Baydur said that he had come to visit Grew for the
purpose of ascertaining the attitude of the American Government towards this situation.
Grew told Baydur that the American Government was very definitely concerned with any
threat to the peace which might fall within the purview of the UN Organization. However,
for the present, he said, they understood that the conversations had been a friendly exchange
of views and that no concrete threats had been made. In his turn, Baydur asked Grew
whether, if the Soviet Government should demand that the USA cede to the Soviet Union the
cities of Boston and San Francisco, it should not consider such a demand as a threat, and he
also asked whether the USA felt that such a demand could be a matter for negotiation. Grew
replied definitely in the negative, but asked Baydur whether the Soviet Government had
specified the nature of the frontier rectification which it desired and whether the demands
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were yet of such a concrete nature as to be regarded as open threats. Baydur replied that
“Mr. Molotov had stated that the Treaty of 1921 had been negotiated at a time when Soviet
Russia was weak and he had said, ‘Now we are strong.’ The obvious implication was that
Soviet Russia desired the return of the Vilayets of Kars and Ardahan.” 60
Consecutively, Baydur said he wished Grew to know that Turkey would not cede one inch
of territory, and that if Soviets should appropriate such Turkish territory, Turkey would
immediately fight. A situation would thus be created which was totally contrary to the spirit
and letter of all that had been achieved at San Francisco. The Turkish Ambassador
underscored that the Turkish Government felt very strongly that strong representations by the
United States in advance of possible trouble would have a powerful effect on Moscow.
Baydur had understood that Grew had told the British Ambassador, Lord Halifax, that the
American Government would support the proposed demarché of the British Government in
Moscow, but that later the US Ambassador at Ankara, Edwin Wilson, had informed the
Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs that the matter would be further studied, and had implied
that the US Secretary of State had made no such statement.
To the disappointment of Baydur, Grew said that the Ambassador was quite right since he
had had no conversation on this subject with Lord Halifax whom he had not seen officially
since his return from San Francisco. 61 He then told Baydur that he had to know very well
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himself that the USA had been following this situation with concern; that he hoped the
subject might be discussed at the meeting of heads of government and that, for that purpose,
the US President had been fully briefed on all the information in possession. Grew noted that
he personally believed that much more could be accomplished by a direct talk between the
US President and Stalin than could be accomplished by any formal representations made in
Moscow.
Washington’s reluctance to respond to Ankara in the affirmative was no doubt another
blow on Turkish political circles, given Turkey’s narrowed sphere of action under the
pressure of Russian tactics which were pushing it into coming forward first with its ideas on
the redefinition of Turco-Russian relations or gradually shifting to accommodate the designs
of the Kremlin.
Turning back to talks of the Big Three, the third meeting of the heads of governments
took place at Potsdam, a suburb of Berlin, between 17 July-1 August 1945. Roosevelt was
dead and his place was taken by Harry S. Truman. Churchill and the Foreign Secretary
Anthony Eden were replaced by Clement Attlee and Ernest Bevin respectively, while the
Conference was in progress, as a result of the Labour Party's victory in the general election.
Stalin, who was the sole survivor from the earlier meetings, had in effect obtained the
position of dominance in Eastern Europe to which "Imperial Russia had aspired in vain in
the First World War". 62
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At Potsdam, Turkey and the Straits were once more in deliberations, but in different ways
and on different premises. Truman had come to Potsdam with the idea that the free and equal
rights of all nations to transport on the waterways of Europe, the Rhine, Danube,
Dardanelles and the Kiel Canal would be advantageous if not essential to the preservation of
peace in Europe. He was also prepared to make such a proposal to the conference. However,
at the end of the first session on July 17, Truman had the impression that Stalin wanted the
Black Sea Straits for Russia, as had all the czars before him, while the British Premier was
determined that Britain should keep and even strengthen its control of the Mediterranean.
Indeed, Stalin clearly expressed that the Montreux Convention was “inimical” to the SU.
Furthermore, he added that Turkey was too weak to give any effective guarantee of free
passage, and it was only right that the SU should have bases to defend the Straits. As stated
above, in his turn, Truman declared that while the USA agreed to a revision of the Montreux
Convention, it believed however, “that the Straits should be a free waterway open to the
whole world and guaranteed by all of us.” Commenting on this interchange, Secretary of
State James F. Byrnes said, “that presented the issue. The Soviets wanted the free navigation
of the Straits guaranteed by the Soviets, or by the Soviets and Turkey. This meant their armed
forces would be on Turkey’s soil. We wanted the free navigation of the Straits guaranteed by
the United Nations.” 63
On July 21, the British delegation agreed with the Soviets to take up the issue of
modification of the Montreux Convention and other aspects of Soviet-Turkish relations in the
deliberations. In fact, Churchill had agreed to raise these issues at Potsdam during his
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Moscow talks in October 1944. Against this background, on July 22, he stated that the
British Government favoured the revision of the Montreux Convention through an agreement
among the signatories with the exception of Japan. Churchill also expressed that Britain
would endorse an arrangement for the free movement of Russian ships, naval or merchant,
through the Black Sea and back. He pointed out the necessity of not alarming Turkey as well.
However, massing of forces on the part of Bulgaria and Soviet press, and radio attacks and
by the turn Sarper-Molotov talks had taken, Churchill argued that the Turco-Soviet
discussions had not included Soviet demands from Turkey since Turkish officials formulated
an alliance option with the SU. 64
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    As for the approaching end of the war, the drop of two atomic bombs brought a quick end to the
war in the Pacific, whereas uncertainty persisted in Western Europe, especially concerning the
settlement of differences of opinion over Germany. In Germany, America and Russia confronted
each other, no longer quite allies, not yet open enemies. Graham Ross, The Great Powers and the
Decline of the European States System 1914-1945,  p. 46.
   The Western Democracies-SU relations further deteriorated when the Kremlin concentrated on its
domestic regime which became increasingly suspicious of the Democratic camp. In 1945, Stalin
charged A. A. Zhadanov with the task of enhancing the control of the Communist party, and
countering the increasing power of some influential  figures. The pressures of war had led to the rise
of the Red Army, which had won much prestige in the SU as a result of its victories over Germany.
Again, the rise of the heavy industry sector under G.M. Malenkov, which had been expanded
enormously to meet the needs of the war, and of the political police (NKVD/KGB) under L. B.
Beria, had accumulated vast powers during the war. See, Michael Dockrill, The Cold War 1945-
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As for the post-war settlements, meanwhile, Molotov accepted the proposal by J. Byrnes
that the Foreign Ministers should meet in Moscow in December 1945. At Moscow, it was
agreed that, a Four-Power Control Commission should be sent to Romania to ensure non-
Communist representation in its government, while non-Communists would be given posts in
the Bulgarian government. In return, the USA agreed to set up an Allied Council in Tokyo to
make suggestions to General MacArthur, the US Supreme Commander there, about the
regime in Japan. Finally, it was agreed that the Council of Foreign Ministers would meet in
the spring of 1946 to draw up peace treaties with Germany's former European allies.
Dockrill argued that although the Moscow Conference led to a temporary thaw in US-Soviet
relations, "These mutual concessions were purely cosmetic: the Western powers would
continue to have as little influence in internal political arrangements in Romania as the Allied
Council would have in Tokyo". 65
For Turkey, optimistic expectations for the new post-war order were short-lived.  This
was due to an intensifying Soviet propaganda warfare which seemed to have growing
ambitions to envelop additional territories in Europe, Middle East and elsewhere. Following
the end of the war, the Soviet Union had emerged as a vigilant force in the midst of a
devastated Europe. Being one of the winners, it had openly launched a series of revisionist
demands on the Red Army occupied territories of Eastern Europe, and proved to have further
designs in other parts of the globe. Encouraged by the vacuum in this newly shaping
international environment, the SU demanded a revision of the Montreux convention of 1936,
and the transfer of Turkish provinces of Kars and Ardahan - to restore the pre-WW I status
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quo since these provinces were gained by Russia at the Congress of Berlin, but lost again to
the Ottoman Empire after the Great War. Besides, it was demanded of Turkey to break its
relations with Britian and conclude a treaty “similar to those the Soviet Union was concluding
with the nations of eastern and south-eastern Europe.” 66 Not surprisingly, examples of
Moscow’s twisted rhetoric did no cease even after Turkey declared war on Germany.
At this stage, İnönü’s policy line proved to be right. Indeed, the Turkish leadership was
criticised both in domestic political circles and in the international arena for its over cautious,
slow - but in fact, calm and collected - policy. Turkey was in a key position in the Balkans
and the Middle East, and both Britain and Germany wanted the country as an active ally.
Ankara’s decision to ally with Britain was another fact. However, events proved that Turkey
was almost obliged to confine itself with the rules of a cautious neutrality. Then, from
Berlin’s standpoint a change in Turkey’s attitude to benevolent neutrality was regarded as an
important diplomatic gain at Britain’s expense. This occurred in June 1941 when Ankara
signed a treaty with Berlin.
The Nazi Reich had also pressed for a secret protocol allowing them deliveries of military
personnel and war material across Turkey into Iraq and Syria. Facing all these challenges and
a highly unpredictable and chaotic course of international events, İnönü had based his policy
on the following policy calculations which amazingly all came into existence:
i) The Western Powers and the democratic front would eventually win the war;
ii) It was rightful to adhere into an alliance with Britain and France;
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 iii) Both Germany and Russia would try to draw Turkey into an alliance or at least into a
state of benovelent neutrality towards them. However, none of these might be an alternative,
but a lethal entrapment for Turkey. Vis-a-vis these powers, Turkey should seek the ways it
could strengthen its hand and apart from its geo-strategic assets, the only way for this was to
rely on an alliance with the democratic countries of the West;
iv) During the WW, the real threat for Turkey had been generated from the Soviets. So
the calculations of Turkey should have a special emphasis on avoiding this power;
v) There would inevitably be a war between Germany and Russia. In this case, alliance
with Britain and France would acquire an additional meaning in the name of Turkey’s
security. As will be discussed below, this new international arena paved the way for a
rapprochement to be later institutionally strengthened, as Turkey on the one side, the USA
and Britain on the other.
It can be evaluated that the threat posed by the totalitarian regimes had necessitated
Ankara to constitute an uniterrupted policy of integration with the West. It was clearly
understood that these regimes could unite around their objectives and create blocs as well.
With a view to this fact, it was unthinkable that Turkey could follow an independent course
without integrating its foreign policy to that of the democratic grouping of states. As will be
discussed next, Ankara’s steps in this direction indicated that no alliance could be maintained
through an evasive policy and alliances could prove to be costly.
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III TENSIONS REVEALED: PRELUDE TO WAR, COLD AND  HOT, AND THE
BEGINNINGS OF THE TURKISH QUEST FOR  SECURITY (1946)
This chapter discusses the emergence of the crisis in Turkish Soviet relations in 1946 and
Ankara‘s increasing security concerns throughout the same year. In this context, it is first
explained that at a time when Turkey, Greece and Iran were under pressure of the Kremlin,
ambivalance prevailed in Washington as to what extent it could counterbalance the Soviet
moves, and which policy it should follow in regard to these countries. Subsequently, the
chapter focuses on the main events of the period under review, the visit of USS Missouri and
the Turkish-Soviet exchange of Notes (concerning the Soviet demands for a re-arrangement
of the Straits regime and Ankara’s rejection of these demands), being the most important
ones.
III . 1 “In the Near East Things Are Not Always What They Seem” 67
 By the turn of 1946, the Soviet press and radios had intensified their broadcasting
campaign against Turkey. The broadcasts propagandized that Turkey had served Axis interest
                    
67 Statement of Dean Acheson in explaining the events in Iran. Dean Acheson, Present at the
Creation, p. 197.
lxxii
during the war, that the Turkish government had fascist tendencies; and, in addition to
Georgians, the Armenians had also legitimate rights over Turkey. Turkey’s reply came on
January 6, when Turkish Premiere Saracoğlu explained in his statement to the press in
Ankara that Soviet Russia had no rights over Kars and Ardahan. Those provinces had been
ceded to Russia at the end of the 1878 Berlin Agreement, for the first time in history, in
exchange for a huge war indemnity - an amount which couldn’t be met - but were returned to
Turkey following WW I through a plebiscite as well by the Brest-Litovsk (1918) treaty,
reiterated by the subsequent Moscow and Kars Agreements (1921). Addressing the claims of
Georgian professors, Saracoğlu pointed out that throughout those claimed areas Turks were
in the majority and these claims resembled Hitler’s well-known “living space” theory. In this
context, Saracoğlu also explained his gratitude to the world press that supported Turkey’s
rightful cause. 68
A few days before Saracoğlu’s press conference, the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs,
H. Saka, had arrived in London on January 3 to attend the first session of the UN General
Assembly which was to be held on January 10. Saka interviewed allied and friendly
statesmen for an entire week. While these deliberations were going on, Turkey’s participation
in the founding organizations of the free world was increasing through its adherence to
another major agreement. In this framework, on January 4, 1946, Turkey, Belgium,
Denmark, France, Greece, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Norway, Britain and the USA signed
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the Agreement of European Coal Organisation in London. 69 Subsequently, on his way back
to Ankara, Saka paid a visit to Paris where he held similar talks with his interlocutors.
Meanwhile, the watershed in US-Soviet relations came in February 9 when Stalin
delivered another major speech and described the causes of war. In this context, the war, he
said, had been caused not by Hitler but by the workings of the capitalist system:”...Marxists
have declared more than once the capitalist system of world economy harbors elements of
general crises and armed conflicts and that, hence, the development of world capitalism in
our time proceeds not in the form of smooth and even progress but through crises and
military catastrophes.” 70  If Stalin’s analysis was correct, there was no essential difference
between Germany and the Soviet Union’s allies in the war against Germany. A new war was
inevitable sooner or later, “and the Soviet Union was experiencing armistice, not a true
peace.” 71
On February 22, George Kennan sent his telegram to express his views that were already
known and widely accepted within the US government. Kennan's cable is rightly regarded as
one of the landmark documents of the early Cold War period.72 In it, Kennan stated that:
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...Wherever it is considered timely and promising, efforts will be
made  to  advance  official limits of Soviet power. For the
moment, these efforts are restricted to certain neighboring points
conceived of here as being of immediate strategic necessity, such
as northern Iran, Turkey,...a "friendly" Persian Government
might be asked to grant Russia a port on Persian Gulf... 73
...Where individual governments stand in path of Soviet purposes
pressure will be brought for their removal from office. This can
happen where governments directly oppose Soviet foreign policy
aims (Turkey, Iran),... 74
Indeed, the crisis over Iran, indicated the way the Cold War was to be conducted. The
country had been occupied by Britain and the Soviets since 1941 and both countries had
agreed to withdraw by 2 March 1946. However, even before the war ended, the Soviets tried
to exact an oil concession from the Iranian government. Failing to realize this, the Soviets
began to encourage the northern province of Azerbaijan to establish its independence under
their influence. The Soviets backed concurrently the leftist Tudeh party to spread its
organization in the country. However, the Soviet designs reached a climax in January
following the establishment of a Soviet sponsored “Mahabad Republic” of Kurds. The
republic was headed by Ghazi Muhammed and the Kurdish warlord Molla Mustapha Barzani
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who had fled from Iraq following his rebellion, and undertook the defense ministry with
3.000 militia. 75
In its turn, the Truman administration aimed to counter the Soviet aims. American
support was given to the Shah's decision to send troops to the northern border. The issue had
come before the Security Council between January 28-30, 1946, and the US Secretary of
State, Byrnes, had also seized the chance to publicly condemn the Kremlin since then. After a
deadline for the withdrawal of Soviet forces passed in March 1946, the US Embassy in
Moscow issued notes of protest to the Kremlin.
Explicitly, once Germany was defeated, the Soviets had shifted to re-evalaute their
position over the lands they began to control in Europe and ceased to cooperate with their
former Allies. As a result of the war, the SU had extensive territories under its sphere of
influence. Equally significant was the fact that the governments set up, after Poland,
Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia were liberated by the Red Army were
under the influence of the Soviets. It was in these circumstances that Winston Churchill, on a
visit to America early on 5 March 1946 said: “From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the
Adriatic, an Iron Curtain has descended.... Behind that line lie all the capitals of the States
of Central and Eastern Europe - all are subject in one form or another not only to Soviet
influence but to a very high and increasing measure of control from Moscow.” 76
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Turning back to the Soviet onslaught in Iran, exchanges of grave notes between Soviet
Ambassador Andrei Gromyko and Byrnes regarding the situation in this country followed. 77
On March 6, Washington issued a strong protest to Moscow on the basis of the US-UK-
Soviet tripartite treaty of 1942. However, the situation continued to deteriorate. The US
representative in Tabriz reported that by March 19, a minimum of 235 Soviet tanks and 3500
trucks had passed into Azerbaijan through the railhead in Tabriz. Concurrently, the Soviet
troops appeared to be strategically heading in the direction of Turkey and Iraq.  At this
juncture, Iran called upon the UN for assistance and intense negotiations ensued, which
shortly afterwards culminated in a worldwide support to Iran. Then the SU agreed to
withdraw its forces, but quickly created a local militia “stiffened by a cadre of Soviet
‘volunteers’ numbering about 800” 78 as well. Following the Soviet withdrawal, the Tabriz
government created in Iranian Azerbaijan and the Kurdish republic were completely
dissolved. Ghazi Muhammad, the President of the Kurdish republic was executed on March
31, while Barzani passed to the SU. 79
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The Russian troops withdrew in April, but the Majlis (Iranian parliament) repudiated the
joint oil company. Tension increased again as the Tudeh Party demanded an election under
its control. 80 Then, the USA sent a favourable response to the Iranian Government’s request
for strong support should the SU object to Iranian forces entering Azerbaijan. When the
troops arrived, the separatist regime collapsed and shortly afterwards the whole province was
reacquired. In May of that year, when the Soviet forces completed their withdrawal from
Iran, the crisis was over.
The Soviets’ withdrawal from Azerbaijan, however, was not acclaimed as a signal that the
Kremlin had accepted a more reasonable attitude towards Turkey       or that it had
abondened its ambitions to encroach on Iranian and Turkish sovereignty. 81 W. Bedell Smith,
the US Ambassador to Moscow, suggested that Russia’s determination to gain a foothold in
the region reflected the Soviets’ conviction that their security interests were at stake and that
they desired to gain independent access to the Mediterranean and the Arab world by severing
the British Empire’s “jugular” at Suez. Smith stressed that if the SU portrayed a friendly face
to Turkey, it would be a purely tactical and temporary action, “as the Russians since the time
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of czars had linked advances in the Near East to their domination (or ‘liberation’, in Soviet
parlance) of Turkey.” 82
As for Turkey’s foreign policy towards the Middle East, Ankara was interested in
developing its relations with the countries of the region through completing a series of basic
treaties. In this context, the treaty of friendship and good neighbourhood between Turkey and
Iraq was signed on March 29, 1946 in Ankara by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Saka and
the Secretary General Erkin and the President of the Iraqi House of Representatives, Nourry
As-Said, and the Iraqi Regent Prince Abdulilah. In fact, the Turco-Iraqi treaty was more than
an expression of a wish to perpetuate friendly relations between the two countries. The treaty
was concluded to last for an indefinite period and included six additional protocols envisaging
a broad range of cooperation which pertained to: the regulation of the waters of Euphrates
and Tigris; mutual assistance on the issues of security; education, training and cultural
affairs, mailing, cable and telephone services; economic affairs and border controls. 83
   Having concluded an important framework treaty with Iraq, in Ankara there was still a
sense of urgency for assuring the security of the country. To justify these concerns, a few
days before the US decision to send military advisers to Iran, the Soviets also tried to bring
pressure to bear on Turkey to permit Soviet troops to have bases near the Straits. Together
with this, the Turkish provinces of Kars and Ardahan were also claimed by the SU within the
context of restoring the pre-WW I status quo. This incident reinforced the already strong
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suspicions of Washington. A special report prepared for President Truman by his White
House aide, Clark Clifford, stated that, “compromise and concessions are considered by the
Soviets, to be evidence of weakness.” 84  Here, it was also underlined that the USA must
avoid the error of 'appeasement' and should even be prepared to go to war if necessary to
resist Stalin's ambitions for world conquest. 85 As will be explained below, in his turn,
Truman decided to give a decisive response to Soviet strategic maneuvers.
III . 2 The US Gunboat Diplomacy in the Mediterranean and Its Aftermath
On November 11, 1944,  the Turkish Ambassador to Washington, Mehmet Münir
Ertegün died in Washington, not a very important event at a time when Allied forces were
sweeping across France and Eastern Europe towards Germany and Berlin and Tokyo were
approaching the imminent end. Sixteen months later, however, the ambassador’s remains
were the “focus of world attention as the curtain went up on a classic act in the use of armed
forces as a political   instrument.” 86
Subsequently, on March 6, 1946 the Department of State announced that the late
Ambassador Ertegün’s remains would be sent to Turkey aboard the battleship USS Missouri,
visibly the most powerful warship in the US Navy and the ship on board which General
Douglas MacArthur had recently accepted Japan’s surrender. It was also decided that the
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Missouri would be accompanied by two cruisers, USS Providence and USS Power during its
mission. Between the ambassador’s death and this announcement, not only had WW II ended,
the cold war - as yet untitled - had begun. In addition to conflicts between Washington and
the Kremlin over Poland, Germany and other areas, the Kremlin had demanded from Ankara
the cession of  two provinces in the east and in the west, a base in the Straits. 87
The USS Missouri and the two cruisers left New York on March 22, and arrived in
İstanbul on April 5. On the same day an extra-ordinary welcoming ceremony with dozens of
gun salutes for the visit from Turkish battleships was made. The ceremony was attended by
the personal representative of Truman, A. Veddell, representative of the State Department,
George Allen, Admiral Henry Hewitt and Rear Admiral Jules Cames who were in the US
delegation and Ambassador Wilson, and the representatives of the President of TGNA, Prime
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Ministry and the MFA, respectively, MP Halit Bayrak, Cemal Yeşil and Ambassador Şevki
Berker, Governor of İstanbul, Lütfi Kırdar, General Cahit Toydemir and Asım Tınaztepe.
The next day, the US delegation paid a visit to Ankara where they were received by
President İnönü. Regarding the visit, Prime Minister Saracoğlu stated that “the youngest and
the most perfect child of our old world America and the Americans, the flags of humanity,
justice, freedom and civilization in their hand, are marching onwards establishing a great
world of humanity of the United Nations with strong and unwavered steps.” 88 Saracoğlu also
expressed that Turkey would take its place in the frontiers the USA would form and remain
next to them [the Americans] “to serve the great cause.” 89 The Turkish Chief of the General
Staff, Kazım Orbay expressed similar views and said that Turkey was aware of the noble
meaning in the demonstration of friendship through the assignment of Missouri, a historical
and one of the mightiest ships of the US Navy, to the mission of returning the body of
Ambassador Ertegün. It was the first time since the end of the war that American vessels
were in Turkish waters. This, to some extent, proved that the US was ready to face any
danger, not only in the Pacific, but in the waters of the Mediterranean as well which
dominated European affairs. 90 George Harris stated that to the man on the street here at last
was tangible proof that Turkey did not stand alone, despite the refusal of the American
visitors to confirm openly that their mission was more than a mere courtesy call. Regarding
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the Turkish press, it hailed the USA as the defender of “peace, right, justice, progress and
prosperity.” 91
As for the commentaries of the leading newspapers, repercussions of this incident were
quite positive at large. N. Nadi wrote in Cumhuriyet that “the people of İstanbul joyfully
welcome Missouri which visits the free and blue waters of the free Straits for a few days from
across the Atlantic and see the idealism that works to realize tomorrow’s peaceful world in
the mighty features of this greatest American     battleship.” 92 Another comment was made in
Vakit which pointed out that the visit of the US vessels to İstanbul coincided with a turn of
events around the Iranian question towards acquiring a character in accordance with the UN
Charter:
It would be right to consider this coincidence as an auspicious
sign...the US might assign another ship in order to send Ertegün’s
body to Turkey...the dispatch of Missouri, the symbol of
American victory in the Far Eastern war is enough to express that
a distinguished meaning other than a mere demonstration of
friendship exists...It is unnecessary to conceal this additional and
distinguished meaning with any policy consideration. On the
contrary, it is in the good of humanity and international peace if
this is understood by the world...We can now believe that the
Russian occupation forces will move out of the territory of  Iran
until May 6...We find a relationship between the coming of
Missouri vessel to Turkish waters and the turn of events around
the Iranian question towards acquiring a character in accordance
with the Charter of the UN. We have an intuition that a meaning
exists in the coincidence of these two incidents indicating the
victory of human rights and international peace.93
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Considerable evidence suggests that no one missed the meaning of this demonstration of
serious concern of the USA about Middle Eastern developments. Washington had not subtly
reminded the Soviets that the USA was a great power and that it could project this power
abroad, even to shores far distant. Whether the visit of USS Missouri and subsequent US
actions deterred the SU from implementing any planned or potential aggressive acts towards
Turkey will probably never be known. “What is clear is that no forceful Soviet actions
followed the visit.” 94 Besides, as an illustration of American support for Turkey vis-a-vis the
SU, the visit of USS Missouri was well received and appreciated by the government of
Turkey, the Turkish press and by the public opinion at large. The US Ambassador Wilson
stated that to the Turks the visit indicated that “the United States has now decided that its
own interests in this area require it to oppose any effort by the USSR to destroy Turkey’s
independence and integrity.” 95
According to Blechman and Kaplan, the 1946 visit to Turkey by the Missouri and further
displays of US military support for Ankara which culminated in the decline of Soviet
pressures on Turkey was an example of discrete political use of the armed forces which
contributed to the establishment of new international relationships, such that US interests
were protected for decades. They pointed out that generally, skilled US diplomacy during
incidents has typically borne fruit only after ambiguous US military commitments were
clarified by the movement of major military units. Their conclusion however, included that
demonstrative uses of the military in some cases with very special circumstances, were often
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effective political instruments in the short them, and that effectiveness declined when
situations were re-examined after long periods of time had elapsed. 96
Undoubtedly, Turkish foreign policy makers were interested in to utilize this momentum
in the economic field as well. In this context, Ankara’s relations with the emerging Western
Bloc was further developed when the TGNA approved Turkey’s adherence to the United
Nations Relief and Reconstruction Agency on May 8, 1946. According to Law No: 4881, the
Government was authorized to adhere to this agency which was founded by the agreement
signed by the UN in Washington on November 9, 1943 as member and pay for Turkey’s
contributions. 97
Turning back to the crisis precipitated by the Kremin’s twisted vision of  world
domination, although the outcomes of the US gunboat diplomacy in the Dardanelles were
favourable, evidence had been accumulating that Stalin’s offensive had further aims. Acheson
explained that geographically the Soviet offensive was concentrated along Russia’s borders in
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Eastern Europe and the Middle East, where the Soviets’ physical position was strongest and
that of the USA weakest. In a tour d’horizon he said:
Politically, it [the Soviet offensive] centered against efforts to
create a United Nations military force and the United States plan
to put atomic energy under effective international control.
Blocking tactics in the United Nations were made easy by Soviet
possession of the veto. The creation of Soviet Satellites succeeded
only where the Red Army was present to reinforce it. When the
attempt moved beyond the Soviet occupied areas of Eastern
Europe to West Germany, the Balkans, and the Middle East, the
United States Government gave fair warning that, if necessary, it
was prepared to meet Soviet force with American force, rather
than with mere protests and resolutions in the United Nations. The
first warning was given in August 1946 . . . 98
Indeed, in the August of 1946, the US Secretary of State, Byrnes found himself
“enfiladed from three fields of fire.” 99 The first question was the settlement of the Yugoslav-
Italian border dispute. Since May, it had turned into a prestige batttle between the Russian
and the Anglo-American positions. On August 9, Yugoslavia forced down, and then on
August 19 shot down unarmed US Army transport planes. Simultaneously, the Kremlin
which had backed Yugoslavia and Bulgaria to pressure Greece to detach its northern
provinces, launched an all-out drive in the UN against Greece in support of an attempted
Communist takeover in Athens by the National Liberation Front (EAM). 100
As for the general problem of the Soviets independent course, the Soviet perception of
post-war settlements was further complicating the process of negotiations. Given this, the
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Council of Foreign Ministers met in London (September 1945); Moscow (December 1945);
Paris (April-May and June-July 1946) and New York (November-December 1946) in
prolonged and finally successful efforts to make treaties with the former Eastern European
Axis satellites. In accordance with the agreement at the Potsdam Conference, the Council of
Foreign Ministers drew up draft peace treaties with Italy, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary and
Finland. 101 The Peace Conference sat in Paris from July 29 to October 15, 1946. It could
only recommend. All final decisions were made by the Council of Foreign Ministers. Then,
the first meeting of the Foreign Ministers in London produced nothing but an unseemly
wrangle. Though the agenda was limited to Europe, Molotov complained repeatedly of the
exclusion of the Soviets from a share in the control of Japan. 102 When the Council of
Ministers next turned its attention to the treaties with Austria and Germany, the SU which
was extensively exploiting Austria's resources, refused to negotiate the German and Austrian
questions separately and no agreement could be attained. 103
In the meantime, the situation in the Balkans in general, and in Turkey and Greece in
particular, could not be improved either. As will be discussed below, on August 7, the Soviet
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Government demanded that Turkey allow the SU to participate in what it called the defense
of the Straits “but which meant the occupation of Turkey.” 104
III 3. Setting the Stage for Turco-Russian Cleavage
In the aftermath of the crisis in Iran and at a time when Greece was still in serious
turmoil, the Soviet note of August 7 marked an ominous phase in the softening-up process of
Turkey.  Indeed, following the Soviet note which Soviet Charge d’affaires conveyed to the
Minister of Foreign Affairs Saka, an atmosphere of extreme caution dominated in Ankara.  A
copy of the note was given to the US and the British governments in the guise of informing
Washington and London of the Soviet wish to assume a greater responsibility in the defense
of the Straits. Here, it was argued that some incidents of the last war had indicated that the
Montreux Convention was no longer adequate to meet the security needs of the Black Sea
states.
The Soviet claims included that during the war, contrary to the convention, some battle
and frigate ships had passed through the Straits. In particular, a demarché was made when
                    
104 Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 195.
lxxxviii
German coast guard ship Seafalke had passed to the Black Sea on July 9, 1941. The note
expressed that in the same year, an Italian frigate ship, Tarvisio, was given permission to
pass to the Black Sea and in October 1942, the SU had informed Turkey that German frigates
each 140 tons were scheduled to pass through the Straits disguised as merchant ships. The SU
had also protested the passage, in May and June of 1944, of eight EMS and five
Kriegstransport type battle and frigate ships. Given these incidents, it was understood that the
convention regarding the Straits could not prevent hostile states to use the Straits against the
SU and other allied states for the purposes of war and “Turkey could not be held
irresponsible in such a situation.” 105 And for this reason the Soviet Government had
proposed to discuss the question of the regime of the Straits. It was known that the
Conference of Three States at Potsdam had agreed on the following:
a) the Three Governments recognized that the Convention regarding the Straits, concluded
at Montreux, should be revised, failing to meet present-day conditions;
b) the Three Governments agreed that as the next step, this matter would be the subject of
direct negotiations between each of the three states and the Turkish Government. 106
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It was also stated that the note of the British Government which was given to the Turkish
Government on November 21, 1945 was known to the Soviets. In fact, this note had followed
the note of the US Government dated November 2, 1945. Both notes had similar departure
points concerning the admittance of a need to revise the Montreux Convention. The note of
the UK, however, was different since it stated that negotiations towards this end was not an
immediate question. Thus, the first three of these principles were in general consonance with
the US and the British     viewpoints. 107
 Against this background, the Soviet demands were explained with brutal clarity:
1. The Straits should be always open to the passage of merchant
ships of all countries.
2. The Straits should always be open to the passage of warships of
the Black Sea powers.
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3.  Passage through the Straits for warships not belonging to the
Black Sea powers shall not be permitted except in cases specially
provided for.
4.  The establishment of a regime of the Straits, as the sole sea
passage, leading from the Black Sea and to the Black Sea, should
come under the competence of Turkey and other Black Sea
powers.
5. Turkey and the Soviet Union, as the powers most interested
and capable of guaranteeing freedom to commercial navigation
and security in the Straits, shall organize joint means of defense of
the Straits by other countries for aims hostile to the Black Sea
powers.  108
 
The Soviet note had been transmitted to the USA and the UK as well and one of the first
things done upon its receipt was to order a respectable naval task force to the Mediterranean,
the USS Missouri arriving in the Bosphorus on April 5. The aircraft carrier, the Franklin D.
Roosevelt and two destroyers, following a rendezvous off the Portuguese coast with two
cruisers and three destroyers proceeded to the Mediterranean. The next step was to develop a
firm position to stand resolutely by the Turkish Government. Truman asserted that this was
an open bid to obtain control of Turkey. “To allow Russia to set up bases in the Dardanelles
or to bring troops into Turkey, ostensibly for the defence of the Straits, would, in the natural
course of events, result in Greece and the whole Near and Middle East falling under Soviet
control.” 109
Then, as expected, the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs which maintained regular
exchange of views with the US Ambassador Wilson and the British Ambassador David Kelly,
increased its efforts to draw Washington and London’s attention to the threat posed by the
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Soviets. In his turn, Wilson informed Washington that the real objective of the Soviets was
not to revise the Montreux Convention but to destroy Turkish independence by introducing to
Turkey its armed forces with the ostensible aim of enforcing the joint control of the Straits
and establishing a friendly regime and make Turkey its satellite. He pointed out that if
Turkey fell under Soviet control, the last barrier would be removed before the Kremlin’s
advance to the Persian Gulf and Suez. Wilson concluded that the assets Turkey provided
should not be allowed to  fritter away. 110
The developing crisis reached its climax when the news on an observable increase in the
military activities of the Soviet troops were reported. McGhee underscored that in this
context, reliable information indicated that the SU, as part of its continuing war of nerves
against Turkey, also directed ground forces towards Turkish territory and held naval
manoeuvres 45 miles off the Turkish coast. In its turn, Turkey, suspecting a real attack,
mobilised its own forces under the guise of manoeuvres. 111
Shortly afterwards, Truman instructed the Departments of State, War and Navy to study
the situation and on August 15, at a meeting in the White House with Acheson, Secretary of
War, Kenneth C. Royall, Secretary of Navy James Forrestal and the Chief of Staff, Dwight
D. Eisenhower, where a report was discussed. Acheson stated that the report expressed the
seriousness of the Russian moves against Turkey and Greece, which aimed at the domination
of the Balkans and the eastern Mediterranean. He said the report asserted that they should be
resisted at all costs and maintained, a note to Moscow “should by its studied restraint impress
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the Russians that we meant every word of it. Where they had valid criticisms of the Treaty of
Montreux, we should say so, but be adamant against any interference with exclusive defense
of the Straits. We recommend making very plain to the Russians, Turks, British and French
that we were in deadly earnest.” 112 Here, it was also noted that if Turkey, under pressure,
agreed to the Soviet proposal, any case which the US might later present in opposition to the
Soviet designs before the UN or to the world public would be materially weakened. Besides,
it was not realistic to count on Turkey’s will to resist by force Soviet attempts to secure bases
in Turkish territory even if it had to fight alone without assurance of support from the USA.
It was explained that the best hope of preserving peace was the conviction that the USA
would not hesitate to join other nations in meeting armed aggression by the force of
American arms.113 On August 16, in view of the delicacy of the situation, the Turkish
Government was advised to assume a reasonable, but firm attitude and was told verbally that
the American position of firm support had been formulated only after full consideration had
been given to the matter at the highest levels.
Meanwhile, the USS Missouri was already in the Dardanelles and during this meeting it
was also urged sending a powerful naval force, including the newly commissioned
supercarrier USS Franklin D. Roosevelt to join the former vessel. Then, Acheson stated:
General Eisenhower asked me in whisper whether I had made it
sufficiently clear that the course we had recommended could lead
to war. Before I could answer, the President asked whether the
General had anything to add. I repeated his question to me. The
President took...a large map of the Middle East and eastern
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Mediterranean and asked us to gather behind him. He then gave
us a brief lecture on the strategic importance of the area and the
extent to which we must be prepared to go to keep it free from
Soviet domination. When he finished, none of us doubted he
understood fully all the implications of our recommendations. 114  
On the following day, on August 19, Acheson delivered the US note to the  Soviet Chargé
d’Affaires, Fedor T. Orekhov and sent copies to Ankara, Paris and London, urging their
government to consider the issue. He told Orekhov that the fourth point in the Soviet note did
not seem to require a revision of the Montreux Convention, but, devising a new regime
would in effect exclude all the non-Black Sea countries. The US Government had already
declared that the regime of the Straits was an international question, the settlement of which
required the contribution of all interested states including the USA. As for the fifth point, the
US Government maintained its position that Turkey should be primarily responsible for the
defense of the Straits and warned: “Should the Straits become the object of attack or threat of
attack by an aggressor the resulting situation would constitute a threat to international
security and would clearly be a matter for action on the part of the Security Council of the
United Nations.” The note also declared that the regime of the Straits “should be brought
into appropriate relationship with the United Nations” while ensuring its “function in a
manner entirely consistent with the principles and aims of the United Nations.” 115 The USA
considered that the establishment of a regime in the Straits was not the exclusive concern of
the Black Sea Powers. The US view was made public as well since two days before this
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interview Acheson had briefed the press, stressing the seriousness of the situation, their
decision to stand firm against any outside military interference with the defence of the Straits,
and the undesirability of speculation upon possible developments. 116
A few days later, in its note of August 21, the British Government declared that it had
long been internationally recognized that the regime of the Straits was the concern of other
states besides the Black Sea powers. Thus, the British Government could not agree with the
Soviet view that the future regime should be the concern of the Black Sea powers and Turkey
alone. As regards the fifth proposal that Turkey and the SU should organize the defense of
the Straits by joint means, it was considered that Turkey, as the territorial power concerned,
should continue to be responsible for defense and control of the Straits. 117
In view of these circumstances, the Turkish formal reply was given to the SU on August
22. It is interesting to note that the Turkish Note was not forwarded to the Soviets before the
US and British Notes were sent. Moreover, on August 20, the US and British Governments
informed Ankara that they had agreed with the “draft of the reply” to be forwarded to the
SU. 118 Given this premise, in its lengthy format, the Turkish Note addressed each of the
Soviet claims concerning the passage of the Axis ships contrary to the convention, and
emphasized that Turkey has strictly applied the rules pertaining to the passage of ships in
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concern. None of the Axis ships were in the list of frigate vessels except Tarvisio - petroleum
ship - whose passage was allowed upon the statement of Italian Embassy, which declared that
it was excluded from this list and it was cruising for purely commercial purposes. The
passage of Tarvisio was not permitted for the second time and Turkey’s determination in this
regard was acknowledged by the Soviet Ambassador on August 25, 1941 in his interview
with the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs. The passage of EMS and Kriegstransport ships
were also in conformity with the convention since the inspections had proved that the load of
these ships were coal, timber and grass and they were not on the list of frigates either.
Therefore, they could ot be regarded under the IInd Annex of the   Convention.
However, based on a reliable intelligence from the UK, forwarded to the Turkish MFA,
which explained that these ships were employed in the navy and joined the activities of
transport of troops, the first ship of this type was interrupted and from then on these
grouping of ships were not permitted to pass through the Straits. It was also underlined that
no breach of the convention was tolerated and the exploitation of Turkey’s good intentions
was not allowed to repeat. The note stated that with the aim of obtaining a regime for the
Straits, completely along the lines of its national interest, the Soviet Government was basing
its evidence on the inadequacy of the regime established by the Montreux Convention to
provide the conditions for the prevention of the hostile use of the Straits against the Black Sea
states. 119 In fact, except for a few incidents of fraudulent passage which were then followed
by the demarchés of the Soviet Embassy, the Soviet Government had not appealed to the
Turkish Government throughout the war for circumstances of passage endangering its
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security in the Black Sea. Besides, the SU had repeatedly observed that despite the facilities it
provided vis a vis tactical and strategic targets, the Axis powers could not dare to force the
Straits. It was emphasized that this was not an outcome of the underestimation of the use of
the assets of the Straits, but an end-result of the power and honesty Turkey maintained,
sometimes at its own expense, in this regard. 120
The note also pointed out that the objective of the Soviet Government was understood to
have been the revision of the Convention in accordance with Article 29, which envisaged a
term of 5 years after which requests for amendment might be directed. If this were the case,
the SU would need at least one other signatory state to endorse its appeal which should be
forwarded to other contracting parties with a minimum period of three months in advance. It
was stated that the “Republican Government which took note of the wish expressed by the
Soviet Government for revision, and on the other hand, desired to satisfy the wish of the
American public opinion concerning the free use of the waterways” 121 did not intend to cause
any difficulty in regard to the examination of any demand for revision in an international
conference, following the approval of the contracting parties and the USA.
Besides, the Turkish Government had favoured the first three articles of the Soviet Note
in compliance with the suggestions of the Note of the USA dated November 2, 1945. The
reply of the Turkish Government to this note had included that Turkey would not hesitate to
seriously examine the issue since it was informed about  the viewpoints of the states present
at Potsdam. The Turkish Government, however, had asserted that it had considered the
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suggestions of the USA in the affirmative and found these proposals to plausibly constitute
the basis for discussions under certain pre-conditions and reservations. As for the
participation of the USA in the proposed conference, the Turkish government stated that it
considered this “not just a realization of an ardent wish, but an international requirement.”
122
However, the 4th and the 5th points of the note were found particularly inconvenient. In
this framework, the 4th point appeared to be claiming the revision of the Straits regime
through introducing new principles by the Black Sea countries and Turkey by excluding the
other signatory states. Such a consideration was assessed as having inadmissable effects since
it disregarded the coherence and the specific clauses pertaining to the revision of the
convention which was agreed to last until 1956 in the first instance. Moreover, it did not
leave room to the wishes of other states which had clearly expressed their will to take a part
in the negotiations.
As for the 5th principle put forward in the Soviet Note, the Turkish Government observed
that it had “no other meaning but the arrangement of a joint Turco-Soviet defense for the
security of the Straits against any violation originating from the Mediterranean.” 123 Thus,
the Soviet proposal was found against the sovereign rights and the security of Turkey. It was
stated that the acceptance of this suggestion would result ending Turkey’s role of balance and
communication, and  the establishment of the so called security of the Black Sea countries
upon the destruction of Turkish security. Besides, the note underlined that the Turkish
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Government had the conviction that wherever any danger might come from, the duty of
defense  belonged to Turkey alone. It was maintained that history had not recorded any
example of war that Turkey participated in where Turkish nation did not perform its duties
for the country. If  Turkey had not the power to defend its sovereign rights over the Straits
through its own instruments, it could not save itself from sharing the destiny of all its
neighbours, which were subjected to violations or military invasion in the greatest war
history registered. 124
Lastly, it was emphasized that at a time in which all nations were contesting to establish
peace and security, it would be a sign of mistrust to demand further reinforcement of a
defense system which proved to be successful in the past. It was also pointed out that in
addition to this strong assurance Turkey extended, in accordance with the new perception of
war, Turkey had considered it rightful to conclude that the security of all states were
primarily under the guarantee of joint forces that both Turkey and the SU allocated to the
authority of the UN. Thus, in all circumstances, including the occurrence of an attack
originating from the Mediterranean - which was stated as impossible - and passing through
the Straits to the Soviet positions in the Black Sea, it was stated that “the Turkish Government
is of the opinion that the Soviet Government should also trust the effectiveness of the
organization of the UN to which the Turkish Government is strongly attached.”  125
Meanwhile, on August 23, 1946, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) reported that they
viewed Kremlin’s moves in the Middle East as “calculated Soviet policy of expanding de
facto geographical control” and concluded that Turkey “was the most important factor in the
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Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East.” 126 Among other things, the JCS underscored
that since Soviet military base rights in the Straits would not provide effective control of
traffic unless such rights were extended to include military dominance of the area for several
hundred miles in all directions. Soviet participation in the defense of the Straits would also
tend to justify further military penetration through the Aegean. If the Soviets attained military
dominance by political concessions in Turkey, there was grave doubt that in the event of a
major world crisis, the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean could be considered militarily
tenable for the non-Soviet powers. It was recognized that an unwavering opposition to the SU
rested essentially on the Turkish Government, that the security interests of Britain were more
direct than those of the USA, and that the American people were not well informed regarding
problems in the region. The JCS suggested encouragement of the Turkish purchase of both
economic and military supplies from the USA. 127 Thus, concurrently with the crisis in
Turco-Russian relations, the rationale for US assistance to Turkey had been established,
while in discussions with Britain the USA gave assurances that it was prepared to assume
greater responsibility in the region.
The SU did, however, continue its reckless policy towards Turkey. Following a short
period of deceptive silence, the SU conveyed its second note dated September 24, 1946 to
Ankara. Although different in texture and intensity, the second Soviet note was more or less
a reshuffle of previous arguments and claims, but this time with a stronger phraesology. It
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cwas firstly stated that the Soviet note of August 7 had not comprised all the incidents of
violationary passages of German and Italian ships from and to the Black Sea. According to
the Soviet note, the Turkish Government’s acceptance of the passage of hostile ships before
the protest of the British Government confirmed the Soviet declaration that the convention on
the Straits was no longer adequate to prevent the use of the Straits for purposes of war. The
overtones of intimidation were not confined to this. It was argued that Turkey had not raised
the issue of revision of the related articles of the convention during the war, and it had not
accepted the need for revision before it became inevitable.
The Soviets also disagreed with the Turkish statement that the SU never applied to the
Turkish Government claiming its security was endangered in the Black Sea as reflecting the
truth. Besides, no correlation between Turkey’s efficiency in regard to the performance of its
duties in the Straits and the hesitation of Axis powers to dare any venture to violate the
regime of the Straits could be made. In this context, it was argued that with a view to these
free passage of enemy ships, the Soviets were compelled to move a significant number of
their forces from the essential areas of the theater of war for the defense of the Black Sea
region. 128
Subsequently, it was put forward that the Black Sea was an inland sea and it was natural
that the passage to this sea was regarded as a matter of greater concern for the Black Sea
states since the positions of these countries could not be compared with other states. Besides,
the case of the Straits differed in terms of the user nations and with a comparison of its
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characteristics to that of other waterways of global importance such as the Gibraltar and the
Suez Canal.
To the astonishment of Turkish officials, the Soviet note explained the Kremlin’s
perception that the special position of the “Black Sea Straits” was recognized through the
Turco-Soviet agreement of March 16, 1921 where it was agreed to deliver the issue of
determination of the definitive status of the Straits and the Black Sea to a conference
composed of riparian states. Moreover, it was stated that a similar clause existed in the
agreement between Turkey and the South Caucasian Soviet states dated October 13, 1921 and
in the agreement of January 21, 1922 between Turkey and the Soviet Socialist Republic of
Ukraine. According to the Soviets, inclusion of the principle of determination of the Straits
regime by the Black Sea riparian states was a clear indication of the degree of importance
these countries and Turkey attributed to the matter. Given these, it was argued that the 4th
point of the Soviet note of August 7, was entirely in harmony with the previous agreements
Turkey had signed since this proposal was designed to help the establishment of the
conditions required for the maintenance of security in the Black Sea. Consequently, this
would reinforce general peace. Moreover, both the experiences of the last war and the
principle concerning the establishment of the Straits regime which was agreed to by the SU,
corresponded to the rightful interests of the Black Sea states and these poins did not
contradict the “stability of the general peace and the interests of the other nations concerned
with the security of  nations.” 129
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At this juncture, Soviet accusations of Axis ship appearances in the Black Sea during the
war were combined with an historical example. This was the assault of the German cruisers
Göben and Breslau to the Russian navy and some Russian harbors in the Black Sea in 1914.
According to the Soviet note, it was “very well remembered” that the two cruisers had
inflicted a serious an unexpected damage, and regarding the proposal of the Soviet Union on
the joint defense of the Straits, these were all considered. The reference of the SU to an event
in the Great War which had emerged as an outcome of the planning of the German Joint Staff
and a small cliqué within the Ottoman Joint Staff, was regarded quite disturbing in this
regard. 
There was another blame directed at Ankara with which the note reached its  abrupt
ending. It was stated that the Soviet Government had felt it necessary to express that the
Turkish Government seemed to have disregarded the decisions of the Big Three as stated in
the Berlin Conference, and in this context, as for the preparations towards a conference on
the regime of the Straits, the demand for an extensive negotiation of the issue through direct
talks was repated.
Interestingly, as it did in replying to the earlier note, before Ankara’s reply, on October
9, Washington again responded to the second Soviet Note although it was not addressed. This
time, the note had been handed by Lt.-Gen. Bedell Smith, US Ambassador in Moscow, to the
Soviet Foreign Ministry. Here, the USA, reiterating its previous position, recalled that in the
protocol of the proceedings of the Potsdam Conference the three governments had recognized
that the Straits Convention should be revised for failing to meet present-day conditions and it
was further agreed that as the next step the matter should be the subject of direct pour-parlers
ciii
between each of the three governments. Through this repetition it was aimed to underscore
that the US Government did not believe that the Potsdam Agreement contemplated that direct
conversations envisaged in the protocol should have the effect of prejudicing the participation
of the other two signatory powers in the revision of the Straits regime. On the contrary, it
was stated, the Potsdam Agreement had definitely contemplated only an exchange of views
with the Turkish Government as a useful preliminary to a conference of all interested powers,
including the USA, to consider the revision of the Montreux Convention. It had also declared
that in the US view Turkey should continue to be primarily responsible for the defence of the
Straits and that should the Straits become the object of an attack or threat of an attack by an
aggressor, the resulting situation would be a matter for action by the UN Security Council.
In its reply on the same day, like the USA, the British Government laid down the same
point that the Potsdam Agreement stated that as the next step, the problem should be subject
of direct conversations between each of the three governments and the Turkish Government.
But, differently, the British Note emphasized that the “next step” had already been completed
by the exchange of views which had “now taken place between these Governments.” As a
result, it saw “no need for or purpose in the continuing direct correspondence on the
subject.” 130 In other words, the future of the Straits regime between Turkey and Russia had
now reached the limit which the British, US and Soviet representatives had in mind when
they agreed at Potsdam that each should discuss the problem separately with the Turkish
Government before moving towards the international conference necessary to revise the
Montreux Convention. As for the points 4 and 5, it was stated that the British attitude
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towards these remained as it was indicated in the note of August 21. Given this, the British
Government was ready to attend a conference of the USA, the SU, the UK, France and all
other signatories of the Montreux Convention, with the exception of Japan, to consider a
revision of that Convention. 131
On October 15, Ankara radio reported that representatives of the British and US
Embassies had had long meetings with Turkish officials at the MOFA and that Turkey
“considering Britain and America party to all negotiations, is keeping them informed of all
developments of the question of negotiations about the Straits,” although the Soviet
Government had failed to send a copy of its Note of Sept. 24 to London and Washington. 132
The nature of Turkish reply to the Soviet Note was indicated in a statement by R. Peker,
the Turkish Prime Minister, to the Ankara correspondent of the Daily Telegraph, on October
17. Peker said that there were no grounds for supposing that the Turkish reply would contain
any modification of Turkey’s position. He declared that Turkey could neither accept the 4th
point of the Russian demands limiting discussions to the Black Sea Powers, which involved
what would amount to bilateral conversations with the Soviet Government, nor the fifth point
demanding the joint defence of the Straits by Turkey and the SU. He stated that Turkey
believed in the UN and said, “no one will admit the right of any Power to make demands on
the territory and sovereignty of another, no matter what strategic convenience is at stake.”
                    
131 Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1946-1948, Vol. VI, p. 8199. On October 10, the problem of
the Straits came up indirectly this time at the Paris Peace Conference. The larger issues involved, of
course, were those of the sovereign rights and the territorial integrity of Turkey.
     For a detailed account of the support of Russian thesis of the mare clausum in the Baltic and
Black Sea Straits, and for some American perceptions of the regime of the Panama Canal which
suggested settling of disputes in this area within the domestic jurisdiction of the USA, see, Harry
Howard, Turkey, the Straits..., footnote (77), p. 252.
132 Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1946-1948, Vol. VI, p. 8199.
cv
Peker pointed out that it had always been the Turkish view that direct conversations
regarding the provisions of the Montreux Convention could only usefully take place provided
all interested parties were included, and that the conversations should only be preparatory to
a general conference. While the continued state of partial mobilisation of the country’s armed
forces was unquestionably accepted by the Turkish people, it hindered the realisation of
government plans for economic development and the resumption of normal life in every
direction. Schools, hospitals, clinics, and the building of 12 000 miles of highways, etc.,
were, he added, among the immediate needs of the country, as well as a great expansion of
textile production, which was at present inadequate to clothe the population. Because of the
present state of alertness however, he said, the Turkish Government could not make an
effective start with its economic and social programme. Peker, expressing full satisfaction
with the British and US attitude, concluded by stressing the five cardinal points of Turkish
foreign policy as follows:
1. To maintain the sovereign rights of the Turkish nation and the territorial integrity of
the Motherland.
2. Confidence in, and loyalty to, its friends and Allies, Britain and the United States.
3. Sincere attachment to the United Nations.
4. Within the framework of these conditions, friendship with its neighbours and especially
the restoration of sincere friendship and reciprocal confidence with the SU in accordance
with the tradition established after the Turkish War of Independence and developed between
the two world wars.
cvi
5. Normal and reciprocal commercial relationships throughout the world. 133
On October 18, a lengthy note of the Turkish Government in reply was forwarded to
Moscow. Here, it was reiterated that with a view to the concrete positions adopted by both
the parties “it would be useful to consider that discussion in the field of diplomacy was
exhausted” 134 and the Turkish Government would accept to go to international arbitration (as
it was stated in its previous note) if the Soviet Government wished to do so as well. As for
the German ships which were subject of Soviet claims once more, since these ships were
built in the dockyards in the Danube, it was expressed that their presence in the Black Sea
could not be related to the will of Turkey. Besides, if they had passed through the Straits this
was because they had not carried any feature of battle or auxiliary support ships.
Regarding the Soviet statement on the Turkish Government’s cession of the circulation of
reports on the navigation in the Straits, it was explained that according to Article 24 of the
Montreux Convention, Turkey was entitled to circulate the reports in concern to the
contracting parties, but not to belligerent forces. Thus, it was explained that the Turkish
Government had asserted that with a view to the interdiction of the passage of the warships
through the Straits while the conflict was going on, and considering that no other war vessels
from other countries were present in the Straits in this period, these reports which remained
unrepresentative of regular peace time statistics, and were not conveyed to the Secretariat of
the League of Nations or to the signatory states. These records were kept on a regular basis.
This being the case, it was assessed that the distribution of information concerning
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commercial navigation activities could have no use and in contrast, would have a negative
effect on the Allied side since such reports would declare that these activities had
considerably decreased as a result of the conflict. It was for this reason that though it had
regularly prepared them, Turkey had dispatched annual reports pertaining to the years 1941-
1944 following the end of the conflicts in 1945, on January 29, 1946. Besides, it was also
worth noting that no signatory state to the Montreux Convention had raised an objection to
Turkey’s conduct. Meanwhile, the riparian states had not informed Turkey of the total
tonnage of their ships in the Black Sea, as of January 1 and July 1 each year, during the
period either, which would naturally be included in these reports. Given this, it was stated
that Turkey had not considered to complain about this attitude of the SU. 135
In sum, Turco-Soviet exchange of Notes in 1946 produced no outcome, but culminated in
a strong suspicion of Ankara of the Kremlin’s intentions towards Turkey. As will be
discussed under the subsequent title, from then on Ankara increased its efforts to side with
the democratic regimes of the western democratic camp. The Turkish policy makers asserted
that the most direct way to achieve this objective was to democraticize the regime in Turkey.
Their consideration would no doubt introduce a fundamental change in the country, but still a
discreet one amidst the controversies of an unpredictable international political atmosphere.
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IV THE FORMULATION OF TURKISH STRATEGIES IN ADAPTING TO A
NEW SECURITY ENVIRONMENT (1945-1947)
This chapter discusses the developments concerning the formulation of Turkish foreign
policy vis a vis the emerging trends in international affairs between 1945 and 1947. Here, the
events leading to USA’s inclusion of Turkey in its foreign assistance program and the
foundation of Economic Co-operation Administration (ECA) in Europe were also examined.
Evidently, following the end WW II, the idea of rejecting totalitarian regimes was
increasingly gaining ground in Turkey and elsewhere. In his turn, İsmet İnönü, who had
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assumed the presidency and the leadership of the RPP after Kemal Atatürk in 1939 was at
odds between his attempts to protect the political status quo or devise a new one. Actually,
this tension between the old and new lasted, perhaps, much shorter than expected. As a result
of President İnönü’s search for a popular support of democratic nations, fundamental changes
were introduced, commencing a multi-party political life in the country as well. As will be
first discussed below, external factors served as a catalyst towards this effect.
IV 1. Turkey’s Response to Emerging Trends in International Affairs
At the end of the war, challenged by the forces of change, the status quo orientation of
Turkish policies were experiencing sporadic and local political disturbances. The destruction
of the one party regimes in Italy and Germany, the adherence of Turkey to the UN
Declaration, and closer relations with the West considerably weakened the foundations of
one-party rule in Turkey. Accordingly, the political atmosphere abroad, especially in the
USA, made it apparent that without a democratization of its political system Turkey would
not be able to gain in the West the proper moral recognition it desired and needed. Besides,
the strains of discontent at home, stemming from various economic social measures taken
during the war had become “so serious that it was necessary to ‘open a safety-vale’ to
prevent a general upheaval”. 136
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In this period, the challenging needs of the government during the war forced it to pursue
ways in which it could simply increase its revenues to perform its role as a provider of
welfare and to support an army which was kept fully mobilized for years throughout the war.
As a result, in 1942, the government shifted to other measures: the capital tax, and the
compulsory sale of a part of the agricultural production to the state below the market price.
Through the capital tax, it was intended to levy tax on war profits emerging out of
commercial activities. However, it caused a serious burden on the weak middle class, which
started to believe that the small merchants and agricultural producers had mistakenly devoted
their efforts and capital for further production and investment. Besides, the compulsory sales
which were expanded during the war damaged both the farmers and infant bourgeoisie.
In fact, in 1942, the German armies were concentrating their strongholds throughout
Europe and being deployed in key areas. At a such a point in time, Ankara had shifted to
implement the “capital tax” on the revenues of non-Muslims. Correspondingly, anti-semitist
propaganda and the claims of the non-Muslims selfishness regardless of the countries
domestic socio-economic problems were also increasingly tolerated in the press, radio and
elsewhere and shortly afterwards, the first group of indebted was sent to Ashkale in January
1943. Despite the fact that Ankara’s measures against non-Muslims never acquired a wicked
nature similar to that of Nazis, considerable evidence suggest that in this move, İnönü had
planned to divert the attention of the Axis war machine to somewhere else, and give a
message that Turkey was considering to give credit to the new order envisaged by the
revisionists.
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But, İnönü was pursuing a meticulously calculated policy. Within a year, when he saw
that the course of the global conflict was gradually removing Turkey out of the scope of
belligerent powers, this time he decided to lift the pressures on non-Muslims in the country
to the extent of abolishing the working camps. It was also declared that the taxpayers would
pay their debts without leaving their homes. 137
This was followed by another foreign policy oriented decision of Ankara in domestic
politics. In 1944, when the Red Army was gaining victories, İnönü administration then
turned against the Pan-Turanists, who were shortly after found guilty of racist activities 138.
Explicitly, with these steps, İnönü was aiming at sending a message to the Soviets that
Turkey would not allow the activities of the racists and those sympathetic to the Nazi empire.
 At this juncture, by accepting the Charter of the UN, Turkey moved towards the
democratization of its regime. It decidedly set the stage for the opposition to one-party rule,
since it provided the dissidents with legal and moral arguments against the one-party system,
and encouraged them to bring their opposition into the open and to seek popular support. The
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Turkish delegation to San Francisco was instructed to declare that liberalization was under
way in Turkey. In this context, it was also underlined that after the war every democratic
tendency would be allowed to develop in the country.  A few days later, İnönü declared on
May 19, 1945,
...the political regimé and the government of the people
established by the Republican regime shall develop in all aspects
and in every way, and as the conditions imposed by war
disappear, democratic principles will gradually acquire a larger
place in the political and cultural life of the counrtry. The Grand
National Assembly, our greatest democratic institution, had the
Government in its hand from the very beginning and constantly
developed the country in the direction of democracy. 139
After the relatively stagnant first few months, contrary to the RPP’s liberalization
promises, a destructive action took place in İstanbul on December 5, 1945 and in a couple of
hours crowds destroyed leftist  journals and magazines as well as bookstores that were selling
Soviet literature. This incident could be explained in part by the deterioration in Turco-Soviet
relations prompted by the Soviet demands on Turkey. But undoubtedly, it once more covered
the beginnings of democracy in Turkey with a cloud of fear and suspicion.
Ş. Süreyya Aydemir pointed out that İnönü and the RPP Group had decided that under the
existing laws an opposition could not flourish and it was an outstanding necessity to complete
the legal framework before the general elections. Shortly afterwards, on April 29, 1946 a law
concerning the modification of the clauses of the law of municipalities pertaining to elections
was enacted. This was followed by the law of amendment of the elections law and the
modification of the law on associations. Subsequently, on June 11, 1946, clauses of the law
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on the administration of provinces concerning elections were changed. Shortly afterwards,
elections for the municipalities, provinces and the Assembly were scheduled. 140
As a result of the control imposed on elections, the majority in the TGNA (396 seats) was
easily attained by the RPP. In its turn, the DP won 65 seats in uncoercible regions including
İzmir and İstanbul. Having been rather discomforted since the notorious election results of
1946, when RPP rule experienced the very first challange against its power, but managed to
keep it in its hands in one way or another, the numbers suspicious of the honesty of the
foundations of RPP rule were constantly rising. Indeed, 1946 elections where open voting
and closed counting of votes system raised considerable criticisms. It was claimed that
counting of votes and announced results were untrustworthy. Under these circumstances, on
May 6, 1946, in a public speech, İnönü expressed that “...in this period it is required to
make it clear as to which direction and understanding Turkey’s policy would take. We saw
the necessity in this regard with a view to the great interests of the country...” 141 Thus,
advised by President İnönü, the Turkish Government had clearly defined a direct relationship
between the success of democratization process in the country and achieving a defensive
partnership with the western grouping of states.
Undoubtedly, the first democracy experience of Turkey in the general elections of July
21, 1946 was marked by a great debate. From then on, both external and internal
developments served to prepare the ground for political freedoms and necessitated the easing
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of the political restrictions. Thus, in the light of strong criticisms of the Ankara regime,
İnönü had gradually shifted to revise his attitude against his political opponents. Under such
external and internal pressures, İnönü began to exhibit a conciliatory attitude towards his
critics. 
While maintaining a democratisation process in the country, there is ample evidence to
believe that İnönü did not adopt a hasty anti-Soviet foreign policy. In contrast, he paid special
attention to personal likes and dislikes between the Turkish statesmen and the Kremlin
leaders. Erkin related one of the episodes in regard to the Kremlin’s indirect messages to
İnönü to have Prime Minister Saracoğlu removed and have him replaced by another person
who would be ameanable to wishes of the SU. He maintained that by January 1946, the
Soviets began to implement tactics towards this end. The most direct attempt was made
however, on an informal ground, during a reception by a foreign ambassador in honour of
the acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nurullah Sümer. According to Erkin, the host had the
audacity to approach Sümer and following a tour d’horizon on the reasons of the disturbing
tension which poisoned the Turco-Soviet relations and had adverse effects on the political
situation of Europe too, to tell him - as a very confidential secret - that the prevailing distrust
that the Kremlin leaders felt towards Saracoğlu and his cabinet was the major reason why the
Turco-Soviet relations could not be improved. 142
Erkin stated that having been told of such an undiplomatic and an discourteous act, he
himself called in the foreign representative to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and informed
him in the strongest terms possible that the Turkish Government would not permit the foreign
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representatives to interfere in its domestic affairs, and neither would it tolerate public
statements by such envoys concerning their approval or disapproval of its conduct. However,
as events unfolded, it was understood that Moscow’s assertive policy towards Ankara would
remain unaltered. Then, Secretary General of the MFA, disclosed the subsequent Soviet
ouverture. Although he had not disclosed the details of the first incident, he stated that this
time at a reception held by the British Ambassador, Maurice Peterson, in mid-February, to
the disturbance of Ankara, an unexpectedly lengthy discussion between the acting Minister of
Foreign Affairs, Sümer and the Soviet Ambassador Vinogradov had taken place. 143
Under these circumstances, Turkey’s inclusion in the US aid bill was brought to the
agenda. Concurrently, during the debates in the US Congress on the military aid to Turkey
and Greece, the heated discussions on this aid focused on Turkey’s political regime. On April
12, 1947, a US delegation headed by Congressman Barkley, visited Ankara. The aid bill
which included a provision allowing American radio and newspapermen freely to transmit
news concerning the implementation of the aid program was eventually accepted by the
Congress.
Undoubtedly, the Turkish Government followed the debates in the American Congress
closely. Shortly after the decision of the Congress, President İnönü stated to a correspondent
of the Associated Press that American aid was a step towards the defense of democracy and
that closer relations between Turkey and the USA would contribute to the firm establishment
of democracy in Turkey.
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Meanwhile, opposition within the RPP began to organize itself in a more concrete manner
as well. Different tendencies in the party paved the way to forming of two rival groups. The
first group were the “extremists”headed by Prime Minister Peker, who opposed any
compromise and tried to give the opposition a subordinate role, while the second group, the
otuzbeşler (thirty-fives) emerged as moderate and younger Republicans. The position of
otuzbeşler became clear in the RPP Group’s seven hour debate in August 1947 on the policies
of the Peker government. At the conclusion, 303 deputies voted in Peker’s favor and thirty-
four against him. In the end, despite the great number of votes in his favor, Peker’s position
was shaken, because the votes cast against him meant that the government did not have the
confidence of the party hierarchy. In an attempt to satisfy the critics, Peker changed six
members of the cabinet, which, however, increased the disturbances within the RPP since
they were not consulted prior to this. Meanwhile, Peker’s disagreement with İnönü, who
expressed that the approval of the the TGNA of the recent changes in the Cabinet should
immediately be assured in order to comply with the Constitutional process, was mounting.
Eventually the TGNA approved the changes, whereas three days later Peker resigned in view
of the assessments in the party concerning the cabinet even after it received a vote of
confidence. Shortly afterwards, the Hasan Saka Cabinet - the Turkish Minister of Foreign
Affairs who had signed the San Francisco Charter - was established on September 10, 1947.
The period in which the cabinets of H. Saka served was marked with an expectation that
he would better the relations between the government and the opposition. It is also worth
noting that since the beginning of WW II, İnönü had adopted a particular strategy in regard to
the changes of governments and this was greatly based on the nomination of Minister of
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Foreign Affairs as Prime Ministers. Thus, even the manner in which the changes came is
reflective of the adaptive capabilites of the Turkish political system to maintain its permanent
features. This being the case, upon Saracoğlu’s resignation, Hasan Saka was re-appointed as
Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Recep Peker Government which remained in office
between August 7, 1946 and September 9, 1947. Aydemir stated that Peker was a man of the
one-party regime and he could act as a strong administrator in a totalitarian regime. In fact,
İnönü had first proposed the Premiership to Hilmi     Uran. 144 However, Uran declined this
offer, suggesting Peker to this post. With a view to these considerations, İnönü’s nomination
of Peker was a half-hearted decision. Shortly afterwards, the Turkish President’s
unwillingness surfaced in his decision to appoint Saracoğlu as the Deputy Head of the Party.
145 Following the resignation of Peker, this time İnönü instructed Saka to form the new
cabinet on September 10, 1947. On June 10, 1948, following a reshuffle by President İnönü,
Hasan Saka formed his second cabinet in which Necmettin Sadak kept his position as
Minister of Foreign Affairs. 146 Despite the fact that Saka resigned on June 8, 1948 and was
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reappointed as Prime Minister,  the political situation in Turkey had been acquiring a
relatively stable course while liberalization was showing rapid progress.
IV. 2 The Situation on Turkey’s Western Flank Levels the US Aid
 
Considerable evidence suggests that by the year following the end of WW II, the US
administration had left behind the times it was at odds between a confrontation or seeking
peace with the SU, and decided to shift to a policy less tolerant of the Soviet ambitions. The
US and Soviet forces had confronted each other in Iran, with the Kremlin relinquishing
claims to the northern portion of the country. Negotiations over the fate of Germany had
faltered and the prospect of a permanently divided Germany seemed more and more likely.
The gathering storms of Cold War were contributing to respond to such situations harsher
than ever.
Despite these developments, the Kremlin continued to maintain its foreign policy based
upon expanding the territory under its control and weakening its potential opponents. No
doubt, the crisis in Turco-Soviet relations was among the most significant trouble-spots
which required diligent and considered effort on the part of the USA if Soviet efforts for
penetration were to be prevented. However, a scheme for the systematic support of regimes
opposing the Soviet menace was still unorganized. A thoughtful observer then could see that
the Soviets would not consider to hold back. As will be discussed below, shortly afterwards,
the Kremlin did not hesitate to make another attempt to flow into the Straits.
cxix
In view of these circumstances, the primary Turkish effort was to strengthen its ties with
the West to secure strong support for its territorial integrity and sovereignty in the face of
Soviet irridentist claims. Towards the end of January 1947, the US Ambassador Wilson
visited General Secretary of the MFA, Erkin. Erkin stated that it was usual for the British
Ambassador to visit him once a week while Wilson made these kind of visits two to three
times a week. This time Wilson was scheduled to leave for Washington shortly after his
interview with Erkin. In his talk with the Turkish General Secretary, Wilson explained that
Turkey’s determined and calm resistance against the menacing attitude of the Soviets aroused
great admiration in the USA and with these bold efforts Turkey was not only defending itself,
but was also undertaking a defensive role in the name of the Western Europe and the USA.
In his turn, Erkin told Wilson that his assessments were entirely true, and in case of
aggression Turkey was determined to defend itself whatever the cost and degree of pressure
would be and the calm behaviours observed was the peace and the calm of people who had
decided to perform their duties for the motherland. However, this will of Turkey compelled
it to keep a large army in mobilization which brought the Turkish economy to the brink of
collapse. Given this, Erkin inquired if the concerned countries which were the beneficiaries
of Turkey’s efforts might be urged to share the financial burden emerging from these
defense expenditures. Then, Wilson, according to Erkin, remained silent as “Sphynx” for a
while, and continued his course of talk without addressing Erkin’s statement.
Following the talks, as usual, Erkin sent a copy of his interview to the President, Prime
Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The day after, İnönü invited the General
Secretary and congratulated him for his timely demarché he made in his talks with the US
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Ambassador. However, R. Peker who was nominated as Premier following the elections of
July 1946 was critical of Erkin’s statement. To the disturbance of Erkin, Peker argued that
his demarché might have negative implications. Erkin explained to Peker that his reply was
prompted by Wilson’s speech and it was his duty to elaborate on this. The conversation
ended in such an atmosphere after which Erkin decided to leave his office for a post in
Rome. 147 The following months would prove that Erkin’s statement had prompted the
inclusion of Turkey in the financial aid program for Greece which was launched following
the British Government’s informing of Washington that it desired to turn over its
undertakings towards this country. 148
Meanwhile, specific warnings concerning the situation in Greece had been crossing
Truman’s desk for weeks. As early as February 3, the US Ambassador in Athens, Lincoln
MacVeigh, reported rumors that the British were pulling out of Greece, where, since 1945,
their forces and finance had helped maintain a royalist government in a raging civil war with
Communist guerrillas. On February 12, another dispatch from MacVeigh urged immediate
consideration of American aid to Greece. A few days later, Mark Ethridge, publisher of the
Louisville Courier-Journal and a member of a UN investigating committee, cabled from
Athens that Greece was a “ripe plum” ready to fall into Soviet hands.
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In his analysis of the Communist onslaught in Greece, Acheson pointed out that
Ambassador Lincoln MacVeagh had informed in December, 1946 that the SU wanted
complete control of Greece and would interfere with all positive steps by the Greeks to save
themselves. 149 Meanwhile, warnings about Turkey had come even sooner, and Turkey had
“little hope of independent survival unless it is assured of solid long-term American and
British support,” cabled Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, who had replaced Averell Harriman as
the American Ambassador in Moscow. 150
At this juncture, Erkin’s assessments are worth noting with regard to the accumulated
evidence on the strong correlation between the course of events in Iran, Greece and Turkey.
Erkin pointed out that the Soviet efforts aimed at the domination of the Mediterranean were
not merely confined to the political and military pressure exercised on Turkey, but
contstantly supported by the plans applied in Greece and Iran as well. He explained that since
the failure of the civil war in Greece, subversive activities of Communism was provoking
conflict between the Communists and the non-Communists on the one hand, and supporting
the “Balkan insurgents” in their war of attrition against the Greek army and the public on the
other. He explained that through this the SU aimed at destroying a British out-guard post in
the Mediterranean and on the same occasion, obtaining the control of the Dodecanese islands
which were “granted” to Greece in a hasty manner in the Italian Peace Conference through
the support of the Soviet Government, though they belonged to Turkey in historical and
geographical terms in one way or another. Then, eventually, Turkey would suffer and the SU
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would use Greece to spread its influence to Italy and ultimately acquire the most convenient
opportunity towards the establishment of Communism in Europe with its all consequences.
Then, Erkin combined the cases of Greece and Iran and stated that the Soviet intervention
had also caused a tragic crisis in Iran. Moscow had attempted to establish an obedient
government in Tehran, annex Azerbaijan, terminate the British influence over this country
and capture oil reserves both in the south and north of Iran. “It was not the product of an
ordinary coincidence that all these plans were applied in a harmonious way in Greece,
Turkey and Iran.” 151 He further assessed that though in appearance, the campaign which was
carried on in a balanced way in Greece and Iran had a local meaning, in reality, it had an
extensive nature.
Turning back to discussions at Ankara, in late March, while Erkin was still in his office,
Wilson paid another visit to him. He stated that he had explained the difficulties of Turkey
regarding the large army it constantly maintained. And when he conveyed this message to
Washington, concurrently, due to a serious lack of resources, the UK had stated its wish to
transfer its undertakings towards Greece to the USA. At this juncture, upon the statements of
Wilson and the directive of the Secretary of State, it was decided to add Turkey to this aid
program, which was named the Truman Doctrine and would be announced in the near term.
152
In fact, as explained by the Minister of Finance, N. Esat Sümer, on the occasion of his
presentation of the programme pertaining to the 1946 fiscal year in the TGNA, the Turkish
Government had already decided to obtain long-term credits and increase its internal debts in
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order to overcome the economic bottleneck. Correspondingly, Ankara had started receiving
economic aid from Washington prior to the Truman Doctrine. In this framework, it was also
pointed out that the issue of bilateral agreements had its roots in the year 1945, when an
agreement between the Turkish Government and the US Government which envisaged
Turkey’s inclusion in the countries considered within the scope of the Lend and Lease Act of
March 11, 1941, was signed on February 23, 1945 - the same day with Turkey’s declaration
of war on the Axis. Through this agreement, it was decided that as authorized by the
President, the US Government would continue to transfer defense items, defense information
and services to the Turkish Government. In its turn, the Turkish Government would provide
items, services, facilities or information to the USA. 153 It was also stipulated that the Turkish
Government would return the undestroyed, unused and unlost items - in the conclusion of
this extraordinary situation - which might be employed in the defense of the Western
hemisphere, as determined by the US President.
 Indeed, Turkey was faced with a dilemma of pursuing industrialization and maintaining a
large armed force at the same time. To hamper the already crippled economy, the prices of
Turkish export commodities which were high during the war, had fallen to a normal level
with the end of the war. The transformation of Turkey from an agrarian to an industrialized
country was one of the objectives of the government while agricultural production was
conducted by primitive methods and poor transportation means. Thus, it was obvious that
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Turkey could not achieve the purpose of industrializing on its own. On the other hand, there
were no signs of an economic collapse since Turkey had gold and foreign exchange reserves
amounting to 245 million dollars which Turkey kept in case of a Soviet attack. 154 Given this,
Turkey sought foreign military and economic aid as a contingency measure.
In October 1945, Turkish-US talks had led to a Turkish request for a credit of $500
million from the Export-Import Bank. In April 1946, concurrently with the visit of Missouri
President İnönü had taken the opportunity to reveal Turkey’s request of 500 million dollars
credit for the realization of industrial development as well as infrastructure projects. At the
same time, he had disclaimed any desire for American military equipment, saying that he
“hoped it would not be needed”. 155 However, only 25 million dollars were offered to Turkey
despite the endeavours of Ambassador Wilson who argued that not to exceed Eximbank’s 25
million dollars aid would be a severe shock the Turkish Government. In this context, he
suggested that the State Department might take the following points into consideration before
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giving its final decision: first, since the Turkish position vis-a-vis the SU was critical, an
unfovarable loan treatment could lead to misunderstandings in the Turkish Government;
secondly, even though Turkey was not devastated by war, it was in need of financial aid in
order to make certain economic readjustments; and lastly, Turkey was in need of
modernizing its agriculture, minerals development, transportation and communications so as
to bring its economy to a better situation, all of which necessitated more credits. At the same
time, Ankara was informed that the stated amount far exceeded the total resources available
to that lending agency and that much more detailed justification would be required in any
event. Subsequently, in March, Washington sent word that Turkey was likely to receive no
more than $23 million. 156
Meanwhile, the first bilateral agreement between Turkey and the USA in the aftermath of
the WW II was signed in Cairo on, February 27, 1946. It was decided that a credit of 10
million dollars would be given to Turkey. Turkey would pay this credit back in 10 years in
equal installments with an interest rate of 2, and in 3/8 ratio. Shortly afterwards, on May 7,
1946, another agreement betwen the two governments concerning the lend and lease requests
was signed in Ankara. Oral Sander stated that through the credit agreements of 1946, and as
                    
156 Ibid., pp. 20-21; FRUS, 1946, Vol. VII, pp. 902-904. On May 23, 1946, the Director of Near
Eastern and African Affairs, Loy Henderson, made clear to the Turkish Ambassador to Washington,
H. R. Baydur, that because of the Banks’s shortage of funds as well as its previous commitments, the
chances of giving a 25 million dollars loan to Turkey was high but, increasing it to 50 million was
not possible. Shortly afterwards, on July 3, 1946, Eximbank, with the approval of the National
Advisory Council, gave 25 million dollars in exporter credits to Turkey for fiscal years 1946 and
1947. The term “exporter credit” meant that Eximbank would participate up to 25 million dollars in
financing projects put forward jointly by the Turkish Government and the US suppliers, or put
forward by the US suppliers and approved by the Turkish Government. In any event, Turkish
Government’s notes or Turkey’s guarantee would be required,  culminating in the effect that no
advances would be made without the approval of the Turkish Government. Ibid., pp. 907; 911.
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will be discussed below, the agreement of July 12, 1947, Turkish statesmen sought the ways
to increasingly obtain US economic aid beyond the military assistance provided by the
Truman Doctrine. 157
While these developments were taking place, within the framework of increasing
Turkey’s participation in the major organisations of the UN, Turkey adhered to United
Nations Relief and Reconstruction Agency (UNRAA) on May 8, 1946. 158 On the same days,
Turkish experts and commissions of Foreign Relations and Finance were working on the
conditions for Turkey’s adherence to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) as well. In the aftermath of
the completion of these commissions, a justification of the law in regard to Turkey’s
accession to this organisation signed by Prime Minister Peker, was submitted to the TGNA
for approval on November 30, 1946.  Here, it was pointed out that Turkey’s share in these
organisations would amount to 43 million dollars for each. Finally the TGNA approved the
Law No. 5016 on February 14, 1947.
Turning back to the crisis in the Mediterranean, evidently, the attention of the US foreign
policy officials had already been drawn to the necessity of implementing a new strategy by
the events in Iran and especially the Eastern Mediterranean. The real division between the SU
and the USA came in 1947, over Greece. Since its liberation by the British troops in 1944,
Greece had been torn by a civil conflict between nationalists and a group of Soviet supported
communist guerrillas. In 1946, as a result of elections, the Royalists formed a government
                    
157 Oral Sander, Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri 1947-1964, pp. 44-45. See also, ibid., pp. 26-36 passim.
158 Birleşmiş Milletler Yardım ve Kalkındırma İdaresine Katılınması Hakkında Kanun, in Resmi
Gazete, 10 Mayıs 1946, Vol. 6303.
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and a plebiscite declared in favour of the return of the King. Civil war then broke out again.
Greece took the case before the Security Council, and stated that the insurgent communists
were receiving aid from Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria. The Soviets refused to accept the
Greek appeal and attributed the disorders to the vindictive policies of the Greek government.
On 24 February 1947, the British Ambassador to Washington, Sir Oliver Franks, told the
Secretary of State that, Britain due to its financial problems, would no longer assist the Greek
army in its conflict against the Communists. The United Kingdom explained the necessity of
the replacement of its aid with US subsidies. As will be discussed below, the response of the
USA was launching the Truman Doctrine.
By articulating a greater concern and apprehension about the Soviet menace in the post-
war era, the problem of assistance to Turkey and Greece was being studied by a special
committee since February. Kennan, who was asked to participate in the deliberations of this
committee was then in his tour of duty at the War College. Establishment of different
structures within a short period of time was surprising to Kennan as well. Previously, he was
informed by Under Secretary Acheson that General George Marshall, who had assumed the
Office of the Secretary of State in January, had in mind the establishment within the
Department of State of a planning unit - something to fill the place of the Divisions of Plans
and Operations to which he was accustomed in the War Department - and Kennan himself
would be asked to head this new unit.
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When the special committee headed by Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, Loy
Henderson - a colleague of Kennan from Moscow and Riga days 159 - met on February 24,
Kennan asserted that, what they had before them, on that occasion, “was the task of
recommending whether to respond affirmatively at all to the problems posed for us by the
British withdrawal, or whether to leave the Greeks and Turks to their own devices”. 160
Kennan stated that he had revealed that it was in fact had already been decided in principle,
and that the task of the committee was to outline in more detail the course of action that
should be recommended to the President and Gen. Marshall. In his turn, Kennan gave it as
his opinion that the US had no choice but to accept the challenge and to extend the requisite
aid. This was the consensus of the group as a whole and subsequently, an appropriate
recommendation was drawn up.
However, on the day before the State Department’s final draft of this message went to the
White House, when Kennan came over to the department to have a look at the paper, he
figured out that the language to which he took “particular exception was not the product of
Henderson’s pen or of any of his associates in the geographic divisions.” 161 It had been
produced, at the initiative of the Department of State’s public relations office, in a sub-
committee of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) which clearly felt itself
under the necessity of clothing the announced rationale for Truman’s decision in terms more
                    
159 Based on Daniel Yergin’s “Riga and Yalta axioms”, Arthur M. Schlesinger explained that one
school of American policy-makers, guided by foreign service officers like Kennan and Cahrles E.
Bohlen who had studied the SU from the Riga listening post in the years before American
recognition, saw a revolutionary state committed by Leninist ideology to world conquest. The Yalta
school, on the other hand, saw just another traditional great power. Arthur M. Schlesinger, The
Cycles of American History, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1986), p. 204.
160  George Kennan, Memoirs 1925-1950, p. 314.
161  Ibid., p. 315.
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sweeping than anything that Kennan envisaged. Kennan admitted that the reasons behind his
unhappiness over the wording of Truman’s message lied in the exclusion of conclusions he
had obtained from the lengthy discussions of different working groups in the War College on
the situation in Greece and Turkey, and the question of why it was desirable that the US
Government should respond to the challenge of the British move which he later developed to
lay down the basis of the text in concern. 162
On March 12, 1947, after the British Government formally informed Washington on
February 24, through a note dated February 21 that as of March 31 the British Government
could no longer shoulder the burden of militarily supporting Greece and Turkey and “would
be obliged to discontinue the financial, economic and advisory assistance which it has been
giving” to these countries, Truman informed Congress and the public of the situation and
recommended that the US Government extend aid to Greece and Turkey. In his historic
address to the Congress, the main points of which were to become known as the Truman
Doctrine, the US President justified this request through describing a worldwide struggle
between the free world and totalitarianism.
                                                               
162 Ibid., pp. 315-316. Kennan stated that in the words of the following War College presentation he
had accepted the conclusion, to which many others in the government had arrived: “if nothing were
done to stiffen the backs of the non-Communist elements in Greece at this juncture the Communist
elements would soon succeed in seizing power and in establishing a totalitarian dictatorship along the
lines already visible in Balkan countries.” Ibid., p. 316. However, he had considered that the
Russians and their Eastern European associates were poorly set up to take responsibility either for the
governing of Greece or for the support of the Greek economy. He said, “all this might boomerang on
them in the form of serious economic difficulties and other problems, which the West might even
ultimately exploit to good advantage.” Ibid. But, Communist rule he asserted would probably be
successfully consolidated in the long run and might some day have most unfortunate strategic
consequences from the standpoint of any military adversary of the SU and more important were the
probable repercussions which such a development would have on neighboring areas.
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Regarding the crisis in Greece, he said, the existence of the Greek state was threatened by
the terrorist activities of several thousand armed men, led by Communists, who defied the
government’s authority particularly along the norther boundaries, while the Greek
Government was unable to cope with the situation. 163 It was considered that the UN might
assist in the crisis. He said, the situation was an urgent one requiring immediate action, and
the UN and its related organizations were not in a position to extend help of this kind that
was needed.
As for Turkey, he stated that the future of Turkey as an independent and economically
sound state was clearly no less important to the freedom-loving peoples of the world than the
future of Greece. Truly, the circumstances in which Turkey found itself were considerably
different from those of Greece. Turkey had been spared the disasters that had beset Greece
and during the war, the United States and Britain had furnished Turkey with material aid.
Since the war, Turkey had sought financial assistance from Britain and the USA for the
purpose of effecting that modernization necessary for the maintenance of its national
integrity. “That integrity is essential to the preservation of order in the Middle East” Truman
said. 164
                    
163 ”Message from President Truman to the Congress on the Truman Doctrine”, in, Arthur M.
Schlesinger, Dynamics of World Power, pp. 111-115, passim. Truman also pointed out that the
Greek Government which had made mistakes had been operating in an atmosphere of chaos and
extremism. Nevertheless, it represented 85 per cent of the members of the Greek Parliament who
were chosen in an election considered to be fair.
164 Ibid., Truman concluded his speech pointing out,
     The seeds of totalitarism regimes are nurtured by misery and want. They spread and grow in the
evil soil of poverty and strife. They reach their full growth when the hope of a people for a better life
has died.
      We must keep that hope alive.
      The free peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining their freedoms.
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In this context, Truman further explained that it was in the US national interest to help
free nations like Greece and Turkey become strong enough to resist Communist aggression
and he proposed an emergency military and economic aid program, which the Congress
finally approved on May 22, through the “Act to Provide for Assistance to Greece and
Turkey”. 165 Among other things, the Act emphasized that “the President may from time to
time when he deems it is in the interest of the United States furnish assistance to Greece and
Turkey, upon request of their governments and upon terms and conditions determined by
him...”166 Thus, in parts, the Truman Doctrine comprised aid to Turkey, and large economic
and military missions were established in Athens and small ones in Ankara to transfer $750
million worth of assistance. 167
                                                               
     If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world-and we shall surely
endanger the welfare of our Nation.
165 Known as Public Law 75 (80th Cong., 1st. sess.) too. From, “Act to Provide for Assistance to
Greece and Turkey, May 22, 1947”, in, Arthur M. Schlesinger, The Dynamics of World Power, pp.
122-125.
166 Ibid. , p. 122. It was enacted that the President would implement the program by rendering
financial aid in the form of loans, credits, grants, or otherwise to those countries; by detailing to
assist those countries any persons in the employ of the Government of the USA [Provided that no
civilian personnel would be assigned to Turkey and Greece to administer the purposes of this act until
such personnel have been investigated by the FBI]; by detailing a limited number of members of the
military services of the USA to assist those countries, in an advisory capacity only; by providing for
the transfer to, and the procurement for by manufacture or otherwise and the transfer to those
countries of any articles, services and information and the instruction and training of personnel of
those countries; and by incurring and defraying necessary expenses in connection with the carrying
out out of the Act. Ibid. , pp. 122-123.
167 George McGhee, Envoy to the Middle World, (NY: Harper&Row Publishers, 1983), p. 20. The
initial amount was stated as S400.000.000 appropriated to the US President to carry out the
provisions of the Act to Provide for Assistance to Greece and Turkey of May 22, 1947. In their turn,
the Soviets had not viewed these developments without protest and countermoves. In fact, while the
future of the US aid programme was back in the lap of the American Congress, the Kremlin was
making clear to the world the hostile interpretation they had of it and the Communist parties in
Western Europe were trying to overthrow pro-Marshall Aid governments. Shortly afterwards, the
Cominform was announced on 5 October and the Foreign Minister’s autumn meeting in London, like
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In his appraisal of the Truman Doctrine, Kennan pointed out that the situation of Turkey
differed quite fundamentally from that of Greece. He evaluated that there was no serious
Communist penetration in Turkey and no comparable guerrilla movement. “The Turks had
nothing to fear but fear.” 168 He considered that if the Turks did not lose their nerves, if they
kept their internal political life relatively clean and orderly, and refused to get involved in
negotiations with the Russians on a bilateral basis over complicated issues such as that of the
Straits, they would probably continue to enjoy a temporary and precarious immunity to
Russian pressure. He said, should they be increasingly encircled by Communist-dominated
entities, it would plainly be harder for them to maintain this stance. Thus, aid to Greece was
important as a support for stability in Turkey as well. However, Kennan concluded that this
view of the problem of Turkey afforded no rationale for the mounting of a special aid
program for Turkey itself.
According to him, the accent was put on international morale and on firmness of
diplomatic stance, not on military preparations. Kennan stated that it was for this reason that
he was not happy to find in the draft of the President’s message to the Congress a proposal
for aid to Turkey as well as to Greece. He suspected that what was intended was primarily
military aid, “and that what had really happened was that the Pentagon had exploited a
favorable set of circumstances in order to infiltrate a military aid program for Turkey into
                                                               
all its predecessors stalled under Soviet intransigence. However, in the middle of December the USA
gave interim aid to France, Italy and Austria and by a new agreement with the UK relieved it of all
dollar expenditures in Germany, as well as assuming seventy-five per cent of the cost of both zones.
168 George Kennan, Memoirs 1925-1950, p. 316.
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what was supposed to be primarily a political and economic program for Greece.” 169 Then,
Kennan asserted that since it was important that the Soviet threat be recognized for what it
was - “primarily a political one and not a threat of military attack - it seemed unfortunate
that the picture of what was needed in Greece should be confused by association with
something that was not needed - or, if needed, was needed for entirely different purposes - in
Turkey.”170
In fact, the difference of the situation in Turkey was pointed by Acting Secretary Acheson
as well. In his statement before the Committee on Foreign Relations on March 24, 1947, he
explained that the Turkish Government had on various occasions applied to the United States
for financial aid, but the US Government had not had the facilities for responding to those
requests and since British aid was not available, the needs of Turkey for assistance were
greatly increased. Subsequently, Acheson referred to both Turkey and Greece and said,
“Greece and Turkey are in urgent need of aid and there is no other country to which they
may turn.” 171
Following his explanation on the situation in Greece, Acheson underlined that the case of
Turkey was substantially different, but Turkey needed this help. The Turkish Army had been
mobilized since the beginning of WW II and this had put a severe strain upon the national
economy. During the war, Turkey had received substantial assistance from Britain and the
USA, which had helped it carry this load. But, if these subsidies were no longer available,
                    
169 Ibid., p. 317.
170 Ibid.
171 From, “Statement by Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson Before the Committee on Foreign
Relations on an Explanation of the Truman Doctrine”, in, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Dynamics of World
Power, p. 115.
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the Turkish economy would not be able to carry the full load required for its national defense
and at the same time proceed with economic development which it needed to keep the country
in sound condition.
Meanwhile, the Turkish Ambassador to Washington, R. Baydur, informed Ankara on
June 25, 1947 that it was admitted in Washington circles that the US assistance prompted by
the serious economic decline of France and Italy, and consecutively extended to other
countries, had been unfruitful. The amount of the US aid in credits and donations to Europe
had reached 12 billion dollars, however it could accomplish very few tasks. Anarchy and
Communism was gaining ground in Europe and the situation was likely to deteriorate further.
Baydur also pointed out that the US-Europe trade balance was 15 billion dollars greater in
favour of the former. The European countries could no longer sustain these commercial
relations with the USA due to their huge budget deficits and lack of finance in dollars. This
would inevitably represent a 7.5 billion dollars decline per year in the trade volume with
Europe.
In this context, Baydur underscored that when President Truman presented his aid plan to
Greece and Turkey, despite the acknowledgement of the need for assistance to these
countries, many congressmen had raised criticisms on the ill-defined scope of the programme
and demanded a budgetary planning which would clearly state the boundaries of the job in
hand. Consecutively, Secretary of State Marshall’s speech at Harvard on June 5, was to the
effect that it should be admitted that the assistance to Europe had remained in a particular
disorder, weakening its effect, and the aid to Europe must be effectively coordinated and
executed singlehandedly. He said, in its turn, Europe had to unite and the USA should
cxxxv
encourage its efforts in this direction. As will be further discussed below, Baydur pointed out
that following Marshall’s speech, Britain and France had acted “at a speed which diplomacy
did not witness before” to respond to the situation. According to Baydur, however, the US
assistance programme was not ready even after the speech of Marshall. Baydur said, his
encounters in the State Department had shown that the programme was mostly a projection
aimed at preparing European public opinion and stimulating the European states to take
necessary steps for unanimous action. Thus, the programme was expected to be
substantialized at a later phase. In the meantime, Truman had decided to set up three
commissions to examine the appropriation resources, to determine the positive and negative
effects of the proposed assistance programme over the US economy, and the distribution of
aids to the recipient countries. 172 In this context, Baydur stressed that the reactions of the
Congress might be seriously negative since Truman had vetoed the law which envisaged a tax
reduction of 4.5 billion dollars in regard to the income revenues which was promised to the
US voters by the Republicans.
Baydur’s assessments concerning the possible course of action of the SU included: first,
Moscow’s satellites would request the permission of the SU to adhere to the US assistance
scheme; secondly, the SU would desire not to stay out of the European integration which was
under construction, and would consent to an immediate ratification of the peace treaties and
the settlement of the question of Germany; and lastly, a phase of exchange of views would be
given its start between Moscow and its satellites, eventually half-removing the iron curtain.
This would represent an ease for world peace. However, in case Russia declined the
                    
172 From, The Embassy in Washington to the MFA (extract), dated June 25, 1947. The MFA
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American proposal, the USA would shift to an enforcement policy “which would mean the
crystallization of the western bloc and the accomplishment of peace between the two blocs
would get harder to achieve”. 173
As for the participation of Turkey in the programme for the reconstruction and economic
development of Europe, through the Note of the British Embassy dated July 4, 1947,  the
MFA was informed that the British and French Governments had studied the suggestions
contained in the speech of Secretary of State of the US, Marshall, at Harvard University on
the 5th June, and the two governments had recognized that Europe had to take the initiative
in the work of reconstruction, and that for this purpose it was essential to draw up as quickly
as possible a programme covering both the resources and the needs of Europe. It was stated
that “in the opinion of the two Governments a temporary organisation must be set up to bring
together the data on which such a programme will be based.” 174 It was further stressed that
this organisation should consist of a “Committee of Co-operation” which would co-ordinate
the work of special sub-committees to deal with certain products or branches of economic
activity. The Committee of Co-operation would be set up with instructions to prepare a
                                                               
Archives.  
173 Ibid.
174 From,  The Note of the British Embassy in Ankara to the MFA, July 4, 1947 (extract). The text of
the, Annex [of this note] to the invitation to European Countries further explained that the British and
French Governments regarded it as all-important that swift action should be taken for the
reconstruction and economic development of European countries which had suffered from the
ravages of war. It was stated that the governments believed that this task would be made easier by
economic aid from the USA such as that suggested by Marshall in his speech of 5th June. Thus, the
first step should be for Europe to help itself by developing the production of its basic resources. “The
support of the United States is essential to enable Europe to accomplish this by contributing resources
which are lacking until this has been achieved. This is the best way to ensure the economic recovery
of European countries and to safeguard their independence.” Ibid.
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report on the available resources and needs of Europe during the next four years. 175 It was
stated that the Committee of Co-operation should, as the American Secretary of State himself
suggested, seek the friendly aid of the USA in drafting the programme. It would consist of
representatives of the UK, France and certain other European states.
In this framework, four sub-committees would be set up to assist the work of the
Committee of Co-operation in regard to the following subjects; food and agriculture; fuel and
power; iron and steel; and transport. British and French governments would invite
representatives, appointed by countries which agreed to participate, to a meeting in Paris on
the 12th of July in order to settle the compostion of the Committee of Co-operation and the
special sub-committees which would begin their work on the 15th of July. It was also decided
that the report of the Committee of Cooperation should be drawn up in time to be presented
to the US Government on the 1st of September, 1947, at the latest. As for the relations of
this organisation with other international bodies, the Economic Commission for Europe
would be informed at its forthcoming session of the setting up of this organisation. The
Committee and sub-committees would be in contact with the UN Organisation and its
specialised agencies and services of inter-governmental organisations.
The Note concluded that;
In the conviction that Mr. Marshall’s suggestions are in the
interests of Europe as a whole, that the task of European
reconstruction would obtain essential help from the assistance of
the United States of America, that this assistance is dependent on
European nations making the effort to co-ordinate and to help
each other, His Majesty’s Government and the French
                    
175 In regard to Germany, which was of course significant for Turkey as a trade partner, it was stated
that information relating to resources and needs of Germany would be requested from Commanders-
in-Chief, members of the Control Council. Ibid.
cxxxviii
Government have the honour to invite the Government of Turkey
to take part in the administrative machinery which they desire to
see set     up. 176
Interestingly, the Note Verbale of the British Embassy discussed above was followed by a
Note Signee dated July 5, in which Ambassador David Kelly explained that he was instructed
to inform the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Saka, that an important sentence was accidentally
omitted from the preamble to the Annex attached to the invitation. After this sentence was
inserted at the end of paragraph 2, it would read:
2. In order to collect quickly the information needed to draw up a
programme covering the available resources and needs of Europe,
a special organisation will be set up. All European states willing
to do so will collaborate with this organisation. It will not
interfere with the internal affairs of these states and no action will
be taken by it which could be regarded as a violation of their
sovereignty. [There will be no restraint placed upon desirable
developments of European trade.] 177
Despite the fact that the announcement of the Truman Doctrine paved the way to a greater
collaboration in Europe, Kennan’s unhappiness with the wording of Truman’s message was
evident. As he pointed out himself, this was mostly related with the inherent limits of the
statement. He said, if he were reacting “today” to the Truman Doctrine, he would certainly
have added to the list of specific requirements the willingness and ability of the threatened
people to pick up and bear resolutely the overwhelming portion of the responsibility and
effort in their own defense against both direct and indirect aggression. Kennan also expressed
                    
176  Ibid.
177 The Note concluded that “I am further instructed to inform Your Excellency that no significance
should be attached to this omission and that the sentence is one to which both the United Kingdom
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that what the USA was concerned to defend in Greece was the democratic quality of the
country’s institutions. The USA would find it necessary to give aid, over the ensuing years,
to a number of regimes which could hardly qualify for it on the basis of their democratic
character. 178
Almost three weeks before the announcement of the Public Law 75, it was decided to
send a military mission to Turkey, whose work, later on would also serve the drafting of the
Aid to Turkey Agreement signed on July 12, 1947, which provided the basis for carrying out
the Turkish aid programme. The goal of the US military mission to Turkey, as directed by
the SWNCC, was to assess the situation on the ground and recommend to the State
Department how much of the $400 million authorised for Public Law 75, but not yet
appropriated, was required that year by Turkey. The SWNCC group was also empowered to
examine the needs of the Turkish armed forces for equipment and supplies and to suggest
priorities; to evaluate the need for a reorganisation of the Turkish armed forces and for staff
training by the USA or Britain; to make suggestions as Britain’s future role in aid to Turkey
and how the two countries could work together if British aid were to continue; and finally, to
make recommendations in concerning supervision of the use of US aid.
George Harris maintained that in its turn, the US Congress was suspicious of Truman’s
decision to help Turkey. He stated that the Congressmen generally considered that the
administration wanted to help Turkey, but since it could not do it on its own, it attempted to
                                                               
and French Governments attach considerable importance.” The Note of the British Embassy in
Ankara to the MFA (extract), July 5, 1947. The MFA Archives.
178 Kennan admitted that it was unwise to suggest that this, too, was an essential criterion. “But these
omissions, the recognition of which does indeed reflect the promptings of hindsight, only reinforce the
validity of the objections to the language of the message that suggested themselves at the time.”
George Kennan, Memoirs 1925-1950, p. 321.
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combine Turkey’s case with Greece, where the problem was much more acute. The Truman
Doctrine he said, finally marked a very sharp break because the British no longer had much
of a role in protecting Turkey. Then the Turkish MFA and the military heavily focused on
the USA as the source of support. 179
As McGhee put it, it was decided that the US aid mission to Turkey should work under
the authority of Ambassador Wilson, since it was feared that the presence of an independent
military mission might be construed as interference in Turkish domestic affairs. According to
him, the Turkish Government had already expressed concern that Washington would try to
exercise its “control” in Turkey. In his turn, Wilson assured the Turkish Government of the
limited and cooperative nature of any such control. He said, the US Government “after
consultation with Turkey, will determine what militay equipment and other aid should be
provided to Turkey...All that will take place on Turkish territory will be ‘observing’ by US
officials as to the manner in which Turkey utilizes assistance given.”  180
At this juncture, the question of the use of American advisers was discussed by Max
Weston Thornburg in his work on the Turkish economy in the aftermath of the Truman
Doctrine. Here, Thornburg pointed out that before WW II, Turkey had made extensive use of
foreign advisers from Germany, Britain and Russia and since 1940, forced by circumstance,
the government had relied on Turkish specialists, However, most of these technicians had not
had the requisite experience to guide the economic development of the country and until this
lack was supplied, the need for foreign advisers would continue. He asserted that “since
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Turkey must in the next few years rely principally on the United States for resources
previously supplied from Europe, there will be a need for American experts, who are familiar
with American standards and practices.” 181 According to him, the object was not to spread
American influence, but to offer the Turks whatever they were capable of making their own.
It would not be in accord with “the American spirit to try to transplant a wholly alien system
to Turkish soil, as the Russians and the Germans did during the thirties.” 182 He explained
that the governmental need for skilled advisers might be fulfilled through nominating:
a) General Consultants: Engineers with broad economic and industrial background to
study the over-all needs and resources of the nation, its state of economic development and
the priority which should be given to various fields of work;
b) Experts in Public Works: Engineers and other experts with appropriate specialized
experience to work with the Ministries of Interior, Finance, Transportation and
Communications and other agencies of government, to guide detailed studies of major
projects;
c) Technical Specialists: Geologists, Mineralogists, Chemists, Architects,  and other
experienced specialists available in the USA from the government and from private
professional ranks whose selection could be made by a private consultant to Ankara. Close
collaboration between Turkish and American technical colleges, interchange of ideas and
publications with corresponding American organizations and formation of Turkish
professional societies would offer a similar gain;
                    
181 Max Weston Thornburg, Turkey An Economic Appraisal, , p. 212.
182 Ibid. p. 216.
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d) Agricultural Experts: Agricultural and livestock experts with long experience in
American practices;
e) Public Health, Education, Economics Experts, who should be sent “especially to gain
the benefits of American experience in vocational training, and to assist in adapting the
technical programs in the higher schools to prepare students for work with Americans.” 183
In this context, Harris pointed out that in the long run, Turkish critics of the USA would
assail the Marshall Plan stress on agriculture in Turkey as a direct challenge to the
philosophy of etatism the foundations of which were laid by Atatürk. Indeed, the idea that
political independence required a self-sufficient industrial base had become widely accepted
by the Turkish intelligentsia since the foundation of the Republic. Harris stated that according
to the opponents of the assistance program, the American aid for development seemed to
spurn industrial development. He explained that the program for aid to Turkey concentrated
the limited available resources on agricultural and infrastructure projects. Of the some $300
million aid provided between 1948 and 1952, almost 60 percent appeared to have been
invested in the agricultural sector. As a result, by 1953, Turkey had become one of the
world’s major wheat exporters and the Turkish national income grew nearly 45 percent
during the five years following the start of the program. Besides he said that the aid emphasis
on agriculture encouraged the government’s orientation towards the peasant masses. 184
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imported, thus excessively complicating the problem of spare parts. He stated that the mechanization
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The US Embassy in Ankara also favoured the continuation of the assistance program in
Turkey and advised that the time was right in order to increase the activities of the US
military mission to Turkey. On June 6, Wilson reported to Washington that the Turkish
Government and people welcomed US aid wholeheartedly, noting that a failure to produce
the aid could be widely misunderstood. The investigations thus far, he stated, had revealed
extensive need for equipment, supplies and training even greater than had been anticipated.
Consecutively, as mentioned above, on July 12, Aid to Turkey Agreement was signed. In the
preamble Article 1, the general framework for the agreement which had the Public Law 75 in
its core, stated that aid was being supplied by the USA at the request of Turkey to strengthen
its security forces and maintain economic stability. The aid would further the basic objectives
of the UN Charter and strengthen ties of Turkish-American friendship. Turkey would make
effective use of the aid of the US Government as the President of the USA might authorize in
accordance with acts of Congress.
Article 2 of the agreement envisaged that information and technical assistance would be
furnished as determined by the US Chief of Mission to Turkey in consultation with
representatives of the Turkish Government, financial conditions being decided directly
between the two governments. Accordingly, Turkey would send full reports, information and
observations concerning use and progress of the aid program. The 3rd Article required that
the aid program would be observed and reported by the representatives of the American press
and radio. Importantly, Article 4 stipulated that both governments would take such measures
for the security of articles, services and information furnished under the aid program “as the
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other judges necessary.” 185 In this context, Turkey would not transfer title to the foregoing,
permit use by anyone not official Turkish representative, nor use for any purpose other than
that intended without the consent of the USA. 186 By Article 5, it was secured that Turkey
would not use any proceeds from aid to pay on a loan or interest to any other government.
Regarding the wording of the agreement, George Harris pointed out that the Turkish
MFA had worked to soften the terms of the statutory requirements imposed by the US
Congress. Concerning the 3rd Article he said, after considerable bargaining, the Turkish
negotiators inserted phraseology making the freedom of reporters to gather news subject to
“security” considerations. Besides, to remove the suggestion of foreign control, the term
“aid administrator” was dropped in favor of the title “chief of mission.” Washington also
agreed to act discreetly in carrying out its supervisory functions.  “As a further gesture to
Turkish sensibilities, Ambassador Wilson was named chief of mission in an effort to submerge
this function in his normal reporting responsibilities.”  187
In his speech made on the occasion of the approval of the agreement in the TGNA, the
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sadak, explained the main features of the agreement. He
maintained that the agreement provided a framework in which Turkey’s use of the American
aid was determined. Since the amount, application and duration of the agreement was not
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stated, these issues would be subjected to special agreements pertaining to its application. As
a result, it would remain in force unless an action was taken on the contrary and would
provide the necessary basis for a permanent and unilateral aid program.
On July 23, Wilson sent another report to Washington including the recommendations of
the SWNCC team and in which he urged a five-year assistance programme be implemented
in order to modernise the armed forces while at the same time reducing their size by two-
thirds, at an estimated five-year cost of $500 million. Meanwhile, towards the end of
September, the Turkish Government informed the US Embassy in Ankara that, for budgetary
reasons, it intended to demobilise a whole class of recruits, reducing the size of the army
from 485 000 to 350 000. In this context, $100 million in US aid funds was requested to
cover an anticipated deficit in the defense budget. Neither the State Department nor the
British Foreign Office opposed the force reduction, “but Wilson and the department agreed
that US aid should be limited to supplying military equipment and that funds should not be
allocated for meeting the budget deficit, altough US purchase of equipment should help to
ease the deficit.” 188
Meanwhile, reactions of the Kremlin towards the US-Turkish collaboration were
culminating in a stronger criticism. In August 17, 1947, E. Zhukov, writer of authoritative
articles on international affairs and Soviet vision of world politics, alleged in Pravda that the
USA had finally replaced Britain as the world’s imperialist power. He argued that one of the
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peculiarities of the postwar period was the increase in numbers of states that found
themselves in a greater or lesser degree of dependency upon American imperialism.
According to him, the expansion of the USA directed itself primarily against sovereign
states, which were thus threatened with the danger of becoming semi-colonial. The same
thing applied to Turkey “which lost its independence as a result of the the realization of the
so-called ‘Truman doctrine’.” 189
Similarly, A. Zhdanov put forward that the strategic plans of the USA envisaged the
creation in peacetime of numerous bases and vantage grounds situated at great distances from
the American continent and designed to be used for aggressive purposes against the SU and
the countries of the “new democracy”. Within a list of countries the USA engaged in
activities, Zhdanov mentioned Turkey, as “the US Government has officially declared that it
has committed itself to assist in the modernization of the Turkish army.” 190
Against this background of events, on September 21, a US delegation headed by John
Taber, the Chief of Committee on Appropriations of the US House of Representatives,
arrived in Ankara on a mission to examine the use of US subsidies. Similar visits followed in
the consecutive months including a visit of the members of the Committee on Foreign
Relations who expressed their mission as preparing a report to the US Congress. 191 The visit
of the Members of the US House of Representatives on October 31, 1947, had coincided with
the visit of a parliamentary delegation from the British House of Commons and on November
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1, both delegations were present in the inauguration ceremony of the 8th term, 3rd legislation
year of the TGNA.
On the same occasion, İnönü delivered a speech in which he underscored that the decision
of the USA, which acknowledged Turkey as a sincere and trustworthy element of peace in
this part of the world, and increasing its legitimate rights of defense as it would serve the
world peace, to extend assistance to Turkey was a unique evidence of its efforts for peace.
The approval of the TGNA of the July 12 agreement was an expression of the appreciation of
the Turkish nation. İnönü stressed that Turkey was neither pursuing a policy of aggression
nor would it tolerate any act of aggression against its territorial integrity. This was the
straightforward and open policy of Turkey which had passed through an ordeal. He said,
though it desired good relations with the Soviet Union, Turkey was subjected to the
unrightful allusions of this country, which promoted the events of the past as it perceived
them and in a false manner. This being the case, Turkey wished the removal of these issues
from the agenda. 192
In addition to this emergency assistance, the Marshall Plan, designed to reconstruct the
war-ravaged economies of Western Europe, opened the door for large scale military and
economic assistance to Turkey. On August 7, Major General Horace L. McBride was
appointed Chief, US Army Group in Ankara. Later in 1947, separate Air Force and Navy
Groups were also established. Subsequently, these programs paved the way for a greatly
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increased American presence in Turkey, but it is from the establishment of the Army Group
that Joint United States Military Mission for Aid (JUSMMAT) traced its history. 193 The US
aid mission to Turkey under the act in March 1948 comprised 182 personnel, including 51
civilians, 71 Army Group, 34 Air Force Group, and 13 Navy Group. 194
At that moment, unquestionably, it was important for Ankara to ensure a partnership
position with Washington to guarantee the flow of US subsidies in increasing amounts. An
overwhelming majority of the Turkish military circles shared the contention that American
war material would best suit the needs of the Turkish Army. There were, however, opposing
views concerning the implications of Turkish-American military partnership. A retired
Turkish Army officer, Orhan Erkanlı explained that through military aid, the USA gave a
vigorous start to re-organize the Turkish Armed Forces at American standars. He pointed out
that under the umbrella of the US Military Mission for Aid to Turkey, the US military
experts were assigned in smaller field teams, which were designed to serve as advisory
boards in the Turkish divisions. Correspondingly, courses were opened by these experts to
introduce the Turkish officers and NCOs to the US war equipment. The Turkish Army
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personnel also attended programmes in West Germany and in the USA. Circumstances of the
Turkish economy indeed further compelled Ankara to increasingly leave the control of its
armed forces to the Americans as far as training, organization and logistic support activities
were concerned. However, “since the US was carrying out a calculated and future oriented
planning, as much as generously acting, together with its equipment, weaponary and
knowledge, it brought its own military proceudures into Turkey providing itself with a single
handed supply of resources.” 195
Concerning the US perception on the need of supporting the Turkish Land Forces,
McGhee pointed out that when he came to Ankara as Ambassador in 1952, he figured out
that the military had a call on the first 40.000 school graduates among those inducted into the
Turkish Armed Forces each year - approximately 135.000, many of whom had not finished
school - the Navy 16.000 and the Air Force 20.000 with the Army taking what was left. He
underlined that this had created a great handicap for the Army in training those required as a
result of the modernisation of tanks, trucks and electronic communications equipment. 196
Turning back to the economic aspects of the assistance, as Sander pointed out, it is almost
impossible to figure out the total amount of US aid since these programmes were widespread
and outnumbered. It goes without saying that the debate around the issue of bilateral
agreements rightfully underlines the existence of various joint activities of unrevealed nature,
the scope and the financial dimensions of which are unknown even today.
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IV 3. The US Assistance Program and the Turkish Participation in the Committee of
European Economic Co-operation
Explicitly, US diplomacy favoured the continuation of the wartime collaboration and the
fostering of international cooperation with the SU. However, the post WW II era proved to
be too eventful to continue with this expectation. By the Summer of 1946, the dominant body
of official opinion in Washington held that the very existence of the SU threatened American
security. By March 1947, the idea that Soviet Communism was bent on world conquest had
been firmly implanted. 197 Michael MccGwire stated that even "the idea of preventive war
was common currency and the option of bombing Moscow was openly discussed, to enforce
compliance with US policies". 198
With these considerations in Washington, the US Government sought the means to
counterbalance the Soviet challenge without waging another war. Undoubtedly, the US
assistance programme for Europe, which was launched to draw the free countries of the
region together served towards this objective. Although the recovery programme was
intended to contain Communist expansion, Marshall stated that it was open to all European
countries, including those under Communist regimes. He stated that, "Our policy is directed
not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos". 199
In this framework, after Marshall opened discussion of the the plan on June 5, 1947,
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Washington made it clear that the Europeans should take the initiative in drawing up the
specifics of the program, that the SU and its allies were invited to participate, and that
German recovery was necessary for the program to work.
On June 17-18, British Foreign Minister, Ernest Bevin and his French counterpart,
Georges Bidault, met in Paris to discuss the speech of Marshall. Here, Bidault convinced
Bevin that it was politically necessary for Paris to make a gesture to include the Kremlin. 200
Then they issued an invitation to Molotov to consult with them in Paris during the last days
of June. In their turn, the Soviets accepted the invitation made by the foreign ministers of
Britain and France to attend a Three-power preliminary conference to discuss the American
proposals.
On June 17, N. Menemencioğlu, then Turkish Ambassador to Paris, reported to the MFA
that the grave consequences of the Moscow meeting of the Foreign Ministers of March 1947
had been followed by the widening of gap between the USA and the SU. Menemencioğlu
asserted that, having felt a necessity to enhance its sphere of influence, Russia had sponsored
the coup in Hungary in May 1947, and had quickly begun to strengthen its position in the
Balkans. It was eager to engage in activities even in Austria. Facing the Soviet threat, for the
USA, there could be no other option but to indicate a firm stand against the Kremlin.
However, he said, this could not be in the form of an actual intervention. The fate of protests
or resorting to the mechanisms of the UN could also hardly produce any positive outcome.
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Thus, it could be foreseen that the USA would mobilize its powers other than arms to
respond to the situation. This could be explained in terms of increasing the influence of the
USA on the satellites of Moscow too.
In this context, Menemencioğlu pointed out that Britain and France had taken action
separately in the aftermath of Marshall’s speech. However, they had acted together in order
to ensure the US Secretary of State to announce that his speech had also meant an invitation
to the SU and the eastern European states. Then, he said, France had assumed a special role
in this regard. However, the officials of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs saw little
prospect for Moscow’s wholehearted participation in the proposed assistance programme.
According to them, the Soviets would either remain silent or accept the invitation, but if the
latter option prevailed they would attempt to overthrow the organisation from inside. Thus,
he said, with an objective analysis it could be perceived that the acceptance of the Marshall
Plan by the Kremlin was out of question. Admittedly, within the framework of a general
economic cooperation, the SU could hardly challenge Washington’s leading position. In fact,
if the Russians could admit this situation, the present impasse would not have been
experienced. As a result, the SU would do everything in its power to ensure the failure of the
US assistance plan. 201
On the same day, the Turkish Embassy in Moscow informed the MFA that British
diplomats in Moscow were emphasizing that Britain had an independent foreign policy from
the USA, and it was determined to protect this position. Similar statements were to the effect
that the arguments on the American control of British foreign policy were pointless.
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Particularly, with a view to tension between Washington and the Kremlin, they said, Britain
could play a role of dispersing the causes of any actual or potential strife. With this objective
in mind, the removal of reasons for the American intervention (which was prompted by a
need for the reinforcement of British interests) in the Middle East and in the eastern
Mediterranean, would serve the maintenance of peace as well as the Soviet interests. It was
also stated that this status of Britain was significant in regard to the avoidance of any conflict
which might break out between these two powers. The telegram stressed that the tones in
these statements were worth noting especially on the eve of talks at Paris and since it had
been understood that the British desired to communicate these issues to the Kremlin at a
critical phase of the deliberations. 202
Against this background, on June 27, 1947, Molotov arrived at Paris with a huge
contingent of experts. In the talks, he raised mainly two issues. Claiming that the Marshall
Plan would infringe on the sovereignty of recipient nations, he urged that European nations
should individually calculate their needs and collectively submit their requirements to
Washington. Secondly, he inquired how the European Recovery Program (ERP) would
influence Germany’s level of industry and reparation payments. Bevin and Bidault sought to
avoid the German question and instead, they told the Soviet Foreign Commissar that the USA
required a comprehensive plan, not a list of national requirements, “that American demands
for statistics and cooperation were innocuous, and that European squabbling might mean the
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forfeiture of American generosity.” 203 According to Molotov, however, the US aid was not
without strings attached and the prospect of American supervision was unacceptable. After
communicating with Moscow, he became more shrill and intimidated that unilateral Western
action might lead to the division of Europe rather than to its rehabilitation. Then, he abrubtly
withdrew from the talks and accused the USA of attempting "to rescue American capitalism
by economically enslaving Europe". 204 As the Soviets saw the Marshall Plan as a serious
threat to their control of Eastern Europe, they applied pressure to persuade the governments
of Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia which had expressed their intention to attend the
conference to be held at Paris in late July. In the meantime, the Kremlin was perpetuating a
systematic harassment of noncommunist parties especially in Poland, but there was still no
outright Soviet suppression of them. However, the SU decided to reply to what it regarded as
America's economic domination of Europe by calling a rival conference in which Cominform
- Communist Information Bureau - to coordinate the activities of the Communist parties of
Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Italy, France, Rumania, Yugoslavia and the SU
was created. 205
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In fact, while Molotov was still in Paris, circles around the US Embassy in Moscow had
started to express the sentiment that Molotov’s participation in the Paris talks aimed at
creating an atmosphere of chaos rather than showing a real effort for the settlement of issues.
On June 28, the Turkish Embassy in Moscow informed Ankara that through expressing
similar views in the diplomatic circles of Moscow, the US officials were pointing out that the
next couple of months would acquire a decisive character. Given this, the USA was not
expecting the Paris talks to produce any favourable outcome. Particulary, the word
“decisive” would serve the effect that the “Soviet satellites and the democrats” had moved
into totally different camps in regard to the issues of international importance. As for the
possibility of   an armed conflict, based on his personal impressions of Ukraine and its
vicinity, an American diplomat in Moscow had explained to his Turkish counterpart that with
a view to its crippled economy, the Soviets could hardly dare a war with the West. 206
Correspondingly, on July 1, 1947, Cevat Açıkalın, then the Turkish Ambassador in
London, reported that in London the prevailing idea on the Russian participation in Paris
talks was not in the affirmative either. However, the talks at Paris had been expected to have
one of the two definite outcomes: agreement or break off. Here, Açıkalın asserted that the
conclusion of the deliberations in the negative meant a reaffirmation of the tragic division of
Europe. 207
According to M. Leffler, the Soviet response to the Marshall Plan was harsh and
calibrated, but it was no declaration of war for the control of Europe as the US Ambassador
in Moscow, B. Smith, said. He argued that the Soviet leadership saw its periphery being
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probed in Turkey and as well as in Eastern Europe, its fiercest enemy Germany revived and
its foreign supporters imprisoned as in Greece, or excised from governments as in Italy and
France. Thus, the Soviets had reacted defensively and their aim was to consolidate the
Kremlin’s power within the orbit of Soviet influence rather than to seek new gains in the
West. 208
Having excluded the Soviets and their relentless delaying tactics, democratic grouping of
states in Europe gave fresh momentum to coordination and planning activities to create the
conditions for a regular US assistance at once. Admittedly, the bulk of the work on the US
assistance programme was being planned by the Committee of Co-operation to which Turkey
was a party since its foundation at the Conference of Paris of July 12-15, 1947. N.
Menemencioğlu, the Turkish Ambassador to Paris, headed the Turkish delegation in the
Conference. On July 15, Menemencioğlu informed Ankara that it was agreed that the
conference mechanism would be replaced  by the Committe of European Economic
Cooperation. As another point of great importance, the talks in Paris had ended in a way in
which the original Anglo-French initiative aiming at confining the participation in the
Committee of    Co-operation 209 to a limited number of European states, and presenting the
programme in concern to Washington along these lines, had left its place to a greater scheme.
In this regard, all nations present in Paris could have a seat in the Committee of Co-
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operation, which would assume a representative role as well. Technical committees and sub-
committees would also address their reports to the Committee of Co-operation which would
have an executive board of five. Despite Menemencioğlu’s demarché, Britain and France
favoured the inclusion of the Netherlands, Norway and Italy into this board while proposing
Turkey a seat in the committees of iron-steel industry and transportation.
Interestingly, Menemencioğlu stated that prior to the talks on the establishment of the
committees and the sub-committees, the Turkish and the Greek representatives had agreed to
act as the representative of two states to optimize the benefits of their work. Greece was
placed in the committees of energy, food and agriculture, while Turkey was given a seat in
the sub-committee of agriculture. In its turn, Greece took a part in the sub-committee of
naval transportation too. In the conclusion of his cable, Menemencioğlu also urged Ankara to
send specialists to join the works of the relevant committees and the sub-committees. 210
Within ten weeks after the Paris Conference of July 1947, a comprehensive scheme was
drawn up for the economic recovery of Western Europe.
As for the formulation of US policy towards the growing cleavage between the Western
and Communists blocs, in an article published in July 1947, Kennan, then Director of
Planning at the State Department, stressed the need for “‘a long-term, patient but firm and
vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies’“. 211 He stated that the USA should
continue to regard the SU as a rival in the political arena. Subsequently, the term
'containment' was widely adopted to describe the aim of US policy in its dealings with the
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Soviets. Furthermore, Kennan stressed that the political personality of Soviet power was the
product of ideology and circumstances: ideology inherited by the Soviet leaders from the
movement in which they had their political origin, and circumstances of the power which
they exercised for decades in Russia. Shortly afterwards, his telegram circulated in
Washington’s corridors of power and finally leaked to the press and definitevely authored the
US policy towards the SU. According to Alan Cassels, Kennan’s strategy of containment had
already been put into effect and “policy began to catch up with ideology” when the Truman
Doctrine was enunciated before the US Congress. 212
Turning back to the implemetantion of the US aid program, the committee of 16
beneficiary nations of the Marshall Plan completed its report on September 22, in which the
amount of aid required by these nations was stated as 22.5 billion dollars for the years 1948-
1951. According to this report, Turkey’s share would remain relatively small in the first
years. 213 On September 27, members of the “Committee of European Economic Co-
operation” 214 in Washington sent an aide-memoire to the State Department, and explained
that a large number of technical points which could not be clarifed in the report of the 16
participating countries were then clarifed. These particular points to which the attention of
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the State Department was drawn, consisted of the aid envisaged; its form and conditions; and
the organisation which should be set up for its administration.
In this framework, it was pointed out that the figure for the dollar deficit in the balance of
payments of the 16 participating countries during the next four years as shown by the Paris
Report, constituted an order of magnitude below which the amount of aid should not be
reduced without the risk of jeopardising the achievement of the programme that the
participating countries had in view. It was also emphasized that it was not possible to
calculate exactly the amount of this deficit which depended on the size of the harvests, on the
movement of prices, on the development of dollar earnings, on the resumption of trade
between Western and Eastern Europe, etc., while the uncertainty of the factors affecting the
figure contained in the Paris Report might lead to revisions upwards as well as downwards.
However, with a view to the consequences of insufficient availability of certain commodities
necessary for the rehabilitation of the European economy, it was stated that “this factor, far
from reducing the global amount of aid necessary, would tend to increase it”. 215
In regard to the form of prosed aid it was underscored that the American aid could be
furnished either wholly in dollars or wholly in goods, or partly in dollars and partly in goods.
It was preferred, however, that the greatest possible part of the external aid would be
supplied in dollars. In carrying out the programme of imports, it was requested that so far as
possible, the ordinary channels of trade should be used. Thus, this condition would be more
difficult to fulfill if aid was furnished in commodities rather than in dollars. In addition, the
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possibility of receiving dollars rather than goods would permit each of the purchasing
countries to procure the types and qualities of goods which were best suited to their needs.
The aide memoire underscored that “there is no doubt that these dollars will for the most part
be used directly in the U.S. themselves which are the principal suppliers of raw materials,
foodstuffs and the necessary equipment.” 216 It was also expressed that the European nations
would need to place contracts outside the USA with producers who would demand payment
in dollars. The participating countries would consequently have to rely on the dollar to enable
them to pay for these supplies which were indispensable to the execution of the European
programme. Additionally, it was recognized that all necessary steps should have to be taken
to limit the inflationary pressure which might result from the purchases. Thus, the European
Group was ready to examine with the US Government how it might best cooperate in this
regard with the US administration in the common interest.
As for the conditions of the proposed aid, it was explained that the estimated requirements
were so considerable that if the aid that was furnished should lead to Europe having to make
large transfers, the participating countries would not be in a position at the end of the period
in view to ensure a stable equilibrium in their balance of payments. At the same time, the
charges to be paid to service an external debt that was too heavy would make it more difficult
to obtain credits from the International Bank or private banks, which would certainly be
necessary to pay for long term capital equipments. The conditions under which these funds
might be used would vary from country to country as well. Consequently, the arrangements
governing the use of these funds would be different for each country and would lead to
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individual discussions. It was also considered important to note that these funds should be the
property of the recipient countries.
Admittedly, the question of how these sums should be handled posed a delicate political
problem given the Soviet propaganda warfare. Regarding the need for a political counter-
offensive against the opponents of the Marshall Plan who had “announced their intention of
using all means to block it”, and who would “seek to show that the existence of these funds is
capable of conferring upon the U.S. considerable powers infringing the independence of the
European countries concerned”, it was suggested that these governments have these funds in
local currency at their disposal, and employ them in accordance with whatever arrangements
might be concluded. 217
Lastly, as would also constitute the basis for an organisation of the 16 participant
countries, it was reiterated that the concerned governments had declared in the Paris Report
their readiness to set up a joint organisation with two functions; on the one hand, to examine
and report on the extent to which the programme was being realised; on the other hand, to
ensure by joint action, the realisation of the economic conditions necessary to enable the
general objectives to which each country had pledged itself to be effectively achieved.
Consecutively, the task which would be entrusted to this organisation would be elaborated. It
was, however, evident that such an elaboration would depend on the character of the external
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aid and of the organisations “which on its side the American Government deems it useful to
set up to ensure the execution of the programme.” 218
On November 4, in reply to the above discussed aide-memoire, the State Department
informed the European Group through an informal aide-memoire that the USA had to give
careful thought to additional factors. The capacity of the USA to continue to export far larger
quantities of goods than it imports was strictly limited. Thus, the USA could not assume
unlimited obligations to meet the balance of payment deficits of other countries. It was stated
that many of the commodities most essential to European recovery were in critically short
supply, not only in Europe and in the USA, but in the entire world. In this context, if the
USA were to make more dollar assistance available than could be honored in the form of
goods, the additional assistance would be purely illusory and would merely contribute to an
undesirable inflationary spiral in world prices.
Hence, it was recognized that the problem of European recovery had both a commodity
aspect and a financial aspect. Thus, a program of assistance from the USA could be worked
out when considered from either point of view, to a total program which would give real
promise of success. However, “this could not be merely an American program.” 219
Furthermore, the most intense efforts would be required on the part of the European
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countries, both individually and collectively, which called for prompt and vigorous steps to
restore internal monetary and budgetary stability. The participating countries were also
expected to boost their production and their exports if sufficient means of payment were to be
found to finance their other requirements. It was clearly basic to the whole program that
exports from the European countries be rapidly developed, and that these exports be of a
character which could continue and expand after special US assistance to European recovery
came to an end. Then, it was underscored that any conditions as to the use of materials
supplied by the USA in the export trade of the participating countries “had to be worked out
with this basic objective in mind.”
The aide-memoire also stated that the US Government was in agreement with the point of
the European Group that restrictions imposed on the use of local currency arising from US
assistance should not interfere with or prejudice the economic and financial control of the
economy that had to be exercised by the government of each country. Thus, it was desired
that “a formulae can be mutually agreed upon between this government and the governments
of the participating countries with respect to the use of these funds which will promote and
not interfere with the over-all objectives of European economic recovery.” 220 The aide-
memoire underscored that the US Congress had a controlling voice, which it would exercise
in these matters as well, and this point was mentioned again to emphasize the present trend in
formulating the recommendations of the State Department for presentation to the Congress.
In their turn, the Republican majority hesitated to grant a huge amount to fund the
programme to be spent by a Democratic administration. With a view to the deterioration of
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the international situation, however, in December 1947, the US Congress passed an interim
aid program, with $552 million for Europe and $18 million for China. Doubts were quickly
dispersed by the communist coup in Czechoslovakia in February 1948. On March 17,1948,
Truman stated in his Congressional speech that, “‘We have learned that we must earn the
peace we seek just as we earned victory in war, not by wishful thinking but by realistic
effort’”. 221 Describing Moscow’s ruthless destruction of the independence of various Eastern
European nations, and its intent to sabotage the Marshall Plan, he asked that the Congress
complete action on the Marshall Plan and provide for a general military training program.
Fortunately for the Marshall Plan’s chances of passage, as explained above, the SU and
Moscow-oriented nations refused to participate, for Truman got it through the budget-
conscious Eightieth Congress by presenting it in a crisis atmosphere. The Congress
responded to his call and on April 3, 1948, he signed the Foreign Assistance Act, under
which the USA provided $12.4 billion to Europe over the next four years. 222
Semih Günver, who had served in Brussels as a Turkish diplomat in these years, pointed
out that particularly the deterioration in the French and Italian economies had prompted the
regular American aid to Europe. He explained that despite the financial assistance provided
by Washington in the aftermath of war, Communism had advanced in Europe, necessitating a
detailed aid project. He said, the US administration had come to the conclusion that no
positive outcome could be expected from assistance packages made on an irregular basis, and
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a total action plan was required. Besides, it was agreed that Europe should be encouraged to
unite and effectively cooperate in the administration of the aid. Interestingly, Günver said, in
the beginning, it was evaluated by the USA that the SU would also accept the assistance in
line with its policy to remain in the negotiation table where the future of Europe was
discussed. Thus, it was initially expected that through this move, the Kremlin would neither
categorically reject the aid, nor would it direct its satellites to do so. At this juncture, he said,
launching of the assistance to Greece and Turkey was a serious decision which went through
a process of long discussions in the US Congress, since the US administration was already
experiencing a considerable difficulty to explain about the future of the aid program to
Europe. This period, he said then included a broader publicity of the Soviets’ vicious goals
and the Kremlin’s assertiveness in different parts of the world, including the Mediterranean.
223
As wil be discussed next, particularly in the aftermath of the Marshall Aid, Ankara’s
efforts to achieve a Mediterranean security organization took place. Meanwhile, Turkey’s
efforts to express its security concerns faced setbacks since the US administration could
hardly receive Congressional support to include Turkey in its further defense programmes,
and Britain could no longer be counted as provider of an offer in this direction with a view to
its weak talks about revitalizing the 1939 mutual assistance treaty.
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V LAUNCHING OF THE WESTERN SECURITY PACTS AND THE TURKISH
ROLE IN REGIONAL DEFENCE (1948-1950)
Admittedly, from 1948 to 1950, the Turkish role in regional defense was a matter on
which uncertainty prevailed. During this period, drawing on a variety of assumptions,
Ankara produced a range of policy alternatives to associate its defense with that of the West.
On this premise, this chapter explains that as a result of the lack of an invitation to become a
founding member first in the Brussels Pact in March 1948 and a year later in NATO in April
1949, Ankara increasingly needed to embark on developing its own projections, a
Mediterranean security groupement offer being the most cited one. Here, it is also explained
that, concurrently, increasing efforts to draw Middle Eastern states together under a new
security umbrella also raised the possibility of establishing a Middle East Defense
Organization (MEDO) perhaps linked to NATO.
That was not what happened however. And, eventually, Anglo-American efforts to create
a regional security grouping of states proved to be in vain. Given this, this chapter discusses
that the conditions gradually arose for Ankara - which was both trying to promote its
Mediterranean security pact proposal, and contributing to the efforts around the establishment
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of MEDO - to renew its efforts for joining the Western defense scheme, but this time in an
entirely different region, in the Far East.
V . 1 Progress Towards A Euro-Atlantic Pact Contains Turkish Participation in the
Alliance
Evidently, the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine and the US aid program, addressed
only in part, from Ankara’s point of view, Turkish security concerns since it did not provide
Turkey with a permanent security mechanism. Thus, in the absence of an American
commitment in the Mediterranean, and while the British maintained an essential strategic
interest in the area, inevitably, Turkey relied on its treaty of mutual assistance with Britain
and France of 1939 in its efforts to counter any future Soviet pressure. Concurrently, Turkey
had been hoping for some security arrangement with the US since 1947, when the waning of
British power in the Eastern Mediterranean became apparent.
Meanwhile, according to McGhee, in a period of increasing demand of the UK for US
support “in other parts of the Middle East than Greece and Turkey, as the military value of
British treaty rights in Egypt, Iraq and Jordan declined” 224 , the British whose objective was
to hold on to these rights for as long as possible, perceived the defence of the Middle East as
an instrument of continuing British influence in the region.  Indeed, there were clear
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indications that Britain had shifted to formulate its foreign and security policies on different
defensive grouping of states each led by either itself or the USA. McGhee pointed out that
the main strategy of the British was “Inner Defence” centred on the “Inner Ring” whose
locus was Suez. The USA, however, saw Middle East defence as a way to defend the region
as a whole from Soviet aggression by bolstering the military strength of Turkey, Iran and
Iraq - the “Outer Ring” - within an “Outer Defence” strategy with “Inner Defence” as a
backdrop. 225
In a memorandum dated 5 January 1948, Ernest Bevin presented his account of Soviet
policy according to which British and American interests were undermined everywhere by
growing Soviet ambitions. There was a risk, he thought, that the Communists would control
Italy, France and Greece. If Soviet plans in Greece succeeded Turkey also would collapse.
Consequently, the success of Russian expansionist designs would imperil the ‘three elements
of Commonwealth defence, the security of the UK, the control of the sea communications,
and the defence of the Middle East’. 2  A few days later, on 8 January Bevin discussed with
the Cabinet his idea of forming, with American backing, a Western democratic system which
would include France, the Benelux countries and Britain, and which would eventually extend
to comprise Italy, Greece and possibly Portugal. At a later stage, Spain and Germany could
also be included. The Cabinet endorsed the proposal and on 13 January Washington was
approached. Along the lines of the same policy, Ernest Bevin proposed a Western alliance
against Moscow. When Truman responded positively, discussions quickened. At the same
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time, Bevin communicated the idea to his French counterpart as well, who agreed to co-
operate. The exact nature of the alliance, and the American relationship to it, emerged
slowly, and as will be further discussed below, on March 17, 1948, Britain, France and the
Benelux countries signed the Brussels Pact, which provided for collective security.
On January 22, Bevin delivered to the House of Commons a message which underlined
that the USA and the UK were heading towards a western collective security arrangement.
He said, “We are, indeed, at a critical moment in the organisation of the postwar world, and
decisions we now take, I realise, will be vital to the future peace of the world...I hope that
treaties will thus be signed with our near neighbours, the Benelux countries, making with our
treaty with France an important nucleus in Western Europe.” 226
Undoubtedly, Bevin’s speech gave rise to mixed feelings in Ankara. On the one hand, the
British initiative addressed what the Turks saw as a need for Western defence cooperation to
counterbalance Soviet power. On the other hand, however, the proposed defence arrangement
did not encompass the Eastern Mediterranean. Ankara became concerned over this exclusion.
The world division into two blocs of power, which had become unmistakably clear by the
end of 1947 certainly justified this concern.
In the meantime, a series of treaties of friendship and mutual assistance between the SU
and Romania (February 4), Hungary (February 18), Bulgaria (March 18) and Finland (April
6) were concluded. The Eastern Bloc to which Poland and Chezchoslovakia also blonged,
and from which Finland would gradually move out, started to take shape.
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In the intensification of the Cold War in Europe, two crises had the responsibility more
than anything else for sharpening the acrimony: the Communist assumption of power in
Czechoslovakia in February 1948, and the Berlin blockade, which lasted from June 1948 to
May 1949. The Czechoslovakian coup surprised Washington precisely because it came
against a backdrop of uncertainty about Soviet intentions. Another importance of the Czech
crisis in its wider effects was that it heightened tension in the Cold War, and accentuated
apprehension over a Soviet attempt to extend Communism elsewhere. Shortly afterwards, the
Kremlin designed its consecutive move towards West Berlin. The Brussels Treaty was
scarcely signed when the Soviets started the blockade of West Berlin (June, 1948). It was to
last for 323 days, and was only countered by the organization of a costly air-lift by the
Western powers. The Berlin Blockade no doubt hastened the setting up of Western defence.
Having watched the events helplessly, the American and British governments concluded
that nothing could be done directly, but the right lessons should be drawn for other parts of
Europe.  Shortly afterwards, with Anglo-American encouragement and with the Czech crisis
as a backdrop, Britain, France, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands increased their
efforts to form a pact for collective defense.
From a Turkish point of view, however, the omission of Greece and Turkey as possible
members of the Western bloc was deliberate. According to F. Cemal Erkin, at the time
Ambassador in Rome, Bevin had in mind the creation of a bloc of states which would enable
Britain to make some sort of a deal with the Soviet Union, possibly at the expense of certain
small states such as Greece and Turkey. Besides, he had conceptualized an evolving western
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European security system to which Italy and Germany would eventually be restored. Under
these circumstances, exclusion of Turkey and Grecee - without an implication of the change
in their status in the future - was not understandble.
Turning back to prevailing ambiguity about the Turkish situation in the aftermath of
Britain’s declared policy, the Turkish President asked urgently for an official summary of the
speech and instructed the Anatolian News Agency to be instantly informed by telephone of
world reactions as they came in.  İnönü stated that the speech had impressed him more
favourably because, it constituted a decision which meant that leaders in Western Europe
were about to adopt to courageous activity in order to get organized.
As Erkin put it, Bevin’s speech on January 22 was enthusiastically received in Ankara.
He stated that the broadcasts of the radiohouse in Ankara included the statements of Turkish
statesmen, who expressed great satisfaction on the news concerning the political and military
alliance, which was in fact, confined to west Europe. However, such positive reactions from
Ankara would soon prove to be untimely. Erkin maintained that the attitude of west Europe
lacked adequate attention to the fact that the Truman Doctrine had clearly underscored the
existence of a threat against Turkey and Greece. Turkey had successfully repelled the Soviet
threat directed at the Straits and its territorial integrity very recently. Given this, it was
disregarded that the Soviets were aiming at settling the question of the Straits, while Greece
was in a bitter civil conflict and Iran was under occupation, 227 placing Turkey in pincers.
Furthermore, troop movements on the Bulgarian-Turkish border were taking place as part of
Soviet designs aimed at increasing the pressure on Turkey.
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When Erkin cabled his views to Ankara, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sadak,
immediately invited him for consultations. In Ankara, Sadak told Erkin that a day before his
statement, Bevin had informed Ambassador Açıkalın in London, and Kelly had visited him in
Ankara concurrently, in order to explain the British initiative, and the guarantee of Britain’s
uninterrupted interest and friendship, and stated that the British Government was convinced
that this development would satisfy Ankara as well. Contrary to Erkin’s expectations, Sadak
also implied that Ankara was satisfied with these statements, and the guarantee which Britain
extended to Turkey. Subsequently, in Erkin’s visit to Prime Minister Hasan Saka, the
Turkish Premiere expressed similar views too.
However, Erkin considered that Turkey had failed to take prompt action. He found a
convenient ground when İnönü asked his assessments on the Brussels Treaty and its
foreseeable outcomes. When Erkin explained his anxiety about the exclusion of Turkey, and
the formulation of the new defensive scheme in Western Europe, İnönü agreed with Erkin’s
anxiety, and asked him as to what could be done next. Erkin said that having failed to
emphasize the imperative of Turkey’s political and military presence of Turkey immediately
after Turkey was informed of the new formation, it was very unlikely that demarchés from
then on could result in the affirmative. However, since the inclusion of Washington in this
formation was nearer, it might   be of use if Sadak was instructed to visit London, he told
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İnönü. Against these expectations, Sadak visited London. But, deliberations in London were
fruitless. 228
As mentioned before, the coup in Czechoslovakia which took place on February 25, 1948
accelarated the discussions between the Westen European States and the USA regarding the
establishment of a defensive alliance. In fact, the Prague Government which had favoured
participation in the Marshall Plan was obliged to revise its views and reverse its decision
after hasty visits by the Hungarian Premier C. Gottwald, and the Czech Foreign Minister Jan
Masaryk to Moscow in July 1947. From then on, the Communists, by means of a campaign
of denunciation, secured the arrest and trial of many members of the democratic party which
held an absolute majority, and finally in February 1948, Moscow’s special envoy Zorin,
engineered the resignation of President Benes to pave the way to the formation of a
Communist Government.
Under these circumstances, on March 4, 1948, negotiations were precipitated towards the
conclusion of the Brussels Treaty, which was proposed by Britain and France to Benelux
countries, and within a fortnight’s time on March 17, the treaty was signed. The Brussels
Treaty had its roots in the Treaty of Dunkuerque between Britain and France, and came into
being as an end-result of the extension of this formation. The Treaty of Dunkuerque was
signed by the UK and France on March 4, 1947 for a minimum of 50 years. This was an
alliance treaty which included clauses explicitly directed against Germany, should it try to
renew a policy of aggression and in certain aspects, it was regarded as an attempt at
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revitalising the “Entente Cordiale”. Under its terms they were also bound, by means of
continuing consultation on problems bearing on their economic relations, to take all measures
necessary to increase their prosperity and economic stability and thus, enable them to make a
more effective contribution to the economic and social aims of the United Nations. 229
The Brussels Treaty was thus mainly directed against Germany and similar objectives
were unavoidably transfered to it. This treaty was directed at different objectives afterwards.
It represented the first step in the post-war reconstruction of Western European security and
brought into being the Western Union and the Brussels Treaty Organization. 230 The signatory
countries pledged themselves to build up a common defence system and to strengthen their
economic and cultural ties. This security meachanism was particularly endorsed by the
willingnes of the participant countries’ expression of their readines to come to the aid of any
contracting party in case it became an object of an armed agreession “in Europe” as
expressed in Article IV. This article stated that in accordance with the provisions of Article
51 of the Charter of the United Nations, the other signatories to the treaty would afford the
attacked party “all the military and other aid and assistance in their power.”  It was also
stated in Article V of the treaty that all measures taken as a result of the preceding Article
would be immediately reported to the Security Council, and they would be terminated as
soon as the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain or restore
international peace and security.
                    
229 Ibid., p. 270. Dankward Gerhold, “Armament Controls of Germany: Protocol III of the Modified
Brussels Treaty” in, Fred Tanner (ed.), From Versailles to Baghdad: Post-War Armament Control of
Defeated States, (NY: United Nations Publications, 1992), p. 72. See also footnote (1) on the same
page.
clxxv
Article VII  of the treaty provided for the creation of a supreme body in Western Union,
known as the Consultative Council, consisting of the five Foreign Ministers. Under it was a
Western Defence Committee consisting of the Defence Ministers. Here, it was stated that at
the request of any of the contracting parties, the council would be immediately convened in
order to permit the contracting parties to consult with regard to any situation which might
constitute a threat to peace, “in whatever area this threat should arise; with regard to the
attitude to be adopted and the steps to be taken in case of a renewal by Germany of an
aggressive policy; or with regard to any situation constituting a danger to economic
stability.” 231 It is interesting to note that towards the final articles of the agreement, the
definition of threat was  more clear and expressed merely as the “renewal by Germany of
an aggressive policy” and “danger to economic stability”. This, no doubt, was a clear
indication of the decision of the participating countries to confine the scope of the agreement.
Turkish disenchantment with being left out of this agreement might be considered as
untimely or as an exaggerated reaction. But, the Brussels Treaty was designed to introduce a
broader defense perspective which included cross-Atlantic partners, namely the USA and
Canada. In this context, it might be argued that the diversion of opinion between Ankara and
the members of the Western Union had its roots in their perception of the Truman Doctrine
and the Marshall Aid. According to Ankara, together with Greece, Turkey was
unquestionably in the center of the Truman Doctine and the American interest in Europe,
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while the others saw these two countries on the brink of Europe and whose defense had a
minimum role for the security of the continent. Obviously, closer contacts of the WEU with
Washington was shaping a similar idea in the minds of the US officials. This being the case,
Ankara rightly saw the danger of being excluded from this treaty which paved the way for a
greater collaboration.
Meanwhile, economic aid to Ankara was no doubt on Washington’s agenda. Marshall, in
a letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives on February 26, requested on behalf
of the administration a further appropriation of $275.000.000 so as to ensure continuing
military aid to Greece and Turkey to June 30, 1949 as the next step. The Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, on March 19, approved the administrations’ request, and the Senate
passed it on March 25.
The Foreign Assistance Bill in its final version was passed by the Senate on April 2, and
by the House of Representatives the same day by 318 (167 Republicans and 151 Democrats)
votes to 75 (62 Republicans, 11 Democrats, 2 American Labour) and on April 3, was signed
by Truman, who declared that the act constituted an historic step in American foreign policy,
that it was “America’s answer to the challenge facing the free world,” and that it was “a
striking manifestation of the fact that a bi-partisan foreign policy can lead to effective
action.” 232
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Turning back to the cross-Atlantic reactions to this new treaty formation of states, the
treaty was met with interest particularly by the Canadian Government. Subsequently, on
April 28, 1948, the idea of a single mutual defence system, including and superseding the
Brussels Treaty, was publicly put forward by St. Laurent in the Canadian House of
Commons. A report of the Canadian Foreign Ministry on the international situation
concluded on April 29, 1948 with a statement on possible intensification of cooperation
between those free countries, which would assure mutual assistance and protection under the
provisions of Article 51 of the UN Charter. On the other hand, despite his general support
for the Brussels Treaty and his willingness, in principle, to grant assistance by appropriate
means to the five signature states if necessary, the US President Truman did not express that
Washington was ready to enter an alliance with those five states, and to accept concrete
obligations in the framework of a regional pact as Bevin had proposed. But it was essential
that the USA should be able, constitutionally, to join the alliance. The Vandenberg
Resolution eventually brought out a break-through when it passed the US Senate on June 11,
1948. 233
As for the reactions of Washington, contrary to Turkey’s expectations, the USA was not
attempting to propose any modification in Britain’s formulation of west European defense,
which would hamper the fulfillment of the European Recovery Programme originally
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prompted by assistance to Greece and Turkey. In an attempt to explain Turkey’s case, on
May 11, 1948, Turkish Ambassador to Washington, R. Baydur, criticized the US policy
which envisaged to give certain guarantees to west European countries against aggression
without any mention of Turkey. Baydur emphasized the existence of a small minority who
were pro-Soviet in Turkey, arguing that for such a small country like Turkey, it was in vain
to resist the SU. Baydur stated that the present US policy which gave the impression that the
security of Western Europe was more significant than Turkey’s, would not only encourage
the Kremlin to increase its pressure against Turkey, but also strengthen this minority group
while undermining public morale. In this framework, he also pointed out the disappointment
of Turks in regard to reduction of the European Recovery Program (ERP). 234
Another country which was interested in the developments around the Brussels Treaty
was of course Italy. To share his concerns, on his return to Rome, Erkin visited the Italian
Foreign Minister C. Sforza. Following an exchange of views on the foreseeable outcomes of
the Brussels Treaty, Erkin underscored the US interest to adhere to this new grouping of
states. This would turn the defensive bloc in concern to a strong and large alliance, which
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would leave Turkey alone vis-a-vis Russia, eventually further weakening its position. Thus,
he pointed out that he couldn’t avoid reproach the exclusion of Turkey on these premises. 235
Erkin, this time as Ambassador in Rome, sent a long report to Ankara on May 8. Here,
having combined his impressions of the talks he held in Rome and the experiences of years of
service as Secretary General of the MFA, he explained the parameters of Turkey’s
Mediterranean policy, and the position of the regional countries towards a Mediterranenan
agreement. Firstly, he evaluated the Italian foreign policy towards participating in a regional
agreement and partnership with Turkey within this “groupement”. Erkin explained that the
Italian Foreign Minister Sforza had made it clear that Italy had always felt itself sided with
Turkey while always keeping itself as “far from any tumultuous and detrimental
demonstrations.” 236 However, Erkin had the impression that Italy had an objective of
ensuring the revision of the clauses on its armed forces and the future of its colonies of the
Italian peace treaty, in return for its accession to the Mediterranean groupement as well.
Regarding France, this country was unlikely to raise any objection to this “groupement”
in the Mediterranean since previous deliberations in Paris were in the affirmative. However,
he said, he could merely state his general impressions of the French attitude towards the
groupement under discussion. 237 In this framework, he pointed out that based on the
                    
235 Ibid., p. 270. In his report to Ankara dated May 8, 1948, Erkin asserted that Italy was then
reluctant to appear attached to one of the emerging blocs. Though it was a natural member of the
civilization and the corporate values of the West, he considered that this country would subject its
accession to the WEU or the Mediterranean grouping of states to the revisions in the Italian Peace
Treaty pertaining to military issues and the future of its colonies. See also, pp. 278-279.
236 Ibid., p. 278.
237 On various occasions, Erkin implied that he was poorly informed of the talks held by the Minister
of Foreign Affairs, Sadak and the officials of the Ministry, in Ankara and elsewhere. This being the
case, while he was in Rome and subsequently in Washington (From June 1947 to August 1948 in
clxxx
instructions of the government, he had exchanged views with American, Greek, Italian and
Egyptian ambassadors on a theoretical basis. Then, referring to his talks with the Egyptian
Ambassador in Ankara, Emin Fuad, on the possibility of realizing a regional agreement, he
said, this issue was discussed during a private visit of King Farouk to the Turkish coasts and
Mersin as well. It was then decided that the conclusion of a Turco-Egyptian treaty could be
announced on the occasion of an official visit of Farouk to be arranged accordingly.
However, the deadlock in the Anglo-Egyptian dispute had handicapped this idea.
Lastly, Spain might assume a place in this groupement, if it could remove the obstacles
caused by its regime said Erkin. His report underlined that the natural members of the
                                                               
Rome and Ambassador in Washington as of the latter date), he considered himself sometimes
grooving in the darkness. He asserted that the way in which his personal relationships developed with
Prime Minister Peker, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sadak and his successor in Ankara as General
Secreatary Fuad Carım had served to this effect. According to him, deterioration of his relations with
the government was a result of Carım’s ambitions who had constantly explained to Erkin, Saka’s
personal dislike of him while expressing similar views to Saka on behalf of Erkin. Interestingly,
Erkin stated that he had not felt any negative vibes for a long time and on the contrary, he had
suggested Carım as his replacement. See, Ibid., pp. 142-143; 157; 175-177; 183-193, respectively.
   Of course, this represents an ample example of the debate on the role of “agent(s)” in foreign
policy/decision-making. Although familiar throughout the discipline of international relations, the
agent-structure debate has been brought under discusssions of international politics increasingly. It is
now widely accepted that any analysis of events must be able to generate explanations that take
account of both structure and agency. The problem arises because explanations so frequently operate
at one of two extremes. At one extreme, human beings (actors-agents) are seen to be free agents with
the power to maintain or transform the systems in which they operate. At the other extreme, it is
assumed that actors are caught in the grip of structures which they did not create and over which they
do not exercise control. Then the problem of structure and agency surfaces because of the failure to
find a way of synthesizing these two extreme positions.
    The debate is admittedly too large to reach a conclusion here since both old and new approaches
(i.e., structuralistm, opposing a unit (actor-agent)-based explanation of the behaviour of states in
terms of their internal properties and advocating that in social systems agents are constrained by the
structure of the systems in which they operate; scientific realism explaining that invisible structures
have just as tangible an existence as the individual agents constrained by them) introduced a variety
of analysis around the question. The problem still persists apparently particularly in developing
democracies. For a general explanation, see, Barry Buzan, (1st edt.), The Logic of Anarchy
Neorealism to Structural Realism, (NY: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 102-113, passim.
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envisaged regional agreement would include these nations, whereas, in the future this defense
mechanism would certainly depend on the attitudes of Britain, France and particulary, of the
USA. As his personal opinion, he stated that the Americans would prefer to extend their
guarantee to a political union of 16 nations that had already united around the Marshall Plan.
Above all, this would serve to safeguard the future of the program and support the firm stand
of the recipient nations against possible attacks. However, some small states were refraining
from enlarging the term “region” while the British and the French had adopted a phase by
phase enlargement policy for the union.  238
At this juncture, on July 4, 1948, Turkey and the USA concluded another major
agreement in regard to the application of US assistance programmes to Turkey. The
Economic Co-operation Agreement between Turkey and the US of July 4, was also
significant since it underscored that Turkey had adhered to the Agreement of European
Economic Co-operation signed in Paris on April 16. 239 Interestingly, both agreements were
approved by the TGNA consecutively, allowing the Turkish-US economic cooperation
agreement to state that Turkey was a participant country in the Organisation for European
Economic Cooperation. In this framework, Ankara agreed to facilitate the activities of the
press which would underscore the objectives and the progress achieved concerning the
programs of the ERP, to further improve a sense of joint effort and mutual cooperation.
Besides, Ankara would release information in regard to the use of finance, commodities and
                    
238 F. Cemal Erkin, Dışişlerinde..., Vol. I, pp. 277-281, passim.
239 Sixteen signatories of this agreement were Turkey, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece,
Ireland, Iceland, Luxembourg, Norway, the Netherlands, Italy, Portugal, United Kingdom, Sweden,
Switzerland and the commanders of the US, the UK and France of Germany under occupation. Resmi
Gazete, July 13, 1948, No: 6956, p. 14393. The TGNA approved this agreement with Law No: 5252
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services received through this program every three months. 240 Besides, Article 8 of the
agreement envisaged the establishment of a “Special Economic Co-operation Mission” of US
experts, which would be considered as an integral part of the US diplomatic mission in
Turkey.
Meanwhile, on June 10, 1948, following a reshuffle by President İnönü, Hasan Saka
formed his second cabinet in which Necmettin Sadak kept his position as Minister of Foreign
Affairs. It is worth noting that since the beginning of WW II, İnönü had adopted a particular
strategy in regard to the changes of governments and this was greatly based on the
nomination of Minister of Foreign Affairs as Prime Ministers. As mentioned above, on
September 13, 1944, Saka was appointed as Minister of Foreign Affairs in the 2nd Şükrü
Saracoğlu Government. 241 He had served as the chairman of the Turkish delegation in the
United Nations Conference on International Organization in San Francisco. Upon Saracoğlu’s
resignation, he was reappointed as Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Recep Peker
Government, which remained in office between August 7, 1946 and September 9, 1947.
Following Peker’s resignation, İnönü instructed Saka to form the new cabinet on September
10, 1947. Saka resigned on June 8, 1948, but he was reappointed as Prime Minister. 242
                                                               
and the Economic Co-operation with Law No: 5253 consecutively on July 8, 1948. For the texts of
the agreements see, ibid., pp. 14393-14398; 14398-14401 respectively.
240 Ibid., Article 7, pp. 14399-14400.
241 The Saracoğlu Governments served between July 9, 1942-March 9, 1943 and March 9, 1943 to
August 7, 1946 consecutively. In the cabinets of Saracoğlu, Numan Menemencioğlu (until June 15,
1944) and subsequently, Hasan Saka were nominated as Minister of Foreign Affairs. Previously Dr.
Refik Saydam had formed two cabinets consecutively, between April 3, 1939 and July 9, 1942 in
which Saracoğlu had served as Minister of Foreign Affairs. Kemal Girgin, T.C. Hükümetleri
Programında Dış Politikamız 1923-1993, (Ankara: Dışişleri Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1993), pp. 19-21.
242 Saka remained in office until he resigned once again on January 14, 1949, on account of strong
differences of opinion between himself and the Parliamentary Group of the Republican People’s
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The period in which the cabinets of H. Saka served was marked with an expectation that
he would better the relations between the government and the opposition. Besides, the small
opposition group in the RPP was pressing for the establishment of a truly democratic regime
and the elimination of restrictions over political freedoms. About this time, President İnönü
was seeking economic and military assistance from the USA. However, a considerable
number of US Congressmen were strongly critical of the nature of Turkey’s political regime
since the discussions on the Truman Doctrine. In fact, the Truman Doctrine was explained in
the US Congress as an effort to save democracy and freedom in Turkey as well. “The views
expressed in the U.S. Congress and the necessity of establishing closer relations with the
West, may be assumed to have had some impact on political developments in Turkey.” 243 On
July 8, 1948, Sadak explained in the TGNA that the Turkish-US agreement was made in
accordance with the US Foreign Assistance Act, which envisaged the signing of separate
agreements between the US Government and the recipient governments. He said the Turkish-
US agreement was designed to serve to the effect that the US Congress would undertake to
forward assistance to Turkey within the framework of the Aid Act, while Turkey would
assume general responsibility in regard to the use of aid in concern effectively. He pointed
out that in the beginning, as a result of the hasty assessments of the US specialists of the
numbers and statistics submitted by the Turkish experts to the conference of the 16 in Paris,
                                                               
Party and President İnönü. On January 16, 1949 Şemsettin Günaltay succeded him and served until
the defeat of RPP in the general elections of May 14, 1950 (formally, until May 22) which brought
the Democratic Party and Adnan Menderes to power.
    Meanwhile, in the both cabinets of Saka and in the subsequent Günaltay Government, Necmettin
Sadak served as Minister of Foreign Affairs. Metin Tamkoç, The Warrior Diplomats, (Salt Lake
City: University of Utah Press, 1976), pp. 315, 328, 341, 344, 352; Kemal Girgin, T.C.
Hükümetleri..., pp. 21-26.
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Turkey’s dollar reserves were estimated greater than they were, eventually causing Turkey’s
replacement in a category which would purchase goods from the USA through payment in
cash. Following Turkey’s explanations, this mistake was corrected, placing Ankara into the
category of recipients of assistance. As a result, based upon the appropriations of the US
Government, an amount of 10 million dollars would be transfered to Turkey for the first
three months. Saka explained that Ankara had submitted projects in the fields of agriculture
(6 million dollars) and metallurgy (3 million dollars) for financial consideration. He said, the
Turkish Embassy in Washington was informed by the Economic Co-operation Administrator
in charge of the ERP, Paul G. Hoffman, that following this period of three months,
allocation of long-term credits of an uncertain amount would be also considered. In this
framework, Turkey had submitted its projects, totalling 85 million dollars for a period of one
year to the Committee of Co-operation and Washington.
Sadak also pointed out that in the letter of Ambassador Wilson dated July 4, the US
Ambassador had stated that the Economic Co-operation Agreement between Turkey and the
USA was approved, and through this Washington admitted that Turkey would enjoy the most
favoured nation status in its commercial transactions in West Germany, Trieste, Japan and
South Korea as long as the USA maintained its controlling or occupying status in these
countries. In this regard, the US Government would apply the related articles of the Trade
Agreement between Turkey and the USA dated April 1, 1939 or the General Agreement on
Customs and Tariffs, dated October 30, 1947 and the latest agreement (July 4, 1948). Sadak
said, “it is needless to mention the significance of the German market in Turkey’s exports. . .
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We hope that the American Government which have made us valuable contributions, will not
create a situation through closing Germany to Turkish goods which will have grave
consequences, and will carefully examine this issue.”
Turning back to the issue of Turkey’s participation in the Brussels Treaty, Ankara would
soon have another try, following the nomination of Erkin to Washington.  In fact, time was
against Ankara, and there were no prospects of realizing a treaty relationship with the West.
The US officials were finding it too hard even to try to explain Turkey’s case, given the poor
public interest towards a country on the margins of the reach of the US assistance programs.
Similar difficulties were experienced during the discussion on the extension of aid to Turkey
in February 1947. Thus, Ankara could hardly expect to involve Washington in its active
search for a security partnership with the West. However, the officials of the MFA strongly
believed that they might convince all the concerned parties that Turkey’s position was vital
for an effective defensive grouping of the Western states since the basic idea had its roots in
the Truman Doctrine, which focused on Turkish economic recovery as well as supporting the
Greek Government in its fight against the Communist insurgents. They considered that the
ERP had a symbiotic relationship with the US aid to Greece and Turkey, just as the
subsequent economic (Committee of Co-operation) and defensive (Brussels Treaty) grouping
of the Western states had. Consecutive developments which culminated in Turkey’s being left
outside the Brussels Treaty, however, were both frustrating and inadmissable. Thus, Ankara
launched an active foreign policy in order to “correct” a mistake. Washington was no doubt,
a crucial place to pursue this objective since it was the center of Euro-Atlantic discussions
aimed at transforming the Brussels Treaty into a major defense mechanism.
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In August 1948, Erkin left his post in Rome and arrived in Washington in replacement of
Baydur. Erkin stated that among the files he examined at the Washington Embassy, one
single issue was of particular importance to him. This was a file on the demarchés of Turkey
which would ultimately enable Turkey to adhere in the “Regional Agreement”. 244 He noted
that the MFA had instructed Baydur to approach the British and French Ambassadors in
Washington in regard to Turkey’s accession to the Brussels Pact. According to Erkin, this
demarché was prompted by the Turkish Ambassador to Paris, Numan Menemencioğlu’s
interview with the French General Secretary in which, upon Menemencioğlu’s suggestion on
Turkey’s joining the deliberations that concerned the “Western Regional Agreement” in
Washington, his French interlocutor pledged to instruct French Ambassadors in various
capitals to express Turkey’s desire on the grounds this issue would be discussed.
Subsequently, Baydur had visited his French counterpart in Washington, but, he was told
that no instruction had arrived from Paris towards this effect. In his turn, Baydur had cabled
Ankara and explained the situation. The MFA had passed this information to Paris, and
following a renewed demarché, Menemencioğlu had informed Ankara that this time the
French Minister of Foreign Affairs, himself, had told him that there might be a delay
between Paris and Washington, and in any case the instruction would be renewed. The file he
examined included that eventually it was decided that Erkin would relaunch the initiative as
the new ambassador.
                    
244 Erkin used the terms “Regional Agreement” and “Western Regional Agreement” to refer to an
agreement which was being planned between the USA and the countries of Western Europe (which
emerged as the North Atlantic Treaty) throughout his work.
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Towards the end of August, Erkin interviewed his French counterpart, Henry Bonnet, and
inquired if he was instructed to explain Turkey’s wish during the deliberations between the
USA, Western European Union and Canada. Bonnet said that he was informed of the talks in
Paris, which he assumed remained more along the lines of a friendly exchange of views. To
the astonishment of Erkin, he added that he had expressed to the former Turkish
Ambassador, Baydur, too that he was not particularly instructed to pronounce Turkey’s wish
in this regard in the Washington deliberations which was in an early phase. In his turn, Erkin
replied that with a view to the statement of Bonnet, it was understood the time for Turkey’s
formal application would have been too soon. However, if a defensive bloc were to be
formed in Europe in association with the USA, no other country’s membership in it could be
imagined as more natural that that of Turkey since it had launched  resistance against the
threat first time three years ago in own capacity. Thus, he said Turkey would formally apply
to the union from the moment the US partnership was incorporated into the WEU. Finally, in
his conclusion, Bonnet told Erkin that the limited membership in the WEU was a result of the
members’ unwillingness to undertake military commitments outside their area. As for
Turkey, however, this time he had stated unintentionally that deliberations in Paris were
discussed in Washington within the framework of general exchanges of view.
At the end of the talks, Erkin had reached to the conclusion that Bonnet was instructed to
make a demarché to point out the need for the willingness of the Mediterranean countries to
assume their role within the West European security system. However, his efforts to invoke a
response in this regard had remained futile. Thus, it was very likely that Bonnet had
refrained from expressing the unfavourable responses of the countries in concern.
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Furthermore, Erkin criticized Bonnet’s attitude when he explained the position of the USA as
too positivistic and rejected the US’ call for an emphasis on the self-help of the Europeans
before US subsidies were dispatched.
Shortly afterwards, on August 31, Erkin interviewed Undesecretary of State  Robert A.
Lovett, who had assumed the chairmanship of the Committee of the Six 245 as well. To the
disappointment of the Turkish Ambassador, Lovett made it clear that Washington would not
intervene in the question of the enlargement of the Brussels Treaty. As set forth in the
Vandenberg Resolution, Washington would only examine if the general requirements for the
US participation in any defensive arrangements were met or not, and if these agreements
were of interest to American national security. Regarding the term, “regional agreement”,
Lovett said, this would acquire the name North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and would
include the countries along the east and west coasts of the North Atlantic Ocean which shared
the seas, languages, cultures, civilizations and world views which had come together to
defend themselves and their common values. He said, Turkey was, of course, a country
whose imporatance was greatly acknowledged. But how one could incorporate this country
which was on the eastern edge of the Mediterranean into this definition and the Atlantic
world ?
In his turn, Erkin strongly objected to Lovett’s conceptualization of the Atlantic
community, and explained that the progress in the world civilization had reduced the
continents to the size of cities in the sense that nations were brought closer and the solidarity
among them were enhanced. Then, the term, “region” had lost its geographical meaning and
clxxxix
acquired a definition pertaining to the common interests of the nations. To make this point
another way, it was because of the same perception of the US administration that the threat
against Turkey was considered as directed against the USA as well. The Truman Doctrine
and the aid act were accepted on the same premise, and the migthy war vessel Missouri was
dispatched to Turkey again with such an objective in mind. Thus, Erkin’s interview with
Lovett ended in a friendly atmosphere, however, producing little impetus. Subsequently, as
will be discussed below, the Turkish Ambassador felt obliged to discuss the same issue, with
Secretary of State Marshall.
In his talks with Marshall where Lovett was also present, Erkin reiterated Turkey’s wish
and need to accede to the most convenient regional agreement to be formed in Europe, and
which would enjoy actual American military aid. Erkin stated that from his interview with
Lovett, he had an impression that the time for Turkey’s participation in the deliberations of
the Committee of the Six had not come yet. Then, Erkin inquired if in this interval President
Truman or Secretary of State Marshall could publicly declare that with a view to the close
relationship between  peace and security in the Mediterranean region and that of the Atlantic,
Turkey’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and national existence, which was an indispensable
component of peace and order in the Mediterranean, was of vital importance for the USA. A
declaration of this kind, would have significant effect on the morale of the Turkish public,
and on Russia which was watching for an opportunity to hunt down Turkey with appealing
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participated in deliberations at Washington. F. Cemal Erkin, Dışişlerinde..., Vol. II, p. 11.
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suggestions. Erkin stated that a declaration of this kind would introduce an additional element
of peace to the Near East too. 246
Meanwhile, at Washington, the Committee of Six, headed by Undersecretary of State
Lovett, concluded the Washington Security Talks on September 9, 1948. The Washington
Paper drafted by the committee recognized the existence of a tie between European security
and the USA, and denigrated the possibility of peaceful coexistence with Soviet Communism
and surveyed the practical problems of defining a North Atlantic security area.
Turning back to Erkin’s discussions at Washington, having exchanged views on the
regional pact with Under Secretary of State, a few days later, Erkin held a meeting with
Secretary of State, Marshall where the Director of Near Eastern and African Affairs, Joseph
C. Satterthwaite, was also present. Referring to the Washington Security Talks, the Turkish
Ambassador said that the completion of an adequate security mechanism undoubtedly
required the inclusion of Turkey in the partnership of the West Europeans and the
Americans. He underscored that options pertaining to the formation of one or more regional
agreements should be revised as well. Erkin explained that for instance, Turkey, Greece, the
UK and the USA could form a groupement in the region. He maintained that while this and
other similar options were being considered - as he repeated his projection on various
grounds for a few times more from then on -  it would be very useful if the US Presidency
could declare the US “vital interest” in Turkey’s integrity and sovereignty. He underscored
as his personal view that the basis of such a declaration was included in the Greek-Turkish
                    
246 As Erkin was informed by the Department of State later on, though it was unusual, President
Truman had undertaken to deliver a message on the occasion of the celebration of the Day of
cxci
Aid Bill, and what he suggested as a formula would represent a further step in this direction
which will be in harmony with the constitutional requirements of the USA. The Turkish
Ambassador emphasized that to respond to Turkey’s needs would introduce additional
components of peace to the Near East. In his turn, Marshall questioned Erkin on the scope of
his projection. However, he gave his interlocutor no sign of approval or decline. As for the
Turkish exports to Germany, he explained that the decisions of the budgetary commissions of
the Congress were heavily politicized, and suggested that Erkin could approach the
Administrator of the ECA, Paul Hoffman. 247
Subsequently, Erkin visited the coordinator of assistance to Greece and Turkey, Wilds.
Here, he explained the crisis in Turkey’s export items, and its need to re-open trade relations
with Germany. In his turn, Wilds, told Erkin that he had noted these points, however, he
should like to make a “friendly suggestion.” Turkey was not paying enough attention to the
Marshall Plan, and the preparations of its projects, which culminated in the delay of affairs in
concern. In this regard, Turkish balance of payments were totally imaginery and full of
incoherent numbers.
Concurrently, the Turkish Ambassador in London, M. Cevat Açıkalın, held similar talks
with his interlocutors. In the same days, he interviewed Bevin as well on the question of
Turkish adherence to the WEU. The British Premiere considered the extension of the military
                                                               
Republic on October 29, in which he expressed his admiration of the Turkish revolution and republic
and the importance he attributed to the Turkish-American co-operation. Ibid., p. 17.
247 Ibid. pp. 15-16. The report of the Director of NEA Satterthwaite revealed that the State
Department initially refused the suggestion of Erkin on a US declaration for Turkey. See, FRUS,
Vol. IV, pp. 173. However, Erkin said, Satterthwaite shortly afterwards informed him that although
it was not customary for the US administrations, Truman had undertook to release a congratulatory
statement on the occasion of October 29, Turkey’s Republic Day. Indeed, Truman’s message was
released on the same day. F. Cemal Erkin, Dışişlerinde..., Vol. II, p. 17.
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guarantee of the WEU and of the USA to Turkey, which was under discussion in
Washington, as untimely. As for the Mediterranean Regional Agreement, with a view to the
situation both in Italy and Spain, and the reactions of the Arab nations which might consider
such an agreement against themselves as a result of their exclusion, planning for an
organization to include a large number of countries was excluded from the current agenda
too.
Around the same days, Erkin gave an interview to the Associated Press in which he
explained that no statement was made to Ankara on the discussions pertaining to the
“question of regional agreements”. In this context he said, it was imperative that, either
throughout entire Europe, or as a combination of separate systems in the northern, western
and Mediterranean regions, unity be secured. PanAmerican unity he said, could be a model,
and in one way or another, Turkish participation in any security mechanism of the European
states would be natural. His statements included that the Charter of the UN had envisaged the
formation of regional agreements for the purpose of defense, and he was of the opinion that it
would be preferable if the Asian countries in the southeast of Europe also conclude similar
agreements and ultimately achieve solidarity among them. The next day, his statements were
published in some US  journals, which basically included that Turkey desired to take part in
the Mediterranean sector of the security system as soon as the Western Unity actively started.
Erkin noted that the correspondent informed that the interview was also cleared with the State
Department. However, he said, the news also particularly emphasized an overwhelming
significance to the Mediterranean formula by his voice.
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In discussing the approaches of various Western countries towards a regional agreement
in the Mediterranean, Erkin stressed that the Greek Ambassador to Washington, Vassili
Dendranis, told him that a competent official of the State Department had expressed that
Washington desired the formation of a regional grouping in the Mediterranean. Erkin noted
that in his interviews, the British Ambassador to Washington, Sir Oliver Franks, had also
pointed out that a separate formation of states in the Mediterranean would be good. The
Ambassadors of Belgium and the Netherlands, however, had made it clear that their
governments were against any enlargement of the Brussels Pact.
A few days later, to Erkin’s big surprise, Ankara cabled him, and demanded an
explanation of the news in regard to a statement of the spokesman of the State Department,
declaring that the projections on a regional agreement in the Mediterranean were not
approved by the USA. Erkin stated that there were no news in the journals published in
Washington to this effect. Having been disturbed by the news he had received from Ankara,
in order to disperse the clouds of suspicion, Erkin asked for an urgent appointment with
Satterthwaite. In their discussion, Satterthwaite told Erkin that although they had no fixed
decision on the issue, the State Department was in fact, inclined to welcome a rapprochement
among Turkey, Greece and Italy to this effect, hence, he assured Erkin that the State
Department had not made and would not make a statement of this kind. The Director of NEA
added that a statement on the issue might only be expected as a result of the meeeting of the
General Assembly of the WEU in Paris within three months.
 Turning back to the discussion around Turkey’s role in regional defense, in an attempt to
explain their assessment of Turkey’s possible course of action in view of these developments,
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the Turkish political leaders made it clear that Turkey, too, could have a role to play in these
new developments. According to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Necmeddin Sadak, the
speech of Bevin “held out the prospect of a system of political and economic collaboration
from the Arab states through Turkey, Greece and Italy to the West which the Turkish
Government would make every effort to help realise”. 248  Turkish diplomatic efforts in the
Middle East, he told Kelly, were directed towards this end, as Turkey’s support for the
Anglo-Iraqi Treaty had already indicated. 249 In other words, Ankara’s hope was to activate
Britain’s interest in including the Eastern Mediterranean in its defence schemes by pointing
out that Turkey could become the bridge between London and the Arab states.
                    
248 As stated in the reports of Ambassador David Kelly to London (FO, 26 Jan. 1948, FO371/72534
R1203/114/44 and FO, 28 Jan. 1948, FO371/72534 R1270/114/44), cited in, E. Athanassopoulou,
“Western Defence Developments and Turkey’s Search for Security in 1948”, in, Sylvia Kedourie
(ed.), Turkey, Identity, Democracy, Politics, (London: Frank Cass, 1996), p. 79.
249 In late 1947, Bevin had launched a major initiative to negotiate mutual defense  treaties with
Egypt, Iraq and Jordan on the premise of recognizing the independendce of those states, elicit their
voluntary support of Western strategic needs in the region, and eventually perpetuate British
influence in the region. Envisaged Anglo-Arab treaties promised to mitigate the political and strategic
losses caused by the British withdrawal from Palestine and to “reconcile the Labour government’s
anti-imperial ideals with the realities of Cold War.” Peter L. Hahn, The United States, Great Britain
and Egypt, 1945-1956, (North Carolina: The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill,
1991), p. 59. Correspondingly, on January 15, 1948, Bevin and Iraqi Prime Minister Saleh Jabr
signed the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty (The Portsmouth Agreement) that Bevin hailed as the first in a new
series of treaties regularizing and expressing the friendship between Britain and the Arab world.
However, a shocking incident forced the British foreign policy makers to re-consider the threats
towards Britain’s position in the Middle East. In the aftermath of this agreement which sought to
extend the 1930 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty in the guise of revising it, six days of mass demonstrations and
some of the worst violence took place in Iraq. To ensure the extension of the 1930 treaty had great
importance for Britain. This treaty was drawn up to safeguard the essential features of the British
order before the expiry of the mandate by October 1932 and would provide Britain a legal basis for
its continuing presence in the country. To Britain’s disappointment the Iraqi Government decided not
to ratify it and with the resignation of Salih Jabr’s government, the treaty negotiations were
suspended indefinetely. For a very good discussion of the issue and related subjects, see, Martin
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V 2. A Period of Redesign in the Middle East and the Anglo-American  Perceptions
of Turkish Regional Role 
Having been excluded from the talks of the Western Union, it was imperative for the
Turkish foreign policy makers to bring other alternatives - which would connect Turkey to
the Western strategic grouping - under discussions at once. Against a background of the
world’s division in two rival blocs, which had become unmistakebly clear, dictated by the
circumstances, Ankara was concerned over two developments: first, the Western Union
which had addressed the need for a Western defense cooperation, had excluded Turkey; and
secondly, the proposed defence arrangement had not introduced any prospect in regard to the
inclusion of the Eastern Mediterranean. Then, as will be discussed below, for Turkey, the
possibility of assuming a self-imposed role of leadership in the Middle Eastern security
grouping of states, which would be in direct connection with the West was increasingly
brought under scope.
In their turn, the British and American Governments had shifted to reorganize their
defense positions in the region with a view to consolidate their stand against the Soviet threat
through an ideological and actual penetration into this region. The Middle East was the pivot
of security concerns of Britain, which was carrying out a regular witdrawal from its global
status, and its significance to the USA was determined mainly along the lines of replacing
“Pax Britannica”. At this juncture, considerable evidence suggests that, Ankara ultimately
concluded - through a partnership with the Anglo-Saxons - the making of a sound foreign
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policy towards the region might culminate in two main outcomes: first, Turkey’s direct
inclusion in the Western Union might be ensured; or the complete integration of the defense
grouping in the Middle East - under the leadership of Turkey - to the Western Union might
be realized, eventually bringing the Middle East and Europe under one single security
umbrella.
Around the same issue, a counter-argument pointed out that after the Czech coup and the
Berlin Blockade, Washington’s primary concern was the establishment of a formal security
arrangement for Europe without mention of Turkey - and perhaps of Greece. Deliberations in
regard to the establishment of a Middle Eastern pact were already launched.
Correspondingly, on February 4, 1948, the Greek Ambassador to Washington, V.
Dendranis, explained Athen’s suggestion on the establishment of forming an entente between
Greece, Italy, Turkey and the Arab states under the leadership of the USA and Britain, which
he said, could give the necessary support and encouragement. While similar views were
considered in Ankara, opponents of Turkey’s active participation in defensive grouping of
states advocated that the Middle East entente or pact was such a vast concept that could not
be fulfilled, and even it it was realized on paper it would not have an operational value. In
this context, it was also argued that a formal defense organization might provoke the
Kremlin, and the eastern bloc since it would be evaluated that it was established against
them. This being the case, Turkey would remain weaker before such a danger since the
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extent of the US support to the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle Eastern countries was still
unclear. 250
To a certain extent, as will be discussed later, these doubts would prove to be right since
the formation of such a pact - though still in vague and limited terms - would not be achieved
before a series of attempts prompted by the Tripartite Declaration on May 25, 1950 by which
the USA, Britain and France recognized the existing Middle Eastern frontiers. In this
framework, the creation of the Middle Eastern Defense Organization (MEDO), the Middle
East Command (MEC) and the subsequent Four-Power proposals which Turkey, the USA,
Britain and France drafted for a MEC to Egypt, could be realized a year and a half later, in
mid-1951, as part of a half-baked attempt towards the conclusion of the same issue.
In 1948, however, it was indeed an outstanding necessity for Ankara to assume the role of
a reliable defense partner of the West, and the circumstances had laid the groundwork for
Turkish contribution in the discussions around Middle Eastern security. While the Turkish
interest in Middle Eastern affairs were shaping along these lines, in July 1947, Egypt took its
case against Britain, regarding the continuation of the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian treaty and
sovereignty over the Sudan, to the United Nations Security Council. In fact, since 1946, the
British government had been negotiating with Egypt for the withdrawal of British troops
from the Suez base stationed there according to the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, which had
given Egypt full recognition as an independent and sovereign state after fifty four years of
British occupation. The question of Egypt’s sovereignty over the Sudan of which there had
been no mention in the 1936 treaty, became also a matter of discussion. These two issues
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were seen by virtually every political circle in Egypt as matters of national pride and
instigated nationalistic resentment against Britain.
In effect, the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 formally recognized Egyptian sovereignty,
ended the British occupation of Egypt, and granted the UK the right to deploy 10 000
soldiers, 400 pilots and an unspecified number of personnel in the Suez Canal and in Sinai,
and personnel to run naval bases in Alexandria. Both Cairo and London had gains from the
1936 treaty. In this treaty, Egypt had agreed to provide Britain with supplies and facilities
and when war flared in Europe in 1939, Britain invoked the Anglo-Egyptian treaty, and 55
000 British troops arrived in Egypt. British forces repelled the attacks of the Italians and
Germans in the autumn of 1940 and in late 1941. However, despite the proximity of fighting,
Egyptian authorities did not abandon their neutrality. Egyptian neutrality was disliked by the
British, and prompted a confrontation between Cairo and London when General Erwin
Rommel repeated the German offensive in 1942, and captured El Alamein, just sixty miles
from Alexandria. King Farouk, worried about German occupation, appointed Ali Maher as
Prime Minister who was known for his sympathy towards the Germans. However, the British
Ambassador, Miles Lampson, insisted that Nahas Pasha should be appointed in replacement
of Ali Maher. In his turn, King Farouk resisted, and on February 4, 1942, Lampson and
General R.G. Stone surrounded the Abdin Palace, with troops and tanks. Then, Lampson and
Stone with a group of guards marched into the Palace and repeated their demands in Farouk’s
private study room. Here, Farouk was pressed to appoint Nahas or abdicate. Unable to raise
any objection, Farouk appointed Nahas who stopped the activites of Axis sympathizers.
cxcix
.Following the parliamentary elections in which the Wafd won 231 of 264 seats, Egypt
was kept on the Allies’ side as a friendly neutral. In November 1942, General B.
Montgomery defeated Rommel at El Alamein and drove the German forces out of Egypt.
Then, Rommel was squezed between the forces of Montgomery and Allied troops under
General Dwight D. Eisenhower. Ultimately, the Axis forces surrendered on May 13 and
Egypt remained secure for the rest of the war. 251 However, matters were still complicated in
regard to the future of the Nahas government.
Given this background, since the 1936 treaty was not due for revision before 1956,
Britain was not obliged to enter into talks with Egypt. Nevertheless, when the Egyptians
formally requested for a revision in 1945, Bevin agreed to negotiate on condition that the
base would continue to operate under joint Anglo-Egyptian supervision, and that British
troops would be able to reoccupy the base in the event of a Soviet incursion in the Middle
East. Discussions went through different stages, but by 1947 they reached a deadlock. The
Egyptians inflamed by nationalistic feelings, demanded immediate and unconditional
withdrawal of British troops and absolute sovereignty over the Sudan. In their report to the
Security Council, they argued that the stationing of British troops was an offence to Egypt’s
dignity and an infringement of ‘fundamental principles of sovereign equality’, and that the
British had encouraged an artificial separatism in the Sudan, aiming to destroy the unity of
the Nile Valley. Egypt failed to establish its contention that the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian treaty
was no longer valid, yet Britain won a modest victory. Although the Security Council did not
present the British with an ultimatum to withdraw, it did not make a clear-cut decision in
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favour of sanction of the treaties as Britain had wished. Instead it called on Egypt and Britain
to resume negotiations for a revision. 252
Meanwhile, Britain’s position in Iraq received a serious blow as well. The Anglo-Iraqi
treaty was signed on 5 January 1948 and it was a revision of the Anglo-Iraqi treaty of
Alliance of 1930, due to expire in 1958. The 1930 treaty had terminated the British mandate
and recognized Iraq’s independence. It had also contained, like the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian
treaty, military clauses - Britain’s acquisition of two air-bases and its right to transport forces
across Iraq in the event of war,- which were unacceptable to Iraqi nationalists. The new
treaty of 1948, which Bevin hoped would provide the model for defensive alliances with the
other Arab states too, was signed as a first step towards relinquishing British military
presence in Iraq. For the time being, however, Britain was again granted the right to use
Iraqi territory in case of war, and to maintain the bases in Iraq, but by ‘sharing
responsibility’ with the Iraqis.
The treaty gave rise to serious opposition in Iraq and it was never ratified. Iraqi
nationalists maintained that it was even worse than the old treaty on the grounds that while
Britain enjoyed basically the same rights as before, it was no longer committed to defend Iraq
in case of war. On January 21, (before Sadak’s conversation with Kelly on the same issue in
which the former expressed Turkey’s support for the British endeavour to renew the treaty in
concern), the Iraqi Regent who had signed the new agreement had stated that he was not
going to ratify it.
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Under these circumstances, King Abdullah of Jordan who had a long friendly relationship
with Britain, asked in early 1948 for a revision of the 1946 treaty with London. Abdullah’s
aim was more to silence Arab accusations that he was a British stooge, rather than seriously
challenge the British military presence in Jordan. Thus, in the revised treaty, the essential
military clauses remained unaltered. Nevertheless, his move did not help to alleviate the fact
that British influence in the area was collapsing.
Ankara’s foreign policy towards the region throughout 1949 and then on, had also been
shaped with a view to its relations with Israel. Considerable evidence suggests that Ankara
had included Israel in its policy plannings, and had been approaching this country in a
constructive way. Explicitly, formulation of Turkish foreign policy towards the developments
in Palestine and the Arab-Jewish conflict were under the strains of Turkey’s historical ties
with the region as well. Turkey and previously, the Ottoman Empire had no “Jewish
problem” or anti-semitist feelings in the past. As for the Arabs, despite sharing the Islamic
faith and again a long common past, emotionally, the Turks had a feeling that the entire
region, including the Holy Lands and Palestine were lost to the Arabs - operating under
British command - in the Great War who had betrayed the Ottoman Empire. Indeed, after the
British occupied the southern part of Palestine, local Arabs joined the Army of the Arab
revolt led by Amir Faysal, son of the Sharif Husayn of Mecca. Some of them participated in
the conquest of Syria in 1918. Some remained in Faysal’s Syrian army until its destruction by
the French in July 1920. 253 As a result of these dictating perceptions on the Turkish people,
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as will be discussed below, beyond any binding moral obligations towards the region - except
viewing the developments from the perspective of international law and the decisions of the
UN - Ankara eventually felt comfortable in adopting a similar policy to those of the Big
Three towards the State of Israel. In fact, soon after the proclamation of the State of Israel,
Turkish foreign policy makers had realistically seen the fact that, it would be a lasting entity
in the region. This early decision to reconize Israel, no doubt, provided the Turkish and the
Israeli statesmen with extra time in improving bilateral relations.
Undoubtedly, since the beginning of the British Mandatory rule by the decision of the
League of Nations in July 1922, the issue of Palestine, had been pursued by Ankara with
close interest. Correspondingly, in the first years of the Republic, Ankara showed an interest
towards Palestine and members of the Jewish community from Palestine were invited to join
in the economic and cultural activities, the first İzmir Exhibition of Commerce and Industry
which was, and has been held annually to this day. In the meantime, Ghazi Mustafa Kemal
had also dispatched experts to examine the situation in Palestine. In November 1938, the
leader of the Jewish community, Chaim Weizman (later the first President of Israel) visited
Turkey and held conferences with his interlocutors.
As for the establishment of Israel, particularly in the first months of 1947, Britain’s
inability to reconcile the conflicting demands of the Jewish and Arab communities led the
British Government to request that the question of Palestine be placed on the agenda of the
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United Nations General Assembly in April 1947. Shortly afterwards, a special committee was
constituted to draft proposals concerning the country’s future. On November 29, 1947, the
Assembly voted to adopt the committee’s recommendation to partition the land into two
states, one Jewish and one Arab. The Jewish community accepted the plan, while the Arabs
rejected it. Turkey voted along with Arab countries against the UN resolution. Following the
UN vote, local Arab militants, supported by irregular volunteers from Arab countries,
launched attacks against the Jews in an effort to prevent the establishment of a Jewish State.
The Jewish defense organizations routed most of the attacking forces, taking hold of the
entire area which had been allocated for the Jewish state.
The UN vote for partition of Palestine essentially enhanced the same impression while
simultaneously it made it obviously more difficult for London to appease Arab nationalists,
who viewed ‘Zionism’ and ‘British Imperialism’ as complementary, if not identical forces.
On May 14, 1948, the day Britain withdraw from Palestine, the State of Israel was
proclaimed according to the UN partition plan. Less than 24 hours later, war erupted
between Israel and the Arab states which refused to recognize this new entity. The regular
armies of Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq invaded the country. The war lasted some
15 months. Between the years 1948 and 1950, during which heated discussions took place
over the question of Palestine, Ankara closely watched the developments in the region, and
nominated the journalist Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın as one of the three members in the Palestine
Conciliation Commission (PCC) who would also serve as the Chairman in this body -
although the Arab countries were against the formation of this commission - established in
cciv
December 1948 by the General Assembly. 254 In the aftermath of his visit to Israel, in his
report to the President İnönü, Yalçın pointed out that it was very unlikely that Israel would
emerge as a Communist state in the region, and it would be a right decison for Ankara to
extend its recognition of this new state at once. 255
During the first months of 1949, direct negotiations were conducted under UN’s auspices
between the conflicting parties. Ultimately, Israel concluded armistice agreements with
Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan 256 resulting in armistice agreements which reflected the
situation at the end of the fighting. 257 Subsequently, on May 11 1949, Israel took  its seat as
the 59th member of the UN. 258
With a view to the emergence in the region of Israel as a state, and its recognition by its
neighbours through armistice agreements, and the prompt extension of de jure recognition of
various states - including the USA and the SU - of Israel, Ankara’s de facto recognition of
this new entity came on March 28, 1949. Towards the end of the year, Turkey’s first
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representative to Israel, Seyfullah Esin was dispatched to Tel-Aviv as Charge d’affaires.
Shortly afterwards, Turkey elevated its emissary in Tel-Aviv to Minister Plenipotentiary.
Undoubtedly, the year 1949 - particularly in the aftermath of Ankara’s recognition of Tel-
Aviv - marked a turning point in the making of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle
East. Under the pressure of dictating circumstances, Turkish foreign policy towards the
region envisaged a categorical denial of the Soviet influence from the region. Thus, the
foreign policy makers in Ankara evaluated that Turkey could assume a leadership role in a
military and economic alliance of the Arab and other countries in the Middle East. In this
context, Ankara followed a policy of improving its technical and economic relations with
Israel, which it assessed, was a country with Western norms, while maintaining its relations
with this country in the military and economic fields in a discreet manner to avoid the
sensitiveness of the Arab states.
Admittedly, Turkish-Israeli relations were essentially based on an acknowledgement of
the mutual needs of both countries. There were however, some suspicions in Ankara in
regard to the future of the regime in Israel. The position of the leftist parties and labour
unions in Israel had prompted certain anxieties both in the RPP and in the DP - which came
to power in May 1950 -. 259 Following the outbreak of the crisis in Korea, when the Arab
states remained impartial towards the conflict, while Israel supported the UN decisions,
Ankara’s remaining suspicions were quickly dispersed. 260  On July 4, 1950, a modus vivendi
regarding economic and commercial relations was reached, and technical and cultural
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relations were provided with a regular fora. Military attaches were also nominated in each
capital. 261
Turning back to the British considerations on the establishment of a regional organization,
at this stage, the Foreign Office had increasingly felt that they had to pull back since the
over-extended use of their resources had caused serious strains for the British economy. In
the eastern Mediterraean, this situation had first culminated in Britain’s withdrawal from its
status as the main supporter of Greece and Turkey in the aftermath of the war. Ankara was
also informed of Britain’s difficulty to continue as the main supplier of countries in this
region. Britain’s war ravaged economy “was the reason they came to the USA and said, we
can no longer help the Turks, we don’t have the resources and if you don’t do it, nobody
could.” 262 The deterioration in Britain’s ability to take the lead in regional affairs was also
apparent in London’s weak attempts to create a defensive grouping in the Middle East.
Under these circumstances, Anglo-American officials agreed that “it did not seem wise to
consider evacuating British troops from Egypt . . ., Russian aggression in the Near East was
entirely possible and it would be essential to our common strategic plan to have the British
on the spot.” 263 But clearly, there were strong differences of opinion on the need for a
regional pact. In May 1950, Foreign Office Under Secretary, Michael Wright, drew attention
to the possibility of making a Middle Eastern defence pact, probably to be linked to NATO.
He asserted that this would also remove the deadlock in the Anglo-Egyptian talks. However,
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the Near Eastern Affairs officials of the State Department declined this project, which would
force to extend the obligations of the USA under NATO to the Middle East and expressed
their view that the area lacked a “power center on the basis of which a pact could be built.”
264 In their turn, the officials at Pentagon opposed the idea also, because it might represent an
undertaking of the USA to use force against aggression in the Middle East.
Despite these reservations, the State Department officials drafted the declaration in May.
Subsequently, on May 25, 1950, the Tripartite Declaration by which the USA, Britain and
France recognized the existing Middle Eastern frontiers came into the scene. The Tripartite
Declaration was defined as the expression of these powers of their determination to lean on
their security interests in the area. Besides, through the Triparite Declaration these countries
aimed to coordinate the supply of arms to regional states, which were under an embargo
imposed by the UN after the May 1948 Arab-Israeli war.
In fact, Britain was at odds between continuing its supply of arms to the countries of the
Middle East which were polarized around the Arab-Israeli dispute, and merely suggesting
them to leave their deep disagreements behind and unite under a defense organization in the
region; the latter no doubt constituting an unconvincing option. Besides, controversially, the
more these countries were armed, their inclination towards an armed struggle would
increase, and in case the British rejected their demands for the supply of war material, they
(particularly the Arab states, except Jordan with which Britain maintained the strongest
relations in the region) could gradually move to the Soviet orbit. Indeed, in February, 1950,
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to convince Egypt to join a defense body, Britain agreed to sell this country arms and
munitions, including jet-fighters. As expected, Israel asked for similar war equipment from
the USA. Regarding the Israeli demands for military assistance, although the USA had
initially chosen to avoid any commitments in the region, domestic pressures were forcing the
USA to change this policy. Given this, Anglo-American understanding around the question of
the Middle Eastern security was handicapped by the intricacies of the inter-state tensions in
the region. In the end, having regarded the weak possibility of forming a joint defense body
in the Middle East, the USA, Britain and France launched a project to limit the flow of arms
to the region. This was the Tripartite Declaration. Similarly, the British Minister of State for
Foreign Affairs, Anthony Nutting, held the view that under the Tripartite Declaration of
1950 three powers were alone responsible for preventing another round in the Arab-Israeli
struggle and there was every reason to demand this responsibility be more widely shared. 265
Attempts to achieve a reliable defense organization in the region, thus had these
limitations in their origin. From then, following the talks in the second US Chiefs of Mission
Conference in İstanbul in February 14-21, 1951 the considerations for the formation of a
regional defence organization continued in some vague forms. At this stage - and as will be
further discussed in the subsequent chapter - in an atmosphere dominated by the success of
Turkish Brigade in Korea, on July 18, the new British Foreign Secretary, Herbert Morrison,
publicly announced Britain’s support for the admittance of Turkey and Greece to NATO.
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As will be discussed below, there is indeed every reason to assert that Ankara was
demonstrating a vigilant policy in the same period. Turkish foreign policy makers were
displaying a performance which reflected that Turkey was an able actor in international
affairs to maintain a primary role on the side of the Western democracies in two different
regions: in the Middle East and in Korea. 
IV. 3  The North Atlantic Treaty Takes to the Stage
One year after the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine, and in the absence of a
formalized relationship with Washington, Turkey continued to rely on its alliance with
Britain in its search for security. In Açıkalın’s words, Great Britain was Turkey’s closest
friend and ally and an important link with the West. 35 Indeed, as far as the Middle East was
concerned, despite its obvious weakness, Britain was still the only power heavily involved in
the region and with long established interests there. As İnönü put it in July 1948 to an
American journalist, he would very much like an alliance with the United States, but he was
of the opinion that American interest in Turkey was not a permanent factor. 266 Truly, İnönü’s
doubts were confirmed previously on April 23, 1948 when the US Undersecretary of State,
Robert Lovett, stated that the US was not against proposals towards this effect, but it was
neither prepared to make any promises nor take any initiative about the proposed pact of the
Middle Eastern or Eastern Mediterranean states. The US Department of State regarded the
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prospect of including Arab states dubious, hence, suggested a Turkish-Italian-Greek trilateral
declaration which seemed more advantageous. 267
In one way or another, alternative bases in the Mediterranean were appealing to
Washington because, if war should erupt suddenly, the USA would have a greater capability
to defend this area. This being the case, attention focused increasingly on the Wheelus field
in Tripoli, still under British control pending UN resolution of its status and in January 1948,
the USA and Britain struck a deal providing for American access to Wheelus which
envisaged its use by transport airplanes while military aircrafts had the right to land there as
well. Lovett’s suggestion for a trilateral declaration which would also include Turkey, was
reasonable with a view to the fact that in late 1948, the Americans started to refurbish the
housing and petroleum facilities, and planned to lengthen the runways so that the Air Force
could use Wheelus for strategic operations in case of war. 268 For Ankara, however, an
Italian-Greek-Turkish trilateral declaration or pact with military bases in Libya as its center,
was outside the reach of Turkish interests. It was plausibly calculated that any concentration
of power in this defensive scheme, might weaken the defense ability of Turkey rather than
enhance it.
In its turn, for the USA, the Middle East was still a peripheral area, one of secondary
importance and had an auxiliary relationship to Western Europe by holding the largest oil
resources and potential bases for airfields on which the USA and British strategic plans
depended. Indeed, the Marshall Plan had accentuated US economic interests in this region.
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There was a shortage of Western Hemisphere oil, and the USA was becoming a net importer
of oil. The Middle Eastern petroleum was easy to get out of the ground and could be
transported to Europe cheaper than  Western Hemisphere oil. Section 112 of the Economic
Cooperation Act of 1948  mandated that European petroleum requirements should be fulfilled
as much as possible from repositories outside the USA. 269 Besides, studies suggested that in
wars that might break out in the mid-1950s, petroleum of the Middle East would be vital to
the West, and the Soviets would be forced to wage an oil-starved war if they could be denied
entry into this region. 270 Equally important for the USA and Britain were the use of airfields
in the region. However, as will be discussed below, the safeguarding of air operations
depended on the active defense of the area by the Turkish Army.
In the fall of 1947, war plan BROILER had assumed that within fifteen days after the
eruption of hostilities, the USA would launch the air offensive from bases in the Middle East,
Britain and Okinawa. The base at Cairo-Suez was particularly important since a major target
was the Soviet oil-refining facilities. Almost 84 percent of this refining industry was thought
to be within the radius of B-29s operating out of Egypt. In the spring of 1948, the JCS
adopted war plan HALFMOON which incorporated much of the Middle East strategy
initially outlined in BROLIER. It was estimated that Soviet radar nets and air defenses in the
south were weak and that launchings from Egypt might be possible up to six months before
Soviet forces seized the area.
As for the coordination of the American and British strategic planning,  British war plan
SPEEDWAY of December 1948 called for the defense of Egypt - despite continuing Anglo-
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Egyptian dispute - by British Commonwealth forces while the US Air Force utilized Cairo-
Suez to launch a nuclear offensive with scores of heavy bombers. Admiral Richard Conolly,
commander of the US forces in the Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, was headquartered in
London as well and coordinated Middle East strategy with his British counterparts. 271
At this juncture, the US officials intensified their military aid programs in Turkey. This
was no doubt, an urgent requirement in order to complement the Middle East Strategy
envisioned in BROLIER and HALFMOON. The US Army Group in Ankara sought to
reorganize and modernize the Turkish Army, augment its mobility and firepower, improve its
command, control and communication skills, its transportation infrastructure and logistical
capabilities. The US advisers wanted the Turkish Army to retard the Soviet land offensive,
thereby affording time for the US and Britain to launch the strategic air campaign from
Egyptian bases. “The Turkish army was given equipment to blunt a three-pronged Soviet
attack across the Bosporus, the Black Sea, and the Caucasus, to fallback gradually, and to
mount a final, large-scale stand in southern Turkey in the Iskenderun pocket.”  272
Throughout 1948, Washington also transferred over 180 F-47s, 30 B-26s, and 86 C-47s
to the Turkish Air Force which would assist Turkish Land Forces, and help interdict Soviet
troops moving towards the Persian Gulf oil or sweeping toward Cairo-Suez. The Pentagon
placed ever greater stress on reconstructing and resurfacing airfields in Turkey at such places
as Bandırma (west) and Diyarbakır (south). Concurrently, training of the Turkish Air Forces
was increasingly supported. On July 11, 1948, on the occasison of the visit of US
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Undersecretary of the Army, General William H. Draper, the head of Air Group in Ankara,
Major Gen. Earl S. Hoag, expressed to the Turkish press that, supported by the assistance
material and the expertise of the technical advisers, over 40 specialized training courses were
continuing its activities in Turkey. It was stated that the objective of the courses was to train
the trainers. The training comprised A-26 Invader and P-47 Thunderbolt fighters, C-47
Dakota planes and related command, control and communication systems. Besides, 45
Turkish officers had attended further training programs in the USA. 273
In fact, top level visits of US officials frequently took place in mid-1948. Previously, on
July 1, Admiral Forrest Sherman had visited İstanbul with three cruisers, each carrying two
sea-planes and equipped with lethal weapons which, no doubt, further impressed his Turkish
counterparts. Admiral Sherman was the former vice chief of naval operations, and a member
of a sub-commitee of SWNCC with an exclusive focus on the SU. In this post, he was the
subordinate of Secretary of Defense, James V. Forrestal. In the same sub-committee,
Secretary of War, Robert Patterson had designated General John R. Deane, while Secretary
of State Byrnes appointed his adviser Charles E. Bohlen. Since then, Sherman was known as
a strong defender of Turkey’s strategic position. During the discussions on assistance to
Turkey, when the Director of Policy Planning, George Kennan, claimed that the Pentagon
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deftly inserted military aid for Turkey into legislation originally designed as a political and
economic program for Greece, Sherman had conceded that Greece was on the flank, but if
Turkey fell into the Soviet orbit, the USA would have an impossible situation. According to
him, the Mediterranean strategy of the USA was of vital importance, and it should be
conceived as a highway for the projection of military power “deep into the heart of the land
mass of Eurasia and Africa.”  274 Secretary of Air Force, W. Stuart Symington, and
Secretary of Defense, James V. Forrestal wanted some of the airstrips designed to handle B-
29s which, if  wartime circumstances allowed, US forces would fly in. Moreover, by the end
of 1948, officials in the State Department endorsed the idea of constructing medium bomber
bases in Turkey. Consequently, “Turkey began to develop the ability to attack vital Soviet
petroleum resources in Romania and the Caucasus.” 275
As the Director of Near Eastern and African Affairs in the State Department, on
December 17, 1948, McGhee recommended $300 million in aid for fiscal year 1950,
including $200 million to Greece and $100 million to Turkey. Three weeks later, in early
January 1949, Ambassador Averell Harriman, the US Special Representative in Europe for
the ECA, met with President İnönü, most of the members of cabinet and a number of senior
government departmental administrators. 276 Shortly afterwards, on January 6, 1949,
Harriman cabled the ECA Administrator, Hoffman, explaining that after his conversations he
had a renewed confidence in determination of the Turks, and in their effective use of
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American aid under the direction of the USA. Harriman said, İnönü stated that he believed
war could be avoided if the USA could develop unity among the free countries of Europe,
which required determination and maximum effort by each country, and that Turkey would
do its part. He underlined that the Turkish President emphasized that firm American moral
support was of even greater value than material aid. He urged that the US supply Turkey as a
matter of urgency on the recommendations of Russell H. Dorr, Chief of ECA Mission in
Turkey, in consultation with Ambassador George Wadsworth and General McBride.
Harriman concluded that “with our assistance, and only with our assistance, can Turkey
become an increasingly effective deterrent to Soviet aggression and a contributor to economic
developments in Eastern Mediterranean and Europe.” 277
In the meantime, in the aftermath of Anglo-Turkish financial talks in Ankara which was
concluded on January 23, 1949, the British Government announced that agreement had been
reached with the Turkish Government on the question of drawing rights under the Intra-
European Payments and Compensation Agreement of October 16, 1948, and that subject to
approval by the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), the UK
Government proposed to grant such rights in sterling in favour of Turkey to the equivalent of
$8.000.000 (£2.000.000). The statement added it was expected that Turkish exports to
Britain in 1949 would be larger than ever.  278
The continuation of US financial aid was also of great importance for Ankara. However,
contrary to the ECA Administrator Harriman’s initial considerations, the aid was being
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reduced. On February 19, during a general discussion in Paris, the Minister of Foreign
Affairs, Sadak, told Harriman that his government was disappointed at the reduction which
had been made in aid for Turkey in ECA’s recent submissions to the Congress. Harriman
said he explained to Sadak that these submissions were purely of an illustrative nature and
they were “in no sense designed by ECA to prejudge the recommendations which might be
made by OEEC in connection with the division of whatever American aid might be
available.” 279
Harriman also expressed that parts of this program which had been included in Turkey’s
estimates were probably beyond the scope of ECA financing. He suggested that Turkey
should push the negotiation to obtain World Bank funds in order to finance some its projects.
In his turn, Sadak recalled Turkey’s need for the continuation of foreign assistance, because,
48% of the Turkish budget was devoted to defense expenditures which drained sources to be
spent for local investment objectives. 280
Meanwhile, negotiations of the Brussels Pact powers with the USA and Canada towards
the creation of a single North Atlantic Alliance based on security guarantees and mutual
commitments between Europe and North America intensifed. They were concluded in
September 1948 with a report to the various governments. The report was accepted by all
governments in concern, thus enabling the Consultative Council of the Brussels Treaty to
announce complete identity of views on the principle of a defensive pact for the North
Atlantic area in October 1948.
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The text of the Treaty was published on March 18, 1949 and three days later Denmark,
Iceland, Italy, Norway and Portugal were invited by the Brussels Pact states to become
participants in this new formation. In spite of the efforts of the SU to prevent the formation
of the alliance by a memorandum adressed to the twelve original signatories alleging the
hostile nature of their action, the talks followed the signature of the Treaty of Washington on
April 4, 1949, bringing into being a common security mechanism among these 12 countries.
The parliaments of the member countries ratified the Treaty within five months thereafter.
The North Atlantic Treaty (NAT) consists of a preamble and fourteen articles. It is short
and clear as to require very brief explanatory comment. Worthy of special note, however, is
the emphasis which those who drafted the Treaty have placed on its conformity with both the
letter and the spirit of the UN Charter. Principally, the NAT consists of a framework for a
broadly based cooperation among the signatory countries. It is not only a military alliance
designed to prevent aggression or to repel should it occur, but it also provides for continuous
joint action in political, economic and social fields. In this context, in accordance with the
terms of the UN Charter, the signatory countries undertake to protect peace and international
security, and to promote stabiliy and well-being in the North Atlantic area. In addition, they
undertake to elimiante possible conflict in their international economic policies and encourage
economic collaboration between their countries (Article 2). In this respect, the Treaty has a
dual aspect: affirming the importance of economic and social progress on one hand, and
adopting a policy of common security based on the inherent right of collective self-defense on
the other.
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Article 3 treats the means of maintaining and increasing the individual and collective
capacity of NATO member countries to resist and to act jointly through the medium of
mutual assistance. Such joint action might be achieved by a gradual integration of armed
forces, and coordination of instruction and training which has been an essential function of
Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe to this date. 281
Article 4 pertains to a threat to one of the NATO countries. The only obligation stated in
this Article is for signatory countries to consult together if the territorial integrity or political
independence of one of them is endangered. Such consultation may be requested by a country
other than the one threatened, and this consultation would take place within the framework of
the North Atlantic Council meetings. As stated in Article 7, which expresses the
compatibility of the Treaty with the Charter of the UN, the primary responsibility of the UN
Security Council is in no way affected. Thus, in the event of threat, when a consultation of
member countries of NAT reveal that enforcement action should be taken, the only
competent body to authorize such action would be the Security Council or in case of default,
the General Assembly of the UN.
Article 5 contains one of the essential provisions: “The Parties agree that an armed attack
against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack
against them all...” This commitment, no doubt, introduced an exceptionally important
measure, because the resulting solidarity created a situation against any possible aggression.
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The Article then goes on to define the obligations of countries in the event of armed attack.
These obligations consist in taking forthwith individullay and in concert with the other
member countries to the Treaty, such action, including the use of armed force, as is deemed
necessary by each Party. Significantly, joint action is justified by the exercise of the natural
right of self-defence, individual or collective, as provided for in Article 51 of the UN
Charter. It was, therefore, admitted that the right of self-defense is a legitimate right, the
exercise of which in no way affects the primary competence of the Security Council in
matters relating to the maintenance and restoration of peace. The final provisions of the
Article include that the measures so taken shall be reported to the Security Council, and shall
be terminated when that body has taken the necessary measures.
Article 6 defined the area in which the provisions of the Article 5 are applicable. 282 In
this context, it is emphasized that the NAT Organization was not established to defend a
geographically homogenous territory, but was created to defend a way of life. Significantly,
the definition of the area in no way implied that political and military events occurring
outside it can not be the subject of consultations within the Council. It is believed that the
overall international situation is liable to affect the preservation of peace and security in the
area in question, and it is to consider this situation that the Council must and does devote its
attention as a matter of course.
Article 7 expresses the compatibility of the Treaty with the Charter of the United Nations
and in Article 8, the Parties confirm compatibility of the Treaty with their other international
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obligations, and undertake not to enter into any international engagements in the future in
conflict with the Treaty.
Article 9 makes provision for the creation of bodies to implement the Treaty. It is these
bodies which constitute the ‘Organization’ as such within the meaning of the NAT.
Article 10 states that the Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other
European State in a position to further the principles of the Treaty to accede to it. In this
brief examination of the Text of the Treaty, it should also be noted that the NAT
Organization has no supranational character. All decisions must be taken by national
representatives unanimously, 283
Turning back to Turkey’s exclusion from this formation of states, evidently, the political
and military circles in Ankara were greatly disturbed by the course of developments. Until
then, Ankara had repeatedly expressed its willingness to incorporate its defense scheme to
that of the West. Towards this end, Turkish policy makers had made endeavours to create a
Mediterranean pact including the West European countries, the scope of which included the
defense of the Middle East. Despite their optimism, neither the plans around a Mediterranean
pact nor the projects aiming at realizing a defensive grouping of states in the Middle East
were fulfilled. Italy’s inclusion to NAT was another surprising development. Although the
US and British Ambassadors communicated their governments’ view to Ankara that the NAT
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was based on certain geographic boundaries which contained only countries of the North
Atlantic region, Ankara, soon realized that Italy which was regarded as a Mediterranean
country in previous security plannings, as well as territory in North Africa comprising the
Algerian departments of France, would be included in this formation. Ankara, then
considered that its exclusion might indicate the reduction of US strategic interest coupled
with an imminent reduction of US aid.
The Turkish Government thought that they should not lose further time to launch a
diplomatic campaign to seize an opportunity to incorporate Ankara to the emerging defense
scheme. The Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sadak, despite the suggestions of some
officials in the MFA to postpone his demarché, decided to beat the iron when it was still hot,
and traveled to New York in early April on the occasion of the opening of the Second Part of
the Third Session of the UN General Assembly which was scheduled to meet between April 5
- May 18. As will be discussed below, Sadak, who was the first Turkish Minister of Foreign
Affairs to visit the USA, visited Washington from April 12 to 15 to hold conversations with
his counterpart and the officials of the State Department.
In his meeting with Acheson on April 12, Sadak communicated the views of the Turkish
Government on the present circumstance that Turkey felt itself deprived of the US guarantee
offered to Europe. In the beginning of their conversation,  Sadak told his counterpart that he
would review the position in which Turkey found itself as a result of the recent signature of
the NAT. He said, in March 1947, the US Government had announced its program in
support of the independence and security of Turkey. Subsequent to that time, Acheson told
Sadak that this support was confirmed through the effective military assistance which Turkey
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received from the USA, and later the formation of the WEU took place and the talks were
directed at a security arrangement with the USA for the North Atlantic area. Acheson
recalled that in the autumn of 1948, conversations took place at Ankara with the US and UK
Ambassadors in which Turkey raised the question of Turkey’s position in the contemplated
security arrangement. The US Secretary of State reminded Sadak that the Turkish
Government was informed in reply by written memoranda that while details of the proposed
arrangement had not yet been formulated, the conception was clearly a geographical one,
restricted geographically in scope to countries of the North Atlantic region.
Concerning Italy, the Turkish Government having been previously informed that the
contemplated pact would be limited geographically, and that Italy would not be included, had
so informed the TGNA. Ankara was satisfied with this situation since the geographical
conception of NAT was clear and understandable while this left the door open for later
consideration of a Mediterranean defense arrangement within which Turkey might consider
to find an adequate place together with other Mediterranean countries. Acheson said, despite
the fact that the Turkish Government was informed that Italy would no be included,
“subsequently, however, it was learned that Italy and the territory in North Africa comprising
the Algerian departments of France would in fact be brought within the scope of the North
Atlantic Pact.” 284 Then, he admitted that the inclusion of Italy completely upset the situation
so far as the views and perceptions of the Turkish Government were concerned.
Subsequently, Acheson underlined that the overall situation seemed all the more
incomprehesible to the Turkish Government and people inasmuch as Turkey had been
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undergoing constant Soviet pressure and threats since the spring of 1945. He pointed out that
since that time Turkey had been making great sacrifices by maintaining a large armed force
to withstand Soviet threats, at the cost of what was becoming an unbearable burden upon
Turkey’s economy and finances. He said, the fear had begun to creep into Turkish minds that
with the negotiation of the Atlantic Pact, the USA had altered its position concerning Turkey,
and that it no longer maintained the powerful interest in the maintenance of Turkey’s
independence and integrity which had characterized the attitude of the US Government since
1946, and added that the Soviet propaganda had not been slow to make the most of this
situation. Then, he expressed that Sadak said that he was frankly at a loss to know what
explanations he could give to the Turkish Parliament and public.
However, considerable evidence suggests that the US Government was still lacking a firm
conception of Turkey’s role in any given defense mechanism. Correspondingly, in reply to
Sadak, in addition to his previous perception of Turkey’s role in regional defence within a
Mediterranean security arrangement, this time Acheson said that the security of the Middle
East was one of the most important problems with which the Department was confronted
soon after he had become Under Secretary in 1945. This time he explained that facing Soviet
demands over Turkey, the President and the Department took a serious view of this challenge
and the conclusion was reached that the Soviet aspirations of dominating  Turkey would be
contrary to the vital interests of the USA. “As a result a strong position was taken by the US
Government in support of Turkish independence with the full knowledge of the possible
consequences. The President considered this the most important decision he had made
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subsequent to the Bombing of Hiroshima.” 285 Indeed, as discussed before, the first action
taken by the US Government was the dispatch of USS Missouri accompanied by the USS
Providence and USS Power, the prolonged effects of which continued in the following
decades. 286 Then Acheson went on to summarize the incidents until the making of NAT, and
assured Sadak that in the US President’s thinking and in his, the vital importance to the USA
of Turkey’s independence and integrity was in no way diminished as a result of these
developments.
In his turn, Sadak told Acheson that two years ago Turkey had stood in the very forefront
of US preoccupations concerning security questions. However, recently, the USA had
transfered its interests to the West European countries, and had now gone further in
guaranteeing their security than it had in the case of Turkey. As regards the West European
countries, the USA pledged to come immediately to their aid if they were attacked; no such
pledge existed concerning Turkey. “If there were any consistency or logic in international
relations, then it would seem that Turkey, the first object of US solicitude in security matters,
would have been the first to be given, the protective cover of a guarantee.” 287 However,
Sadak said, this had not proved to be the case. If, as stated, the US position towards Turkey
had not changed, why had it been impossible for the US to extend the Atlantic Pact to include
Turkey, or for Ankara at least to consider the extension of a similar guaratee to an Eastern
Mediterranean Pact ?
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Acheson replied that first, there was the series of statements by Truman and himself
already referred to beginning in 1946 at the time of the Soviet demands on the Turkish Straits
up to those made in connection with the signing of the Atlantic Pact. Secondly, there was the
important military assistance rendered to the Turkish Government by the USA. In a matter of
days a new military assistance bill would be presented to the Congress. From the hearings in
Congress on this bill, it would be made clear that a substantial amount of this assistance was
intended for Turkey. This would, he said, give evidence of continuing US interest in Turkey.
Thirdly, in Truman’s thinking the economic development of the Middle East, particularly of
Turkey, Greece, Iran and the Arab states, complemented the ERP. US assistance in this
respect also would make evident US interest in that region.
As for the invitation extended to Italy to become one of the North Atlantic Treaty
countries. Acheson pointed out that:
this had been done not merely to please that country or France, but
was a logical development. France had argued that Italy has been the
backdoor into France through which throughout history attacks had
been made upon it. It was only after this backdoor had been closed
through the decision to include Italy that France’s attitude had
changed with reference to its own security problems and that it had
been found possible to reach a settlement in West Germany.  288
Before parting, when Sadak asked to whom Acheson could recommend him to discuss
economic issues, Acheson suggested that he discuss these problems with Assistant Secretary
of State for Economic Affairs, Williard L. Thorp and Director of Near Eastern and African
Affairs, Satterthwaite. The next day Sadak held a conference with Thorp. In their talks,
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Sadak requested increased US financial aid, citing the serious financial position of the
Turkish Government as a result of its continuing defense burden, which was making most
difficult financing ECA and anticipated IBRD projects. He requested a US grant of additional
$30 million under the military aid program to finance current consumption items. Acheson
stated that Thorp had informed him that Sadak also requested US support in anticipated
approach by the Turkish Government to US private money market for a loan probably less
than $70 million with the principal objective of providing dollar exchange for imports by
Turkish private enterprise.
Meanwhile, on April 13, Sadak conveyed the message of İnönü to Truman in which the
Turkish President expressed that he should like to lay particular stress on the precious
military aid which had been given to Turkey by the USA in one the most critical periods
which the world was going through. No doubt, in the same days, the makers of US strategic
military planning were increasingly concerned with strengthening US strongholds in the
Eastern Mediterranean. In a policy paper approved by the Foreign Assistance Correlation
Committee on May 25, 1949, it was pointed out that it was the long-range US military
objective to be able to prevent the loss or destruction of Western European and Middle East
nations, and by securing the natural approaches to the enemy sources of power to facilitate
conduct of offensive operations. It was explained that the short-range military objective was
to improve to the maximum extent practicable, and at the earliest day possible, the capability
of Western European nations to provide for their own defense, and to increase the
capabilities of the Middle Eastern countries to impose a delay on enemy operations directed
towards their areas. In this context, it was pointed out that Italy and Turkey were important
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for their strategic locations astride a natural sea approach to areas from which air power may
be projected towards an important segment of the industrial capacity of Soviet areas. 289
The US NSC, was however, in favour of adopting a careful policy concerning the issue of
including Turkey to the Western defence scheme. The NSC asserted that it would be unwise
for the time being to seek an arrangement with the Turkish Government for the construction
of airfields or for the stockpiling of aviation gasoline. The reason for this decision was that
these efforts would be regarded by the Kremlin as a threat to its security, and would
stimulate further pressure on Turkey and perhaps on Iran. It was pointed out that the SU was
watching carefully any development which could be exploited to support the Soviet thesis that
the NAT was aggressive in intent and operation. 290
As for Ankara’s foreign policy towards Europe, after much effort, finally on August 8,
1949, Turkey and Greece were invited to be members of the Council of Europe. Although
Turkey was admitted into the Council of Europe, Turkish foreign policy makers were of the
opinion that this could not constitute an alternative to the commitment of the USA within a
formal alliance or through NATO. Under these circumstances, Ankara could not help seeking
Turkey’s security under the defensive shield of the Western democratic camp. But, as will be
discussed next, there was a price which Turkey was required to pay for admittance into the
Western defensive system.
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VI THE TEST OF WILLS IN THE KOREAN WAR AND THE TURKISH
INVOLVEMENT IN THE CONFLICT (1950-1952)
This chapter will discuss the development of a local dispute in Korea between 1950 and
1952 into the biggest international conflict since WW II. Here, the emphasis will be on the
Turkish participation in this conflict and the background of events which shaped Ankara’s
decision. In this context, it will be first explained that the crisis over Korea embodied and
fostered the global agenda of the Cold War era. Indeed, Korea, the place where the world
peace was broken not even five years after the end of WW II, was fated to be the
battleground of contesting ideologies and interests. It was the Korean war that first brought
Communist China into the international arena as well. At this stage, having withdrawn all
troops in 1949 in line with a policy of disengagement, the USA was unprepared for
involvement in the war that began with a massive attack on South Korea by the North
Koreans on June 24, 1950 and lasted three years at a cost of more than 150,000 US
casualties.
Consecutively, the making of Turkish foreign policy, leading to Ankara’s decision to
assign a combat force under the UN Command in Korea will be examined. In this
framework, Turkey’s participation in the Korean War will be explained as a crucial point in
recent Turkish history, which marked an important test case for Ankara’s re-evaluation of
Turkey’s place in international politics. Here, it will be underscored that participation in the
war ended nearly 30 years of a policy of non-involvement in international conflicts as well.
Given this, Turkish entry into the Korean War, especially after maintaining a strict policy of
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avoiding involvement in international conflicts since the founding of the Republic, will be
explained through a critical examination of Ankara’s efforts to tie Turkey’s defense with that
of the USA and NATO. The impact of Turkish involvement in the conflict in its foreign and
domestic policies will also be discussed in this context.
VI . 1 Conflicting Strategies Lay Out Options From Total to Limited War
As for the agreements of victors on the future of Korea, it was decided by the USA,
Britain, and China at the Cairo Conference of 1943 that once the Japanese had capitulated,
Korea was again to become a free and independent nation. At the Potsdam Conference of
1945, these same powers reaffirmed this pledge. In its turn, when the SU declared war
against Japan in August of 1945, it formally agreed to stand by these pledges.
At Yalta, Roosevelt had been urged by his military planners to seek a definite
commitment for intervention of the SU in the Pacific struggle. The US President also sought
Stalin’s agreement to giving China a significant place in the UN, and allowing it to gain back
its lost territories. Shortly afterwards, the USA received guarantees of Soviet entry into the
Pacific war. In effect, outer Mongolia and strategic assets were conceded to the Soviet Union
following the defeat of Japan with the concurrence of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, which
Roosevelt agreed to obtain. Eventually, the SU agreed to conclude with the Nationalist
government of China a pact of friendship and alliance. It was also agreed that part of the
agreement on the Far East would remain secret, because Russia had a treaty of neutrality
with Japan, and information that might leak from the Chinese Nationalists to the Japanese,
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and an immediate announcement might jeopardize negotiation on differences between Chinese
Nationalists and Communists, which the US Ambassador to China, Major Gen. Patrick J.
Hurley, evaluated were close to success. Resultantly, the terms agreed at Yalta were not
officially disclosed to Chiang Kai-Shek until June 15, 1945.
It was in September of 1945 that Japan’s unconditional surrender brought World War
II to its formal ending. Liberated from Japan in 1945 only to become a hostage to the Cold
War, Korea remained divided at the 38th parallel, its two halves occupied by US and Russian
troops until 1948 when communist refusal to accept UN-supervised elections led to
establishment of rival regimes: the US backed Republic of Korea (ROK) in South, and the
SU sponsored People’s Republic in North. Countries who sent their troops to Korea could
hardly dream that the two leading Communist powers, SU and China would blatantly
combine in rallying against them.
The Kremlin, in fact, had made preparations for occupation of North Korea in August
1945 where People’s Committees operated extensively. While it is true that in this same
month a line was drawn across Korea at the 38th parallel, this was done to facilitate the
arrangements made for the surrender of Japanese forces in the area. Russia would accept the
surrender of Japanese troops north of this line, while the USA would handle those troops
surrendering south of the line. 291 Thus, the 38th parallel was the result of a temporary
expediency, having nothing to do with natural boundaries, politics or the history of the
country.
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At the end of 1945, a big-power conference at Moscow called for a five-year period of
trusteeship by Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union and China, and the establishment
of a provisional democratic government.  But, when the executive agency of the trustees, the
Soviet Union and the United States, met in Seoul in March of the new year, it was obvious
that it would not work. All the Korean political parties except the Communists demanded
immediate and complete independence and refused to cooperate. The Soviets then insisted
that the Communists were the only legitimate party in Korea, and that it form the
government, but the United States was equally insistent otherwise. Ultimately, both sides set
up their own governments in their own zones. The Soviets passed control over to a
Provisional People’s Committee, and in the summer all of the parties of the north coalesced
into the Korean National Democratic Front; then the northern part of the peninsula made a
predictable transition into a People's Democratic Republic, the standard Marxist-Leninst one-
party state modeled after the Soviet Union, while in December 1946, in the south, a
legislative assembly was set up, half of them elected and the other half  nominated. However,
the country was in near chaos, hundreds of thousands were hungry, unemployed and
homeless, while they wanted their independence.
In May 1947, the Joint Commission of the Trustee Powers made one more try. The
Americans proposed free elections throughout the entire peninsula; the Russians rejected the
idea. They countered by proposing a meeting of equal numbers of representatives of all the
parties of the south, and all the parties of the north, which would have meant the
Communists, since they were the only one. Washington declined this suggestion on the
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grounds that the representatives of the Communist party of the north would be controlled by
the Russians.
As for the reasons behind China’s increasing attention towards Korea, it can be stated that
developments in China in the first half of the 1940s were of crucial importance for the
sequence of events in 1950, culminating in the Chinese intervention in Korea in October
1950. During WW II, the Kuomintang, under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek, was
regarded favourably by the US administration as a result of the Chinese resistance to
Japanese aggression. However, the US Government’s disillusionement with China developed
from the negative contribution made by Kuomintang in the Pacific War. Instead of playing a
vigorous part in the defeat of Japan in the Pacific, the top Kuomintang officials and generals
were interested in exploiting large-scale American aid for their own benefit while Chiang
Kai-Sheik was pre-occupied  with his long-term feud with the Chinese Communists. Indeed,
numerically, the Kuomintang forces were superior to the Communists, but in morale,
commitment and leadership the Communists were far ahead of the Kuomintang as the civil
war was to reveal. The Chinese Communist leader Mao Tse-tung had managed to transform
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) into a powerful platform to attract the Chinese masses.
In fact, the Japanese aggression of 1937 had first created the conditions for a Communist
leadership in China and for spreading the conflict to most of the neighbouring countries. At
this juncture, Stalin surprised the Chinese Communist rebels after having forced them into a
reconciliation with the nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek against the invader, when he
concluded a non-aggression treaty with Japan in August 1941 that implied among other
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things, the end of Soviet assistance to China, and the recognition of Manchukuo, and hence
of the seizure of China’s richest province by the Japanese imperialists.
After the Japanese surrender in August 1945, the Kremlin followed a cautious policy
towards China “and one less sympathetic to Chinese communism than might have been
expected.” 292 Stalin was considerably dubious about the character of the CCP and the
prospects for the CCP taking power throughout China. It is argued that the Soviet leader
anticipated a slow decline of the Kuomitang, balanced by a gradual growth of the CCP which
could point towards a divison of China. This also explains the Kremlin’s preservation of
diplomatic relations with the Kuomintang until a surprisingly late stage in April 1949, by
which time it was obvious that the CCP would succeed on the mainland in the near future.
Meanwhile, speculation grew at the end of 1948 and beginning of 1949 as to whether
Chiang Kai-shek might stall tactically or because he had wearied of the setbacks that had
occurrred. In October 1948, in his statement to the New York Tribune, Chiang spoke of the
world menace of Communism and of the need to support nationalists’ resistance to
Communism. In this context, he linked his message with Communist activities in Korea and
Japan. “A feature of the decline of the Kuomintang was Chiang’s interest in forging links with
[the designated South Korean President] Syngman Rhee and his reference to Korea was one
first signs of this trend. Chiang and the clique surrounding him had reached the conclusion
that the only hope for the salvation of the Kuomintang lay in the third world war; this, too,
was a consistent theme to the outbreak of the war in Korea and after.” 293
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In October 1949, following a decisive victory over Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalists, the
CCP formally proclaimed the People’s Republic of China (PRC). 294 The PRC had an
immediate agenda for regulating its international affairs based on its ideological vision. At
the top was the conquest of Tibet, preparations were made to take over Taiwan and the
conclusion of an alliance with the SU. Beijing did also quickly exchange diplomatic
recognition with P’yongyang, the North Korean   capital. 295
Turning back to the efforts for a settlement of the Korean question in the UN, in
September 1947, the USA took the problem to the United Nations. Two months later, the
United Nations agreed that Korea ought to be independent, and voted to set up a temporary
commission to bring that about. Members from eastern Europe boycotted the vote, and when
a UN commission reached Korea early in 1948, with the task of supervising elections, it was
refused admission to North Korea. With no recourse, it then recommended free elections in
the south; these were held on May 10, and the conservative rightist parties gained a large
majority. On August 15, 1948, Syngman Rheee became the first president of the Republic of
Korea.
Four months later, the republic was recognized by the UN as the only free state in Korea.
But it was given diplomatic recognition just by the western powers, as the People’s
Democratic Republic received recognition solely from the eastern bloc. The UN then set up a
permanent commission to try to unify the country. The Americans ended their military
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presence in government of the south, and agreed to provide advisers and training for defense
forces. The Russion occupation forces left the north. Both countries left behind a government
which the other denounced as illegitimate and which claimed to represent all of Korea.
Within six months, there was occasional raiding across the 38th parallel, and major
exchanges of gunfire. Both sides were calling each other “reactionary imperialist traitor” or
“Communist terrorist revolutionary”.
In fact, Truman’s policy on Korea at the United Nations experienced a significant success
during the last month of 1948. On December 6, the Political and Security Committee voted
by a large margin to reject the Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea (DPRK)’s claim to
legitimacy, and instead to invite the ROK to send representatives to the UN. It then paid
attention to Washington’s proposal calling for international involvement in Korean affairs.
John Foster Dulles, then the US Representative to the UN, delivered a speech appealing for
UN approval of the resolution. American diplomatic pressure proved to be effective and two
days later, the Committee overwhelmingly voted to recommend that the General Assembly
adopt the American resolution. 296 Four days later, on December 12, the General Assembly
approved the American resolution despite sharp criticism from the Soviet delegation. After
rejecting the Soviet proposal to disband the planned commission on Korea by a wide margin,
the General Assembly voted to create a new commission that would be smaller than its
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predecessor, United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK), excluding both
Canada and Ukraine. It was decided that within thirty days, the United Nations Commission
on Korea (UNCOK) would arrive in Korea, and begin to cooperate with the ROK for the
achievement of reunification.
Meanwhile, in April-May 1949, secret consultations between Communist China and
North Korea with regard to the invasion of South Korea were given a start, one year before
the outbreak of the war, with the visit to China by Kim Il, Chief of the Political Department
of the North Korean Army. The Kremlin was a part of the process as well, since prior to his
visit to China, Kim Il had held a meeting with Stalin in Moscow. 297
In December, this time Mao visited Moscow and stayed there for about two months,
holding extensive meetings to discuss with Stalin the expansion of Communism throughout
Asia, and the rest of the world, and other pending issues between the two countries. On
January 2, 1950, Mao cabled his Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai, and informed him that Stalin
had agreed to Zhou’s and other necessary aides’ arrival in Moscow, and to the signing of a
new Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, as well as agreements on credit, trade,
civil aviation, and others.  298
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In the Republic of Korea, as the scope of the Communist attack became apparent, there
was dismayed alarm. The frontier was fully breached, the capital threatened, refugees
thronged the roads. What was important in this situation was therefore not what the North
Koreans intended to do, which was clear enough, or what the South Koreans could do, which
was little enough, but rather what the USA  and the UN could do.
VI 2. The Democrat Party’s Redefinition of Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkey’s
Participation in the Korean War
Against this background, on March 30, 1949, the US Embassy in Ankara conveyed a
Memorandum to the MFA, expressing the views and expectations of the US Government
with regard to the problem of Korea. The US Memorandum underscored that it was the US
view that the UN had made substantial progress towards restoring the freedom and
independence of the Korean people, and that in the General Assembly Resolution of
December 12 it had a “formula for pursuing that progress to fruition.” 299 Here, it was stated
that the USA believed in consolidation of existing gains, and the success of further UN
efforts in Korea would depend in large measure on the firm and unwavering support by the
UN member states of the December 12 Resolution, and the endorsement of the Government
of the Republic of Korea contained therein. In this context it was emphasized that the USA
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felt that every assistance and facility should be afforded the UNCOK in its efforts to help the
lawful Korean Government to achieve the objective of a free and united Korea, “a goal to
which the United States is convinced an overwhelming majority of Koreans of both north and
south wholeheartedly aspire.” 300
The Memorandum also explained the US position on troop withdrawal as based on the
view that to withdraw its occupation forces prematurely or to permit their retention on
Korean soil for any longer than necessary would, in either case jeopardize attainment of UN
objectives in Korea. It was stated that it was the intention of the USA to continue to provide
limited amount of economic, technical, military and other assistance regarded as essential to
the economic and political stability of the newborn Republic. Lastly, it was underscored that
the main burden of responsibility for the failure of UN efforts “must be placed on the Soviet
Union and its evident determination to subordinate legitimate aspirations and the welfare of
the Korean people to its own objective of Communist domination of the entire Korean
peninsula.” 301
Meanwhile, there were some efforts to bring the Korean question to Ankara’s attention on
the part of Seoul. On July 21, 1949, Ambassador Chough, Pyung Ok, Permanent Observer to
the UN, sent a letter to Turkish Permanent Representative to the UN, Selim Sarper, in which
he explained that in addition to the USA, Britain, China, the Phillippines, France, Brazil,
                                                               
299 From, Memorandum by the US Embassy in Ankara to the MFA, March 30, 1949 (extract), The
MFA Archives.
300 Ibid.
301 Ibid. In fact, Ankara’s efforts in the same direction produced a favourable outcome in Turco-
Italian relations and a month later, on March 24, 1950, the Turco-Italian treaty of friendship was
signed. Despite Ankara’s optimism that this timely step would support the establishment of a
Mediterranean pact, it was soon understood that Washington was not willing to re-evaluate its
ccxl
Chile, New Zealand, the Netherlands, Dominican Republic and Cuba, the Government of the
Dominion of Canada accorded full recognition to the Government of the Republic of Korea.
302
By the beginning of 1950, in Ankara, there were, however, no signs of relating the
Turkish wish for joining NATO and supporting the US efforts in Korea. Thus, the US
position in Korea was still a matter of less interest for Turkey, as Ankara was still
concentrating on its Mediterranean security groupement offer. But, it would soon prove that
Ankara would be obliged to shift to participate in the US sponsored discussions on the future
of Korea to perpetuate its policy of drawing together with Washington.
As part of Ankara’s last effort on its usual line of policy, on February 15, 1950, Turkish
Ambassador in Washington, Erkin renewed Turkey’s suggestion for a Near Eastern Pact with
the support of the US. However, Erkin tried in vain to obtain some sort of a US assurance to
Turkey, and explained that such an assurance could be in the form of a declaration by the US
President which would announce Turkey in the same category as members of the NAT. 303
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Grooving in the darkness, on April 27, Erkin this time pointing to the possibility of the
Soviet Union to create a crisis in order to alter the Montreux Convention in 1951, suggested
that the establishment of Mediterranean pact would increase the confidence of Turkey as well
as serve as a warning to the Kremlin. He requested his suggestions to be discussed in the
London meetings. To his disappointment however, in London, NATO’s enlargement was not
on the agenda. 304
On May 11, 1950, while İnönü was still President, Turkey applied for admission to
NATO.  However, at that time the Atlantic Pact members declined Turkey’s application.
Admittedly, there were various reasons behind the Council’s denial of Turkey’s request.
Firstly, the European members of NATO regarded that the membership of Turkey and
Greece would be disadvantageous for their short and long term interests since it would
represent an extension of their own financial commitments, and increase their risk of
involvement in a possible conflict. Secondly, as mentioned earlier, London was supporting
the idea of establishment of a Middle East Command under MEDO, consisting of Britain,
Turkey, Israel, Egypt, Iran, Greece and the Arab League countries.  305
At this juncture, the Democrat Party’s success in May 14, 1950 elections in Turkey
marked a turning point in Turkish politics. Out of 8.905.576 eligible voters, 7.953.055, or
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%89.3 of registered voters joined elections. The candidates of the DP received 4.242.831
votes and the Republican candidates 3.165.096 votes. Since the majority system was accepted
in Turkey, out of the total of 487 seats in the Assembly, 396 went to the DP and 68 to the
Republicans. Since the foundation of the Republic, the RPP rule had dominated in Turkish
politics, and as far as official efforts for modernizing the Turkish nation are concerned, in all
aspects of social life. It had undoubtedly controlled the destiny of the country, always
maintaining its Kemalist revolutionary character. With a view to this past, the result was
more than surprising for President İnönü, who had assumed the title of “the National Chief”,
and controlled the regime’s destiny after Gazi Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the sole political
party organization until then, namely the RPP.
 The DP’s election victory can be explained in various ways. Among these, the RPP’s
overconfidence of its power and its control over the establishment, and the basic structure of
the country should be stated first. As expected by the RPP officials, even under a pressing
international political atmosphere for the democratization of the regime in Turkey, the
opposition could only flourish within the RPP.  Subsequently, the short process of searching
for a new leader paved the way to a race between several aspirants and their groupings.
According to Ergun Özbudun, it was some of these factions within the RPP “which
eventually provided the cadres who led the movement to establish opposition parties or to join
the opposition movement after its successful commencement in 1945”. 306
Another factor which served the DP’s coming to power was a genuine wish of the voters
to enjoy the liberalism of another political party. “The average citizen thought that a real
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political liberalization could not be achieved except by sending the Republican Party into
opposition.” 307 Besides, the DP propaganda succesfully exploited the similarities of single
party rule in the country with those of totalitarian regimes. Meanwhile, there were almost no
attempts on the side of RPP to introduce at least some kind of transparency to its monopoly
on the rule of the country, nor any sign of will to improve democratic skills in Turkish
political life. Having rather been discomforted since the notorious election results of 1946,
when RPP rule experienced the very first challange against its power, but managed to keep it
in its hands in one way or another, the numbers suspicious of the honesty of the foundations
of RPP rule were constantly rising. Again, the 1946 elections where open voting and closed
counting of votes system applied raised considerable criticism. It was claimed that counting
of votes and announced results were untrustworthy. Under these circumstances, a general
discomfort in the country strengthened the feeling of  revanchism and ultimately paved the
way to the election victory of DP.
On May 22, Celal Bayar was elected as the 3rd President of the Republic of Turkey.
İnönü issued a declaration a day later, and announced that following the end of his term of
office he would actively undertake the Chairmanship of the RPP. 308 The Günaltay
government, the fourth since the 1946 elections, was replaced by the government of Adnan
Menderes. Fuat Köprülü was designated as the Minister of Foreign Affairs. 309 As will be
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discussed below, the change in the Turkish leadership introduced an imminent  deviation
from the cautious policy of İnönü administration.
Turning back to the situation in Korea, on June 25, 1950, the Secretary General of the
United Nations, Tyrgve Lie, was informed by the United States and the United Nations
Commission on Korea that North Korean forces had invaded Korea that morning. On the
same day the Security Council determined by 9 votes to non, with 1 abstention of Yugoslavia
and 1 member absent (the SU), that the armed attack was a breach of peace, called for
immedieiate cessation of hostilities, withdrawal of North Korean forces to the thirtyeighth
parallel, and the assistance of members in carrying out the resolution. The SU had not
participated in the Council's work since January 13, 1950, explaining that it would not
recognize as legal any decision of the Council until the representative of the Kuomintang
Group had been removed. It resumed, however, attendance at the meetings on August 1,
1950, when the Presidency of the Council again devolved upon it under the system of
monthly rotation.
On June 27, the Security Council adopted a United States draft resolution, noting that
the authorities in North Korea had neither ceased hostilities nor withdrawn their armed
forces, and recommending that members furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as
might be necessary to repel the armed attack and restore international peace and security in
the area. The vote was 7 to 1 (Yugoslavia), with the SU absent and with Egypt and India not
voting, but later indicating their positions as abstention from and acceptance of the
resolution, respectively.
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Also on June 27, the United States announced that it had ordered its air and sea forces
to give cover and support to the troops of the Korean Government. On June 30, it informed
the Council that it had ordered a naval blockade of the Korean coast and authorized the use of
ground forces as a further response to the June 27 resolution. Fifty one member states
expressed support for the stand taken by the Security Council, while five, including the SU,
together with the PRC and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, shared the view that
the June 27 resolution was illegal, because it had been adopted in the absence of two
permanent members of the Security Council, the PRC and the SU. The SU also declared that
the events in Korea were the result of an unprovoked attack by South Korean troops  and
demanded the cessation of the United States intervention.
Turkey was a member of the UNCOK which made the recommendation that the Security
Council take military action against North Korea. From the beginning, the Menderes
government supported the Security Council decision. Thus, the leaders of the DP believed
that Turkey’s participation in the UN effort in Korea would enhance its international
standing.  
Turkey’s position concerning the Security Council resolution of 27 June was stated in a
cable dated June 29, 1950, from the Minister of Foreign Affairs Fuat Köprülü, addressed to
the Secretary General of the United Nations as follows:
With reference to  your telegram  number  8755  of 28 June, I have
the honour to inform you that the Government of the Turkish
Republic regards the steps taken by the United Nations Council with
a view to putting an end to the tragic situation existing in Korea as
the proper expression of a salutary decision to restore peace and to
safeguard the sovereign rights of a State which has just been the
object of an unprovoked attack. Such a decision, constituting the
most certain guarantee of independence the peaceful nations will
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certainly have the effect of strengthening the confidence of anxious
people in world security. It is with conviction that, in reply to the
recommendation you communicated to it on behalf of the Council,
my Government declares that it is ready to execute loyally and in
complete conformity with the provisions of the Charter the
undertakings which Turkey assumed as a member of the United
Nations. 310
Two days later, on July 1, the UN Secretary General Lie communicated the resolution
adopted by the Security Council at its 474th meeting on June 27, which recommended that
the members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as might
be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the
area. The telegram of Lie also included that in the event that the Turkish Government was in
a position to provide assistance, it would facilitate the implementation of the resolution. 311
On the same day, Köprülü cabled Lie expressing that:
Reply to your telegram dated 1 July, as I had the honour to inform
your excellency on 29 June last, the Government of the Republic of
Turkey is faithful to its undertakings arising out of the Charter of
the United Nations. It is consequently ready to comply with any
decision taken by the Security Council on this subject and to enter
into contact with the Council. 312
On July 7, the Security Council, by 7 votes to none, with abstentions (Egypt, India,
Yugoslavia), and 1 member absent (SU), requested all member states providing military
forces in pursuance of the Council's resolutions to make  them available to a unified
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command under the United States. Subsequently, combatant units were provided by the
following sixteen member states: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Ethiopia, France,
Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, the
Union of South Africa, the UK and the USA. In addition, five nations - Denmark, India,
Italy, Norway, and Sweden - supplied medical units. The Republic of Korea also placed all
its military forces under the Unified Command.
Following the Resolution of July 7, recommending that all assistance should be made
to the Unified Command under the United States, and authorizing the Unified Command at
its discretion to use the United Nations flag in the course of operations against North Korean
forces concurrently with the flags of the various nations participating, responsibility for
deciding what specific measures would be taken to assist the Republic of Korea rested upon
members of the United Nations.
On July, 18, a meeting of Council of Ministers convened far from Ankara at Yalova. In
fact, endorsed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Köprülü, Prime Minister Menderes had
made up his mind much before this meeting. Under these circumstances, discussions could
hardly produce a different outcome other than condoning Prime Minister Menderes.
Following a hasty discussion, the Council of Ministers decided to send a 4.500-man unit to
join the US troops in Korea.
Not surprisingly, in the same days, the Menderes Government was paying  special
attention to the frequently discussed issue of Turkish participation in the Korean War with the
US Government. On July 20, at a private talk with Ambassador Wadsworth, Köprülü said he
wished particularly to brief the US Ambassador in relation to major matters discussed at the
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Yalova conference. Köprülü then informed Wadsworth that the conference discussed and
decided that there was pressing need to strengthen existing Turkish Armed Forces; immediate
action would be taken in cooperation with aid mission to implement the recommendations,
which were explained by the Head of US Military Aid Mission, General McBride, to Turkish
Chief of General Staff, Nuri Yamut, in the letter of the former dated, June 30; and finally
Menderes should invite Köprülü and Wadsworth to confer “to review entire field US-Turkish
cooperation from economic as well as military aspects.” Besides, Köprülü explained that the
conference “took position that in event third world war, defense through neutrality would be
illusory for any nation and for Turkey.” 313
On July 22, this time, Köprülü told Wadsworth that he would discuss with him the
Turkish reply to the UN Secretary General Lie’s circular to 50 UN member nations, urging
that they consider offering effective assistance - including ground forces - to resist North
Korean aggression. The Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs went on to explain that the
Turkish Government wished its reply “bear witness to its sincere desire manifest by practical
action its loyalty to UN and Turk-US collaboration” and added that “we wish particularly
that our reply conform with US policy and public  opinion.” 314 In his turn, Wadsworth noted
that his immediate reaction was that he should urge prompt dispatch of ground forces. Bu he
said, “I refrained from so replying except in general appreciative terms pending consultation
with General McBride.” 315
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A day later, on July 23, after consultation with General McBride and Senator Harry P.
Cain - who arrived from Athens - Wadsworth decided to reply that in his personal view, the
Turkish Government could best manifest its support of UN policies by prompt dispatch of
fully equipped regimental combat team. Wadsworth noted that McBride described this force
as consisting of infantry regiment, artillery battalion and appropriate headquarters, anti-tank,
anti-aircraft, engineer, motor transport, signal, ordnance and medical units and normal loads
of ammunition, spare parts, mines, wire, etc; a fully self-contained combat unit of between
4.000 and 4.500 officers and men, approximately 10 percent above war strength. Wadsworth
said, McBride gave further details as to such a unit could be assembled for embarkation at a
Turkish port within one month. If sent, it would after arrival have to be maintained by UN
Commander. Its artillery, trucks and general services equipment would conform to US
Standards.
Wadsworth stated that on July 24, he had presented this strictly personal suggestion of
McBride to the Secretary General of the MFA, Faik Zihni Akdur. The US Ambassador said,
Akdur told him that he “trusts this decision will be taken promptly by Cabinet and will render
even more effective our collaboration in political as well as military fields.” 316
In the same cable to Washington, Wadsworth explained more than that. He stated that on
the same afternoon, Senator Cain, General MacBride and himself had prearranged conference
with Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of National Defense, Chief of TGS and
Commanding General of Turkish Ground Forces. According to Wadsworth, here, Köprülü
said, “personally I am wholeheartedly in favor of sending ground forces promptly and will
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present your suggestion to Cabinet at earliest opportunity, if possible tomorrow.” In his turn,
Minister of National Defense said “I share my colleague’s view.” Wadsworth noted that the
TGS was also wholly favourably disposed. He knew that the G-3 of General Staff, Maj. Gen.
Yusuf A. Egeli wrote a memorandum to the Chief of TGS, Yamut, expressing that “it will be
the greatest crime in Turkish history if we fail to take advantage of this opportunity.” 317
On the same day at dinner, Köprülü informed Wadsworth that he had telephoned
President Bayar, Prime Minister Menderes and three other Ministers due to return to Ankara
the next day from a Bairam holiday to arrange Cabinet meeting that afternoon. Wadsworth
said, Köprülü expressed that “he hoped sincerely and believed favorable decision could then
be taken. If so, he would at once telegraph Secretary General Lie and instruct Turkish
Embassy at Washington to inform the Department.” 318
A day later, on July 25, the Council of Ministers met in Ankara under the Chairmanship
of President Bayar to determine the details of the decision at hand and the wording of the
press statement. After the meeting in Yalova, the President of the TGNA, Refik Koraltan, the
Minister of National Defence, R. Şevket İnce, and the Chief of General Staff, General Nuri
Yamut were again present in the meeting. Shortly afterwards a text was finalized which
included that the Council of Ministers had realized exchange of views on the text prepared by
the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Köprülü and considered the subject in full details. On the
same day, in accordance with the decisions taken in the Council, a telegram signed by
Köprülü was sent to Secreatry General Lie expressing that:
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In reply to your cable of 15 July; the Government of the Republic of
Turkey, believing it to be its duty to comply with the obligations
arising from the Charter of the United Nations as well as with the
decisions of the Security Council, has examined carefully and in this
spirit your aforementioned cable. As a result of this consideration,
and realizing, in the present world conditions and in the interest of
general peace, the necessity and the importance of the effective
implementation of the aforementioned decisions, the Government of
the Republic of Turkey had decided to place at the disposal of the
United Nations a Turkish combat force of 4500 men to serve in
Korea. 319
Menderes Government’s announcement of the decision to send troops to Korea
remains a controversial issue to this date. The RPP and the whole opposition put forward that
the capacity to send armed forces abroad was strictly in the power of the Assembly, and no
decision was obtained from the TGNA to this end. Their point of departure was from the
Constitution which stipulated that the making of agreements and peace with other countries or
to declare on any state war was in the jurisdiction of the Assembly.  In his turn, Menderes
argued that the sending of the troops to Korea did not mean to declare war on this country
and the decision of the government was entirely in conformity with the Charter of the UN; a
document which was previously approved by the TGNA and acquired the force of a law for
the Republic of Turkey.  320
George Harris maintained that the decision of the Turkish Government had emerged
from the approach of Menderes and Bayar. He stated that the decision of the DP was well
calculated  in the sense that it had not taken too long for the DP administration to see the
importance and the opportunity it provided. According to Harris, the reason that they could
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take such a quick decison was that Bayar and Menderes were also very strongly in control of
their party. He pointed out that at a time of uncertainty when the orientation of the new
deputies was not certain, both Menderes and Bayar had managed to overcome the difficulties
in this regard. Harris also asserted that the control they could exercise over the DP was quite
unusual since they did even not know all the deputies. In contrast to the DP’s case, in
previous years, İnönü had known all the deputies and he had put them on the list himself
because he knew them.
However, Harris explained that the problems of the speed with which the DP regime
had taken the decision to send troops to Korea could not be confined to the reactions of the
opposition. He said, when Bayar and Menderes had made this decision, they had realized that
they had to leave out the Minister of National Defense, İnce, and one other Minister (of
Health and Social Assistance) Nihat Reşer Belger, whom they thought would vote against
them on sending troops to Korea. Thus they had not created a unified cabinet on this one
question either. 321
Around the same issue, R. Salim Burçak, a member of the TGNA from the DP
pointed out that in certain respects, it was indeed hard to explain the decision of the
Menderes government that it took after one and a half months of its coming to power on
Turkey’s “entry into the war” and sending a force of 4.500 to a country which the Turkish
people had not even heard of its name. He said, while the RPP had based its domestic
propaganda on its success of Turkey’s remaining outside of WW II, the DP was following an
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entirely different policy and involving Turkey in a war. This situation however, constituted a
negative propaganda subject which could be used against the DP. 322
Kasım Gülek, then the Secretary General of the RPP, stated that upon the news on the
Menderes government’s consideration of a decision to enter into the Korean conflict, he had
visited İnönü to express his view that such a decision should be the outcome of a united
national will, and it ought to be unanimously made by both the government and the
opposition. However, Gülek said, İnönü replied to him as “You can not explain this.” Gülek
stated that, consecutively he had visited Menderes as well who was a very close friend of him
since the years of the single party rule in Turkey. Gülek said, he had told Menderes that “you
won a great victory. A Historical one. There is now again a historical matter. Turkey will
enter into war. Make it with the opposition as a joint national decision.” Then, Gülek
explained that Menderes replied to him “It is difficult to decide on these matters. If I go and
propose this to İsmet Pasha, people will hear about this. And then, people will say, ‘they are
inexperienced, they felt obliged to go and consult the old experienced ones’, this will not be
good for us.” Gülek commented that perhaps Menderes was right in his suspicions. But, in
one way another, this opportunity was lost. 323
Not surprisingly, there were different reactions in the Turkish press and civilian
organizations on the government’s decision. On August 28, Abidin Daver of Cumhuriyet
wrote that if Soviets had an intention to attack Turkey, they would not have difficulty to find
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a reason other than Turkey’s sending troops to the Korean War. Meanwhile, the Friends of
Peace association protested Turkey’s participation in the Korean War, and some of its
members were arrested and sentenced to various prison terms.
 Turning back to the discussions in UN, the June Resolutions of the Security Council
were the first occasions in history when an international organization as such used force to
stop aggression. The prompt action of the Council and of certain members of the United
Nations, which included Turkey, acting in accordance with the Security Council’s
recommendations not only served to throw back the armed attack but, in addition, greatly
enhanced the security of all people living under the fear of aggression that the assistance
would be forthcoming when needed. In particular it increased the feeling of security of those
people, like the people of Turkey, who at the time enjoyed no other protection than that
provided by the guarantees of the United Nations and their own ability to resist. Despite
these developments in the General Assembly, the progress on the ground was not favourable
for the UN forces. Korea's capital, Seoul, fell on June 28, 1950, and in August the United
Nations forces were confined within a small area in southeast Korea.
Meanwhile, the situation in Korea had been brought to the agenda of the TGNA. On July
30, Minister of Foreign Affairs Fuat Köprülü, following his announcement of UN Secretary
General’s telegram on the aggression in Korea before the members of the TGNA, stated that:
Esteemed friends,
It is of your knowledge that in our foreign policy, to participate in
the Charter of the UN with full strength and sincerity constitutes an
unwavering principle for us. In actual and spiritual capacity of this
charter, to protect peace and security on earth, to resist aggression,
and respect the territorial integrity and independence of all nations,
to ensure the welfare and well-being of humanity is the basis of our
foreign policy...Along the line of these tenets, our close and sincere
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cooperation with US, our present alliance with England and France
are the requirements of our open, explicit and correct policy. Facing
this last situation, had the UN not taken action immediately and
accept this fait accomplis, this would be a source of insecurity for all
the regions of the world and global peace would suffer. Therefore, it
is the duty of all peace-loving and democratic nations who believe
that aggression is completely illegal, to welcome the US who took
prompt action and mobilized its forces to implement the UN
decision to protect the world peace. 324
Köprülü also stated that he had informed the UN Secretary General Lie that he was
prepared to carry out his undertakings in the capacity of a member of the TGNA. Following
Köprülü’s words, the statement of Dr. Hayri Üstündağ and his five colleagues, expressing
their praise for the government’s peace understanding under the principles of UN was
endorsed by the TGNA.
From then on, as the TGNA did not function between the 7th and l0th months of each
year, and no special session or gathering was asked of the TGNA, the criticisms of
opposition could be voiced - of course in limited ways under the threat of censorship - in
other fora, which were mainly the press statements of the MPs from the opposition.
Meanwhile, the second application of the Turkish Government to NAT was made on
August 1, 1950. With a view to its recent decision of contributing troops to the UN
Command in Korea, the Menderes Government considered that this timely action of Ankara
could provide it with a favourable response. However, evidence suggests that the matter was
not cleared in Washington, and within the Alliance, and  following a short period of delay,
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the NAT Council declined this application, merely inviting Greece and Turkey to the
planning efforts for the defense of the Mediterranean. 325
Turning back to the international repercussions of Ankara’s decision, the picture so far
presented of Turkey’s willingnes to cooperate with the democratic countries of the West in
general, and the US in particular, reached a post-war peak in the Korean War. Turkey,
although thousands of miles away from Korea, and although it strived for years under
considerable economic strain, demonstrated an impressive example of the sense of
responsibility to the Charter provisions for enforcement measures against an aggressor when
it contributed forces for Korean action. During the general debate in the Fifth Assembly in
September, Turkish Permanent Representative, Sarper, stated in connection with the Korean
action that:
Aggressive elements in Korea have, by an actual breach of the
peace, threatened the peace and security of the world, and
challenged not only the decisions and actions of this august
Assembly, but also the very principles of our Charter. In the face of
this challenge, the high sense of responsibility and solidarity
demonstrated to the world by the overwhelming majority of the
Members of the United Nations was an expression of the high
responsibility of the United Nations, and a living proof of the reality
of a fundamental principle of this Organization, that is, that the
peace and security of the world is one and indivisible and that all
should join hands in co-operation and devotion in order to safeguard
this sacred treasure. The action taken in Korea clearly showed that
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this principle was not only a theory destined to remain in the pages
of the Charter, but the expression of a living  spirit. 326
Undoubtedly, Ankara tied its commitment to the UN effort in Korea to entry into NATO.
Previously, Turkish Ambassador in Washington, Erkin told Acheson on August 25 that the
commitment to send troops to Korea intensifed among the Turkish leaders and the people that
Turkey should be included in the European collective security arrangement. Erkin said
“today there are three important organizations: the OEEC, the Council of Europe, and the
North Atlantic Treaty. Turkey is included in the first two, and her exclusion from the latter on
a geographical basis would, in my opinion, be inconsistent.” 327
Similarly, on September 12, President Bayar told Wasdworth of his concerns about
Washington’s reluctance to extend formal support for Turkey’s entry into NATO. Here,
Bayar straightforwardly asked Wadsworth if the Government of the USA did not realize that
Ankara would consider further deferment of favorable action on its request by the Atlantic
Pact powers as a refusal and as unwillingness to accept Turkey as an equal partner in meeting
jointly any threat of aggression. Bayar said, “we have shown our good faith by fortright
action towards meeting the Korean crisis. I fear frankly that, if Atlantic Pact Council of
Foreign Ministers turns down our request, our morale will be seriously affected.” 328
In the meantime, on October 7, the General Assembly adopted a resolution which
recommended that all appropriate steps be taken to ensure conditions of stability throughout
Korea; established the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of
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Korea (UNCURK) of seven member states to represent the United Nations in bringing about
the establishment of a unified, independent, and democratic government of all Korea; and
recommended that the United Nations forces should not remain in Korea otherwise than for
the objectives stated, and that all necessary measures be taken to accomplish the economic
rehabilitation of Korea. Meanwhile, in mid-October, following an amphibious landing at
Inchon, the UN forces regained almost all the territory of the Republic of Korea and were
advancing  far into North Korea.
Amidst these developments, the first Turkish Brigade, led by Brigadier General
Tahsin Yazıcı arrived at Pusan in October 1950. The Brigade did not arrive with its own
weapons, and had to be trained to use new American weaponry which was in fact, an effort
begun during its long sea journey. 329 An intensive training period then immediately started
for the Brigade.
On November 6, 1950, a special report of the United Nations Command informed the
Security Council that United Nations forces were in contact in North Korea with military
units of the PRC. A representative of the PRC participated in the Security Council’s
subsequent combined discussion of complaints of aggression upon the Republic of Korea and
of armed invasion of Taiwan (Formosa). On November 30, because of the negative vote of
the SU, the Council did not adopt a resolution calling, among other things, on all states and
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soldiers had not completed their training and had not even seen the new American war equipment,
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(Turks in the Korean War), (İstanbul: İsmail Akgün Matbaası, 1963), pp, 27; 32, respectively.
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authorities to refrain from assisting the North Korean authorities, and affirming that it was
United Nations policy to hold inviolate the Chinese frontier with Korea. The Council rejected
by a vote of 1 (the SU) to 9, with India not participating, a draft resolution condemning the
United States for armed aggression against Chinese territory and armed intervention in
Korea, and demanding withdrawal of United States forces.
Meanwhile, Brig. Gen. Yazıcı informed his American counterparts that it was for
almost two months that his brigade was not given a duty. Yazıcı said, the Brigade had
completed its training and was in Korea to fight, not to parade. Subsequently, towards the
end of November the Turkish Brigade was moved to the northern front just as the Chinese
launched a massive counterattack that drove the UN forces out of north Korea. Following its
battles in Wawon (November, 28) and Sinnim-ni (November 28-29), the Brigade saw its first
great action in the battle of Kunu Ri and in the Sunchon Passage (November 29-December 1).
The mission of the Brigade required it to support the regular retreat of the 8th Army,
a duty which was left to it when the 9th Corps, concerned with the ROK collapse, sent the
Brigade up the Kunu Ri road to Tokch-on to guard 2nd Division’s flank. Shortly afterwards,
however, the Turks understood that the main strength of the Chinese burst over them. At a
point when completely surrounded by the Chinese forces, the Brigade stormed the Chinese
position with hand-to-hand combat. The Brigade engaged in an uniterrupted fighting for two
days in minus 15 C, low in ammunition and supplies and finally arrived in P’yongyang on
December 1. Evidently, the repercussions of this success immensely contributed to Turkey’s
image throughout the Western world. A few days later, the General Assembly on December
12, 1950, requested the Secretary General to arrange with the Unified Command for the
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design and award of a distinguishing ribbon or other insignia for personnel who had
participated in Korea in the defense of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. 330
On December 6, 1950, the General Assembly included the item “Intervention of the
Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China in Korea” on its agenda. On
December 14, it established a three-man Cease Fire Group-the President of the Assembly,
Canada, and India- to recommend satisfactory cease-fire arrangements in Korea. The Group’s
program, aimed at achieving a cease-fire by successive stages, was transmitted to the PRC on
January 13, 1951.
After discussing the Chinese reply to the Cease-Fire Group’s program, the Assembly
adopted a resolution in February which noted that the People's Republic of China had not
accepted the United Nations proposals to end hostilities, and found that it had engaged in
aggression in Korea. The Assembly called on it to withdraw its forces and nationals from
Korea, requested a committee - the Additional Measures Committee - to consider measures
for meeting the aggression, reaffirmed the policy of achieving United Nations objectives in
Korea by peaceful means, and created a Good Offices Committee (the President of the
Assembly, Sweden, and Mexico) to further those ends.
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Meanwhile, the Turkish Brigade was adding to its reputation in Korea. Between
January 25-27, 1951, the Brigade won another astonishing offensive battle in Kumiangjang-ni
against the Chinese forces. The reports soon arrived that the American troops had counted
1734 bayoneted Chinese around the trenches in Kumiangjang-ni. Upon the news on this
fascinating fighting power, the Turkish Brigade was awarded the American Distinguished
Unit Citation; the South Korean Presidential Unit Citation; and the South Korean Order of
Military Merit Taeguk with Gold Star. 331
IV . 3 The Final Steps Towards NATO
On May 18, 1951, the General Assembly, in the absence of a satisfactory progress
report from the Good Offices Committee, recommended that every state apply an embargo on
the shipment to areas under the control of the Chinese Central People’s Government and of
the North Korean authorities of arms, ammunition, and implements of war, items useful in
their production, petroleum, and transportation materials. The SU and four other members
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did not participate in the voting on the ground that the matter was exclusively within the
jurisdiction of the Security Council.
Meanwhile, Turkey’s significance as an ally was explained by Truman in his message
to Congress, dated May 24. He said, he had transmitted in the first week of May a request
for 60 billion dollars for the US defense establishment during the fiscal year ending June 30,
1952, and this time he was recommending for the same year a Mutual Security Program. 332
As explained by Truman, the bulk of the assistance was allocated to the members of the
NAT, but, in addition, substantial quantities would be supplied to nations in the Middle East
and Asia.
As for the US aid to the Middle East, Truman pointed out that no part of the world
was more directly exposed to Soviet pressure. Truman stated that until then the Kremlin had
lost no opportunity to stir these troubled waters, as the post-war record amply demonstrated.
He said, “civil war in Greece; pressure for Turkish concessions on the Dardanelles;
sponsorship of the rebellious Tudeh party in Iran; furthering a fractional strife in the Arab
states and Israel - all reflect a concerted design for the extension of Soviet domination to this
vital area.” 333 The US President put forward that the pressure on the nations of the Middle
East could only be overcome by a continued build-up of armed defenses and the fostering of
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economic development. Thus, to this end, he said he was recommending 415 million dollars
in military aid, for Greece, Turkey and Iran. He underscored that continuing military aid for
Greece and Turkey would make possible the further strengthening of these countries’ large
and well-trained armed forces, “which have already displayed their valiant resolution in the
fight for freedom in Korea.” 334
In the meantime, armistice negotiations between the military commanders of the
opposing sides began in Korea on July 10, 1951. On October 8, 1952, the negotiations were
recessed indefinitely because of differences over whether all prisoners of war should be
returned, by force if necessary. The United Nations Command was willing to return all
except those who would resist repatriation. The other side, however, insisted on the return of
all prisoners.
At this stage, on June 8, 1951, the British Chief of Staff, William Slim, and the
Chairman of the US JCS, Omar Bradley met in London to discuss the British proposal that
Turkey should be a part of a Middle Eastern Command, which would be linked to NATO. In
this context, the British Government accepted Turkey’s entrance to NATO if it would be part
of the Middle Eastern theatre of operations under an integrated command, “and provided that
theatre, which would include Egypt and certain members of the Commonwealth in addition to
Turkey and the three great Western Powers, be placed under a special military organism that
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assures its high level strategic direction.” Interestingly for Greece, it was considered that this
country should be attached to theatre operations of SACEUR. 335
On 18 July, the new British Foreign Secretary, Herbert Morrison, publicly announced
UK’s support for the admittance of Greece and Turkey to NATO. 336 It was concurrently
believed in the Foreign Office that Turkey’s presence in the envisaged Middle Eastern
Defense Organization (MEDO) would be of considerable value. In this context, at the State
Department, the idea of creating a common Middle Eastern Defense Board including the US,
UK, France and Turkey was welcomed. Shortly afterwards, the Ambassadors of the US,
Britain, France and Turkey drafted the Four-Power proposals for a MEC to Egypt. With
these proposals it was aimed to stress that “Egypt belonged to the free world and in
consequence, her defense and that of the Middle East in General is equally vital to other
democratic nations.” 337 However, the dominant opinion in the Foreign Office was that the
Egyptian Government would not show any marked friendliness towards these suggestions.
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Against this background, the text of the “Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the
Accession of Greece and Turkey” was finally completed in London, on October 22, 1951. As
the Article III of the protocol stipulated that “the present Protocol shall enter into force when
each of the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty has notified the Government of the United
States of America of its acceptance thereof”, it was opened to the approval of the member
countries.
Concurrently, Ankara was taking its part in the negotiations concerning the security
of the Middle East. On November 10, 1951 , the USA, Britain, France, and Turkey issued a
declaration expressing their intention to establish the MEC. Here, among other things, it was
decided that the Supreme Allied Commander Middle East would command forces placed at
his disposal and would develop plans for the operations of all within the area or to be
introduced into the area in time of war or international emergency. Leaving the door open to
other states in the region (and perhaps the US, which insistently stayed out of defense
groupings in the region), it was stated that the sponsoring states of the MEC did not regard
the initial form in which the MEC would be organized as unchangeable. 338 In this
framework, combined with its support for Ankara’s entry into NAT, it can also be evaluated
that, through these steps, Britain was considering to place Turkey “into the Middle Eastern
picure as a firm ally” 339 despite the fact that its proposal of MEC would come to nothing.
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In December 1951, Assistant Secretary of State, McGhee replaced Ambassador
Wadsworth when the latter announced his retirement. McGhee also succeeded Wadsworth as
Chief of US Aid Mission to Turkey. He stated that soon after his arrival, he was present in
the visitors’ balcony of the old TGNA when the “Majlis voted unanimously, with one
abstention, to accept the invitation to join NATO.” Subsequently, McGhee made his first
official meeting with Köprülü on January 8, 1952 by expressing his hope that Ankara and
Washington could develop close and early consultation, and coordinate their actions
regarding major world events. In this context, he particularly mentioned the usefulness of the
consultations the two governments held on Iran, the Middle East Command and Korea,
telling Köprülü that he hoped this type of consultation could take place on a regular basis.
When the discussion turned to a review of events surrounding the recent NATO decision to
extend an invitation to Turkey, McGhee explained that the delay in the completion of this
procedure merely reflected the length of time required to clear important matters at all levels
of the US Government and with NATO allies. He also assured Köprülü that the upcoming
ratification vote in the US Senate on the “Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the
Accession of Greece and Turkey” would be favourable. 340
Shortly afterwards, on January 15, 1952, in a statement to the Foreign Relations
Committee of the US Senate when it considered the “Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on
the Accession of Greece and Turkey”, the Chief of US JCS General Omar Bradley remarked
that from the military view point, it was impossible to overstate the importance of Greece and
Turkey. Bradley said, “located as they are - and allied with the free nations - they serve as
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powerful deterrents to any aggression directed toward Southern Europe, the Middle East, or
North Africa...Turkey, astride the Bosporus and Dardanelles, guards the approach by water
from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean and to the Suez Canal and Egypt farther south.” 341
On January 18, 1952, the Council of the NATO invited the Governments of Turkey and
Greece to consider with appropriate NATO bodies the applicability of the findings and
recommendations of the Temporary Council Committee of North Atlantic Council to them,
and “it opened the way for the participation of Greece and Turkey on a full and equal basis
in the annual review to be undertaken beginning next summer.” 342 Finally, the “Protocol
to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of Greece and Turkey” went into effect
following the completion of the NAT members’ notification of the Government of the USA
of their acceptance on February 15, 1952.
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VII CONCLUSION
International relations of the post WW II environment was dominated by chaotic changes.
Admittedly, the Soviet assertiveness in global affairs was the main reason which prompted a
rivalry between the Kremlin and Washington. Unlike any other Allied country, the SU had
reached the end of the war with its forces deployed in critical parts of Europe. The vigilance
of Soviet military machine had also paved the way to assure the Kremlin a seat in the
negotiation table of the Big Three. Soviet assertivenes, thus was perceived as a potential
threat by many countries, particularly by those bordering the SU.
As for Turkey, the prelude to the post WW II period was marked by its suspicions of the
Kremlin’s intentions. At this jıncture, the Soviet demands on Turkish territories, and over the
Turkish Straits in 1945 accelerated Ankara’s search for a definitive alliance with the West.
Despite the fact that some Turkish statesmen and ex-military officials i.e. the former Minister
of Foreign Affairs, Tevfik Rüştü Aras, and Marshal Çakmak advocated that an understanding
between Ankara and the Kremlin could be reached - similar to the first Turco-Soviet
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rapproachment which took place during the Turkish War of Liberation -  events proved that
the conditions in 1917 and in 1945 were dramatically different, making any agreement hardly
possible.
Undoubtedly, Turkey’s quest for a Western Alliance in the aftermath of WW II was a
natural end-result of the experiences inherited from wartime diplomacy. According to
Turkish foreign policy makers, the years of the WW had proved that the aggression could
emerge from the side of totalitarian regimes which had combined their forces or by one of
them. While Turkey’s sensitivity against the bloc strategy of world powers was increasing,
the Nazi-Soviet pact of 1939 demonstrated that the danger could emerge as a collective
movement. Subsequently, it was understood that the split in this bloc had not removed the
threat. Thus, the threat itself was asserted as being in the very existence of undemocratic and
totalitarian powers.
With a comparison to the Atatürk era, İnönü administration was in favour of a
maintaining a more flexible foreign policy. Correspondingly, in 1942, when the German
armies were concentrating their strongholds throughout Europe and being deployed in key
areas, Ankara had shifted to implement the “capital tax” on the revenues of non-Muslims.
Consecutively, the Turkish citizens of Christian and Jewish origin who could not meet the
enormous amounts of tax arbitrarily assessed and imposed by the Turkish authorities were
sentenced to serve years in working camps. With a view to the fact that, however, Ankara’s
measures against non-Muslims never acquired a wicked nature similar to that of Nazis, there
is every reason to assert that in this move, İnönü had planned to divert the attention of the
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Axis war machine to somewhere else and give the message that Turkey was seriously
considering to give credit to the new order envisaged by the revisionists.
Within a year, when he saw that the course of the global conflict was gradually removing
Turkey out of the scope of belligerent powers, this time İnönü decided to lift the pressures on
non-Muslims in the country to the extent of abolishing the working camps. It was also
declared that the taxpayers would pay their debts without leaving their homes.
In 1944, when the Soviet armies were gaining victories Ankara then turned against the
Pan-Turanists. This was clearly a message to the Kremlin which underscored that Turkey
would not allow the ultra-nationalists to act freely in the country.
Despite the fact that Ankara’s balancing attitude was also being shaped by the course of
international affairs, in general terms, Turkish foreign policy was oriented towards the Allied
side during these years. In a larger framework of analysis, Ankara’s responsiveness against
the fluctuations in international politics cannot necessarily be evaluated as deviation from
Atatürkist foreign policy. While the first years of the Republic were marked by avoidance of
alliances except for engaging in regional pacts such as the Balkan Pact Pact of 1934 and the
Saadabad Pact of 1936, there were no alliance blocs in between world wars either.
As for the flexibility in İnönü’s foreign policy during WW II and after, Atatürkist foreign
policy had never ruled out such a policy course. Atatürk’s policy was just as flexible in the
Mousul issue, because Turkey needed reconciliation with Great Britain in 1926, as it was
forward with the French over the contested issue of Hatay (the Sanjak of Alexandretta)
between 1936 and 1938. Atatürk considered war as a criminal act unless it was undertaken
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for defense of the country. Therefore, there is no reason to expect that Atatürk would have
followed a different path from İnönü had he been alive during WW II.
Under these circumstances, the development of Turkish democracy, basically had its roots
in Ankara’s wish for joining the Western democratic camp. While the difference between the
Western democracies and the Eastern bloc was crystallizing, Ankara moved quickly to put its
domestic affairs in order. The first elections in 1946 were not a succesful attempt in this
respect since rumours of Ankara’s  manipulation of elections were widespread in the country.
Apparently, the postelection government was at odds between pursuing a more liberal
attitude towards the opponents of the regime in Turkey and closing of ranks against the
external danger. Initially, it was aimed to develop a middle-way approach to conciliate these
policies, which soon proved to be in vain. Again, İnönü felt a necessity to bring Ankara’s
foreign policy in line with the basic trends in the Western grouping of the states and a strong
anti-Communist policy adopted by the government became dominant. From then on, this
closing of ranks against the SU affected particularly the left wing of the political spectrum.
The Turkish forces were also increasingly deployed against a threat which might possibly
be generated from the SU. Even after 1944, when the SU preferred the preservation of
Turkey’s non-belligerent status and tried to give assurances of its good intentions, alarmed by
the vigilance and assertiveness the Soviets demonstrated, military exercises were regularly
held in Eastern Anatolia. Here, the troop movements on a large scale were a clear indication
of Ankara’s threat perception from the Red Army, which the Turkish General Staff
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considered that might attempt to exploit the chaotic international situation to grasp the long
disputed provinces in this region. 343
In the aftermath of the war, Turkey was indeed at a turning point. It was increasingly felt
in the power corridors of Ankara that maintaining an alliance with Britain and the USA was
of utmost importance. Meanwhile, in 1945, in line with the opinion of some British
statesmen and officials, the British Minister for Board of Trade, Harold Wilson, pointed out
in his speech in the House Commons, that the 1939 mutual assistance treaty between Britain,
France and Turkey was still in force, and could be utilized as a proper basis to strengthen
relations with Ankara. Britain’s acknowledgement of the 1939 was an encouragement to the
Turks. It was, however, soon understood by İnönü that British efforts were overwhelmingly
focused on the Middle East.
In its turn, the USA was not in favor of expanding the scope of the 1939 treaty either.
Until the Truman Doctrine Washington had thought that Turkey was in Britain’s area of
responsibility. It was the Truman Doctrine that marked a complete change in the US
perception of Turkey. With a view to the attempts of the Kremlin in the region, in fact,
Washington was mainly interested in Greece and Turkey and to some extent in Iran. It was
considered that Greece was the country that was under siege while Turkey was relatively
quiet.
Thus, in the aftermath of the Marshall Aid, Ankara’s efforts to achieve a
Mediterranean/Middle Eastern security organization either as proposed by London along the
                    
343 As told by, Retd. Col. Şükrü Erkal, Research Specialist in TGS, Directorate of Military History
and Strategic Research, in a personal interview.
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lines of 1939 treaty or in another form, proved to be unfruitful. Because, the US neither dealt
with the 1939 treaty nor did it react to suggestions for a Mediterranean pact.
Even after the Turkish participation in the Korean War, Washington had not decided to
give its support to Turkey’s adherence to NATO. In September 1950, the US JCS was still
arguing that the inclusion of Greece and Turkey to NATO could adversely affect the progress
which was achieved. The JCS then asserted that the inclusion of these states would cause a
problem in concerting military planning and actions in the Middle East and the
Mediterranean with those in progress in Western Europe. Therefore, the JCS offered to give
these countries associate status by which their representatives would participate in
coordinated planning against any Soviet attack.
Undoubtedly, Ankara’s exclusion from NATO as a founding member and consecutively,
the rejection of its two formal applications caused both anxiety and disturbance in the Turkish
Government. The second application of the Turkish Government was made in August 1950,
following the Menderes Government’s decision of contributing troops to the UN Command
in Korea. However, to the chagrin of Ankara, the Council of NATO declined this application
on the grounds of its smaller members’ unwillingness to make commitments for the defense
of Turkey.
Turkish foreign policy deviated from its traditional path, with the DP’s decision to send
troops to the Korean War. But even then, this was for the purpose of relaying the message to
the West that Turkey was ready to assume and was capable of conducting military
undertakings. This was plausibly to erase its image of an “evasive neutral” during the WW
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II, as well as to use this opportunity to prove its commitment to Western values with the
ultimate aim of being accepted as a member in the Western Alliance.
Against this background of events, the conditions of the Cold War dictated its own
requirements in Turkey’s relations with the Western security camp. Through its participation
in the Korean War and in the military/diplomatic efforts aiming at forming a defensive
grouping in the Middle East, Ankara had demonstrated that it had all the assets to assume the
role of a reliable ally. Ultimately, backed by the US evaluation that Turkey’s geostrategic
position was of tremendous value for the alliance, the difficulties caused by the resistance of
the European members of the NATO were gradually overcome. In fact, this time, the US
leading role in the alliance was forcing the American military planners to make
recommendations for the inclusion of Turkey in NATO. The listening stations in Turkey and
the intelligence gathered by the U-2s based on Turkish territory would soon provide the US
with an efficient system of monitoring the Soviets; a regular reconnaissance activity which
would otherwise cost tens of million dollars to the USA. 344
For Turkey, the years 1950 to 1952 marked the end of an era and the beginning of
another. The Turkish position in the Cold War was first consolidated in the same period.
Eventually, Turkey placed itself in the western camp with its previleges and no doubt, with
accompanying duties, and problems arising thereof.
                    
344 As told by George Harris in a personal interview.
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